From Welfare to Wedlock: Marriage Promotion and Poor Mothers’ Inequality

Gwendolyn Mink

For the past several years, marriage has figured prominently in debates about welfare. The idea of government as dating service or matchmaker doesn’t seem to resonate widely with the public, yet the idea that welfare policy should encourage or pressure poor single mothers into marriages nevertheless has bewitched policymakers of all political stripes. During the 107th Congress (2001–2003), marriage promotion1

provisions figure prominently in welfare reauthorization proposals touted by Senators Hillary Clinton and Joe Lieberman as well as by President George Bush and the marriage moguls in his party and administration.

The seeming irresistibility of the call to marry poor mothers off of welfare is patent evidence of the precariousness of both feminism and democracy. Evidence of a dangerous assault on the rights of unmarried mothers who need welfare, efforts to use income policy to promote marriage directly contradict the intimate decisional rights that extended late-twentieth-century democratization into the personal sphere.

It was , the famous antimiscegenation case decided in 1967, that definitively establishedLoving v. Virginia the significance of intimate associational liberty to our equality as citizens. Asserting the national citizenship rights of individuals against race-based state laws restricting marital freedom, the Court in shifted theLoving axis of marital decision making from government to adult individuals—at least for heterosexuals. Before

, laws governing access to legally valid marriage, relationships within marriage, as well as the status ofLoving marital bonds accomplished government’s cultural, moral, eugenic, racial, and patriarchal regulation of the citizenry. With , however, government’s power to police and to stratify the adult citizenry byLoving conferring marital status on some intimate partnerships while withholding it from others declined, though only for heterosexuals.

Although most importantly established the right to marry a partner of one’s (heterosexual) choosingLoving regardless of race, the decision also incorporated the right as a core element of the fundamentalnot to marry right at stake in the case. Soon after , the Court applied heightened constitutional protection to the2 Loving right to be -married when it held that the right to dissolve a marriage could not be conditioned on thenot ability to pay court costs and related fees and when it ruled that the right to receive welfare benefits could3

not be limited to families in which parents were “ceremonially married.” Both cases involved welfare4

recipients, so both decisions explicitly extended fundamental intimate associational rights across the divides of class and poverty.

Loving was first and foremost a decision against racial regulation of intimacy, demography, and citizenship. But especially in noticing that the right to marry includes the right not to, and its progenyLoving carried special significance for women. Intimate associational liberty implies a collateral right to maintain an independent household even if outside patriarchal, marital norms. It establishes a right to exit from perhaps unhappy, perhaps violent, marital relationships. And it disentangles reproductive choices from the marital circumstances in which they are made. We may mostly think of reproductive liberty in terms of the right notC

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to bear children; and we may mostly think of marital freedom in terms of the right to get married. But Loving and related decisions that democratized person-hood established also that we can bear children and not be married and—because each right is fundamental—we can do both at the same time.

Yet, despite judicial signals that the choice to not marry or to unmarry were among the intimate associational liberties at the core of democratic personhood, government continues to treat marriage as a necessary condition of worthy adult citizenship. Indeed, in 1996, Congress enacted two new laws deploying marriage to stratify citizenship. One of the new laws, the Defense of Marriage Act, stringently limits the rights and benefits of intimate association by defining marriage as a union between “one man and one woman.” The other law, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA), injures or disables poor single mothers’ basic civil rights because they are not married. One law withholds from lesbians and gay men the right to become marital citizens; the other punishes poor single mothers for not choosing marital citizenship.

I want to explore, here, how the federal government wields its power over certain women who are not married and what that means for equality. Feminist and other advances in the late twentieth century have enabled many women to defer, avoid, or exit from marriages, sometimes without suffering opprobrium. For women with children, however, such choices exact heavy costs: single mothers pay for their intimate decisions with their material security and with their rights. Government argues “child well-being” to justify its interventions into the associational autonomy of single mothers—especially if they are poor. Wielding the choice to bear children against the choice to not marry, government delivers some of the most severe blows to women’s equality. One need only examine welfare policy, which aims to end unmarried mothers’ marital status rather than their poverty, to see how.

MARRIAGE PROMOTION UNDER THE 1996 WELFARE LAW

Let me turn now to the Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) program, which the Personal Responsibility Act created when it “reformed” welfare in 1996. In its famous “findings,” the TANF provision of the PRWORA blames countless social ills on black single mothers; in its statement of purpose, TANF policy pledges to promote marriage, reduce out-of-wedlock births, and to “encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families.”5

Toward these ends, TANF subjects single mothers to work rules that deprive them of the right and the flexibility to make parenting decisions about the care needs of their children. It subjects them to paternity disclosure rules that vitiate their sexual and reproductive privacy. It subjects them to family formation rules, which confer social and financial fatherhood on biological fathers (and instantiate their legal rights) regardless of a mother’s say. In these ways and more, TANF punishes single motherhood, endangering the physical, emotional, and material security of poor mothers and their children, jeopardizing poor mothers’ custody of their own children, and negating their right to form intimate associations on their own terms.

Governmental interference in intimate life—especially in the formation of families through marriage—has almost always forwarded dominant societal and governmental goals for racial and gender order. That’s what antimiscegenation laws were all about. That’s what coverture was all about. That’s what countless immigration and naturalization laws were all about, laws that restricted the entry of wives and women, or that stripped U.S. women of citizenship if they married noncitizen men.

TANF recapitulates the racialized, undemocratic, patriarchal tradition in its pronouncements and punishments regarding childbearing and child rearing by single mothers. Marriage serves several functions in TANF: it privatizes poverty, it reaffirms patriarchy, and it spotlights women of color as moral failures.Cop

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Noting the color of welfare and the color of nonmarital mothers who are poor, TANF proponents attribute the need for welfare to the moral or cultural deficits of racialized individuals rather than to racialized opportunities and economic conditions. For example, the , published by the House Ways6 2000 Green Book and Means Committee, proclaimed in retrospect: TANF stakes itself to “the perspicacity of Moynihan’s vision” that “black Americans [are] held back economically and socially in large part because their family structure [is] deteriorating.” According to this argument, single-mother poverty arises from single mothers’7

failure to choose marriage; in turn, the failure to marry is a measure of single mothers’ impoverished citizenship.

Under the 1996 welfare law, TANF’s most extensive efforts to push mothers into heterosexual families headed by fathers arise from its child support and paternity establishment requirements affecting mothers. These provisions do not go so far as to compel marriage or residential co-parenting, but they do require mothers to maintain association with biological fathers (so that they can inform on them!) even if mothers do not want biological fathers involved with their children. Under the paternity establishment provision, a mother must disclose the identity of her child’s biological father or must permit the government to examine her sex life so that it can discover the DNA paternal match for her child. Under the child support enforcement provision, a mother must help government locate her child’s biological father so that the government can collect reimbursement from him for the mother’s TANF benefit. A mandatory minimum sanction against families in which mothers do not cooperate in establishing paternity or collecting child support enforces government’s determination that a biological reproductive nexus constitutes a social family.

Numerous other TANF provisions and guidelines promote marriage either directly or by discouraging women from bearing children if they are not married. For example, executive branch guidelines for TANF implementation reward states for promoting marriage. Both the Clinton and Bush administrations have awarded TANF “high-performance bonuses” to states that most increase the percentage of children living in married-parent families. Moreover, Department of Health and Human Services guidelines specifically tell states that, given the purposes of TANF, they can develop pro-marriage policies with TANF funds. As a8

result, several states have used TANF funds to disseminate the pro-marriage message, to provide marriage classes, or to reward actual marriage in the structure of TANF benefits (as does West Virginia through $100 monthly bonuses for TANF families in which parents are married).

Another provision of the 1996 welfare law gave incentives to states to reduce “illegitimacy.” The “illegitimacy bonus” provided extra money to states that achieve the greatest reductions in nonmarital births without increasing their abortion rates. The bonus gave states a green light to interfere in unmarried9

women’s intimate family decisions, including reproductive decisions—such as by offering bonuses to unmarried pregnant women who agree to relinquish their babies at childbirth; by pressuring unmarried pregnant recipients to marry; or by encouraging or rewarding long-term contraception by unmarried women who are poor.

Abstinence-only education is yet another prong of the federal effort to prevent childbearing by unmarried women. This provision of the 1996 welfare law pays states to teach “groups which are most likely to bear children out-of-wedlock” that “sexual activity outside the context of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects” and that one should “attain . . . self-sufficiency before engaging in sexual activity.”10

These and other TANF provisions compromise poor mothers’ rights, more so if they never have been married. The rights compromised include intimate association, reproductive and sexual privacy rights, not to mention the right to parent one’s own children. These rights abuses are not the haphazard detritus of welfare policy. Rather, they are the arsenal of marriage promotion among poor women with children. To all mothers who might want to choose nonmarriage, and to mothers who are barred from marriage because their partners

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are women, TANF’s rights abuses send an unmistakable warning to find a man and stand by him. To mothers who are unmarried and poor—disproportionately mothers of color—TANF’s rights abuses teach that the only path out of poverty is through marriage or marriage-like financial association with biological fathers. In these ways, welfare policy makes unmarried mothers’ economic insecurity an opportunity for public intervention in private choice and an excuse for impoverishing unmarried mothers’ citizenship.

TIGHTENING THE KNOT

The 1996 welfare law was plenty heavy-handed in promoting marriage and punishing mothers’ independence, but interest currently abounds among policymakers to make that heavy hand even stronger. Although TANF has been in effect for only five years, the need to reauthorize its federal funding has created an occasion to stiffen the marriage lever in welfare policy. Many other issues are on the table as well, ranging from how much to spend on welfare to whether to allow adult recipients to go to school to how much work should be required. Views on these matters vary across the political spectrum. Less varied are views about TANF’s role in engineering marital family formation. Among conservatives, moderates, and even among liberals can be found proposals to augment TANF’s capacity to promote marriage and fatherhood, as well as to prevent sex and reproduction outside of marriage.

One goal of the family formation agenda is to make fathers pay for families. As Senator Evan Bayh put it in the Democratic Leadership Council’s magazine, “We . . . have to make specific demands ofBlueprint American men. . . . Do not bring children into the world until you are prepared to support them.” Another11

goal, as Will Marshall, president of the DLC’s Progressive Policy Institute stated it in , is toBlueprint promote marriage as a way of choking off independent or nonmarital childbearing, which he calls the “ ‘feeder system’ for both welfare and child poverty.” Still a third goal of the family formation agenda is to12

return poor mothers and their children to the patriarchal family by withholding economic security unless they do so.

The most extreme calls to turn welfare into a marital family formation policy come, not surprisingly, from the Republican right wing. Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, for example, has urged policymakers to set aside $1 billion in TANF funds annually for marriage promotion activities, to offer incentives and rewards to parents who marry, and to create an affirmative action program in public housing for married couples.13

Another leading proponent of fatherhood and marriage is Wade Horn, the Bush administration’s assistant secretary of Health and Human Services for welfare, who supports such proposals as rewarding women “at risk of bearing a child out of wedlock” with annual payments of $1,000 for five years if they bear their first child within marriage and stay married.14

President Bush’s proposal for TANF reauthorization, not surprisingly, advances the family formation agenda. One of the statutory goals of the 1996 welfare law is to encourage the formation and maintenance of two-parent families. The Bush plan would amend and extend that goal “to encourage the formation and maintenance of healthy two-parent married families and responsible fatherhood.” It goes on to redirect the $100 million “illegitimacy bonus” to fund research and demonstration projects “primarily directed at building strong families, reducing out-of-wedlock pregnancies and promoting healthy marriages.” It also redirects $100 million in “high-performance bonus” funds to support state-level promarriage activities. It further requires states to end “discrimination” against two-parent married families enrolled in TANF—for example, by applying the same work rules to single mothers that apply jointly to parents in married families. Finally, the Bush proposal requires states to submit marriage promotion plans as a condition of receiving a TANF block grant. These state plans would have to provide explicit descriptions of state marriage promotionCop

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activities. They also would have to establish annual numerical goals for marriage so that the federal government can measure the success of state efforts.15

In addition, Bush administration proposals related to TANF call for $20 million in grants to faith-based and community groups to “encourage and help fathers to support their families and avoid welfare, improve fathers’ ability to manage family business affairs, and encourage and support healthy marriages and married fatherhood.” The Bush budget for 2002, meanwhile, earmarked $135 million for abstinence-only16

education—a 33 percent increase over current spending—to forward the goal of two-parent family formation by preventing nonmarital pregnancy and childbearing.17

The Bush marriage proposals were included in H.R. 4737, the Republican TANF reauthorization bill, that passed the House of Representatives in May 2002. Although the vote on the bill followed party lines, more or less, support for making marital family formation a component of welfare policy abounds in both parties. Bipartisan efforts to link poverty reduction to marriage have been working their way through Congress since 1998. Beginning with the first “Fathers Count Act” in 1998, proposals have encouraged residential fatherhood, often without considering the custodial mother’s wishes, and they have promoted marriage. None of the family formation bills has yet become law, but they have been quite popular, passing the House of Representatives by thundering bipartisan majorities in 1999 and 2000.18

These bipartisan majorities span the political spectrum. In the 106th Congress, for example, Jesse Jackson Jr. (D-IL)—a leading progressive in the House of Representatives—introduced a fatherhood bill that emphasized marriage, while Benjamin Cardin (D-MD) joined with Nancy Johnson (R-CT) to sponsor legislation linking marriage to responsible fatherhood. In the 107th Congress, Julia Carson (D-IN)19

introduced H.R.1300, modeled on the Jackson bill, which calls for programs that

promote marriage through such activities as counseling, mentoring, disseminating information about the benefits of marriage . . . [and] that sustain marriages through marriage preparation programs, pre-marital counseling, marital inventories, skills-based marriage education, financial planning seminars, and divorce education and reduction programs, including mediation and counseling.20

Democratic sympathy for the family formation agenda shows up in several of the Democratic TANF reauthorization bills. In the Senate, Senators Evan Bayh (D-IN) and Tom Carper (D-DE) would reform TANF to promote marriage and “responsible fatherhood” through programs similar to those described in the Jackson and Carson bills, through pro-marriage media and education campaigns, and through related initiatives designed to convince parents to stay married. Other indications of Democratic interest in21

promoting marital family formation include provisions in Senator Jay Rockefeller’s TANF bill that encourage “the formation and maintenance of 2-parent families and healthy marriages and reduc[e] nonmarital births.”22

In the House of Representatives, a TANF bill sponsored by Congressman Cardin (D-MD), the ranking Democrat on the welfare subcommittee of the House Ways and Means Committee, would redirect the “illegitimacy bonus” into a “family formation fund” much as does the Bush proposal. Although the Cardin bill did not mention marriage per se, like the Bush proposal it would support research and demonstration projects “(i) promoting the formation of 2-parent families; (ii) reducing teenage pregnancies; and (iii) increasing the ability of non-custodial parents to financially support and be involved with their children.” The Democratic substitute, offered as an amendment to the Republican TANF bill on the floor of the House in the spring of 2002, repeated Cardin’s call for a “family formation fund” that would promote two-parent family life. Given the limited, heterosexual definition of family imposed on federal law by the Defense of Marriage Act, the Democrats’ legislative embrace of “2-parent families” in welfare policy lends a Democratic imprimatur to heterosexist and patriarchal intervention into poor mothers’ lives.C

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MARRIAGE PROMOTION AND WOMEN’S EQUALITY

The family formation agenda should not be confused with an agenda to support families. In fact, family formation provisions in both the Bush and the Bayh–Carper TANF reauthorization proposals go hand in hand with harsh new work requirements, while all of the proposals mentioned here continue to neglect the educational and wage opportunities that precondition economic security. Pure and simple, what the family formation agenda is about is engineering the structure of poor mothers’ families. It’s about Big Brother dictating what families should look like and about punishing families that don’t look “right” by privatizing their poverty. This threatens personal, cultural, and associational freedoms, not to mention the economic well-being of families that deviate from the prescriptive norm.

The rights won by women since the 1960s are at risk here. George Bush wants to “improve fathers’ ability to manage family business affairs.” Will Marshall and Daniel Lichter want to prevent unmarried women from having babies. Evan Bayh wants to teach men “not to bring children into the world” until they can pay for them. One way or another, perpetrators of marriage promotion designate marital fathers the kingpins of legitimate family life.

Think for a minute what this will do to women’s reproductive rights. These rights—especially the right to make choices about abortion—are grounded in the constitutional notion that —not husbands, notwomen boyfriends, not male sexual encounters, not sperm donors, but —get to decide whether or not to bear awomen child. But according to Senator Bayh, “bring children into the world.” Dressed in the appealing languagemen of “responsible fatherhood,” Bayh’s call for men to refrain from childbearing “until [they] are prepared to support” children gives biological fathers standing as childbearing decision makers and thereby imperils a right that is foundational to women’s equal and independent personhood.

Among fundamentalist patriarchalists, the argument that welfare policy should be about family formation is racially charged and gender-ideological; it turns on what conservatives call their “family values.” The conservative family formation agenda is predictable: it was central to their attack on welfare in the 1980s and 1990s, and it was constitutive of their plans for TANF. Among moderates and liberals, most of whom embrace gender and racial equality as their goals, the argument is more instrumental and accordingly more insidious. Often, it is linked to the observation that families with residential, marital fathers tend to be better off than families without them. As Daniel Lichter reported in the January issue of the DLC’s ,Blueprint “Only 6 percent of married couples with children are poor, compared with 36 percent of female-headed families.”23

The income disparity between married and mother-only families is not surprising, because married-parent families often have two incomes and because a father’s income is generally larger than a mother’s. Rarely does the marriage lobby compare the incomes of single-mother to single- families. In 2000,father gender-based income disparities among single-parent families consigned the majority of nonmarital female-headed families to economic distress and more than a third of them to abject poverty. Nonmarital male-headed families enjoyed far greater economic security, with fewer than 25 percent earning less than $20,000 annually and only 16 percent earning less than $15,000. Further, whereas a third of nonmarital male-headed families earned more than $50,000, only 15 percent of nonmarital female-headed families did so. Avoiding these facts permits the conclusion that it is family structure rather than inequality that makes24

and keeps single-mother families poor. Contemporary welfare reform instantiates marriage as the sine qua non of worthy citizenship. Except as a

warning, welfare reform has little bearing upon the rights or lives of childless adults or of unmarried parents who are not poor. But to be a poor and unmarried mother in the United States today is to be unworthy of full

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citizenship—to be deprived of the rights that have guaranteed equal personhood since .Loving We each do not stand on equal footing as participants and actors in public life if we each are not

guaranteed decisional autonomy and relational equity in private life and if we do not all share the same freedoms to form and sustain families of our own choosing. Given the long history of government’s gender and racial regulation of intimate life and the nexus among such regulation and political, economic, and cultural inequality, the struggle for intimate rights—to marry or not to, to bear children or not to, to parent our own children—has been a crucial dimension of race and gender democratization in the United States. Though stingy and disciplinary, welfare once contributed mightily to the struggle for intimate rights by enabling poor women to choose children, to parent them, and to do so while exiting or avoiding marriage. In contrast, welfare now expressly impedes nonmarital motherhood among poor women by withdrawing rights and enforcing poverty. Given the racially disparate distribution of poverty, welfare’s marriage vise restores the color line to intimate freedom that , in its day, took away.Loving 25

NOTES

This chapter originally appeared as an article in the 11, no. 3Journal of the Political Economy of the Good Society (2002), and is reprinted here by permission.

1. According to a poll conducted by Andrew Kohut of the Pew Research Center in late March 2002, by a margin of 79 to 18 percent, Americans said they preferred government to stay out of the business of promoting marriage. Reported in David Broder, “An Unlikely Marriage Broker,” , March 31, 2002, p. B7.Washington Post

2. , 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967).Loving v. Virginia 3. , 401 U.S. 371 (1971). See also , 409 U.S. 434, 444,Boddie et al. v. Connecticut United States v. Kras

distinguishing between unconstitutional state-imposed financial hurdles to divorce and constitutionally permissible bankruptcy filing fees.

4. , per curiam (1973).New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill 5. P.L. 104-193, Title I, Sec. 101, Sec. 401. 6. In 1999, in twenty-four states, women of color composed more than two-thirds of TANF enrollments. Relatedly,

the decline in welfare caseloads has been more pronounced among whites than among women of color. Meanwhile, the percentage of single-parent families among blacks (62.3 percent) is more than twice that among whites (26.6 percent), and the nonmarital birthrate is substantially higher among non–Hispanic blacks (73.4) and Latinas (91.4) than among whites (27). U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Ways and Means, 2000 Green Book: Overview of Entitlement

(106th Cong., 2d sess., Washington, D.C., 2000), 1238, 1239 (table G-4), 1521.Programs 7. U.S. House of Representatives, , 1519.2000 Green Book 8. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children and Families, Office of Family

Assistance, Helping Families Achieve Self-Sufficiency: Guide for Funding Services for Children and Families through the (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2000), 3, 19.TANF Program

9. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, , Sec. 403(a)(2).Helping Families 10. P.L. 104-193, Title IX, Sec. 912. 11. Evan Bayh, “Demanding Responsibility from Men,” (Washington, D.C.: DemocraticBlueprint Magazine

Leadership Council, January 22, 2002), at www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=250090&kaid=137&subid=258 (accessed January 22, 2002).

12. Will Marshall, “After Dependence,” (Washington, D.C.: Democratic Leadership Council,Blueprint Magazine January 22, 2002), at (accessed January 22, 2002).www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=250080&kaid=114&subid=143

13. Robert Rector, “Implementing Welfare Reform and Restoring Marriage,” in , ed. StuartPriorities for the President M. Butler and Kim Holmes (Washington, D.C.: Heritage Foundation, 2001), 71–97.

14. Wade Horn, “Wedding Bell Blues: Marriage and Welfare Reform,” 19, no. 3 (2001): 39–42.Brookings ReviewC op yr ig ht @ 2 00 3. R ow ma n & Li tt le fi el d Pu bl is he rs .

http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=250090&kaid=137&subid=258
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15. Bush Administration, (Washington, D.C.: Office of the President, February 26,Working Toward Independence 2002), 20, at (accessed Marchwww.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book.html 2002).

16. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, President’s Budget for HHS, FY 2003: Ensuring a Safe and (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, 2002), 84.Healthy America

17. U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, , 22–23.President’s Budget 18. U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 3073, (106th Cong., 1st Sess., Washington, D.C.,Fathers Count Act of 1999

1999); H.R. 4678, , Title V (106th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C., 2000).Child Support Distribution Act of 2000 19. U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 4671, (106th Cong., 2d sess.,The Responsible Fatherhood Act of 2000

Washington, D.C., 2000). 20. U.S. House of Representatives, H.R. 1300, (107th Cong., 1st Sess.,The Responsible Fatherhood Act of 2001

Washington, D.C., 2001), 469(D) (d) (2) (A). 21. U.S. Senate, S2524, , (107th Cong., 2d Sess., Washington, D.C., 2002); “TheThe Work and Family Act

Bayh/Carper ‘Work and Family Act’: An Outline for TANF Reauthorization” (Washington, D.C.: United States Senate), at bayh.senate.gov/~bayh/workandfambillsum.htm (accessed March 2002). See also U.S. Senate, S. 653, Responsible

(107th Cong., 1st sess., Washington, D.C., 2001).Fatherhood Act of 2001 22. U.S. Senate, S. 2052, Sec. 303, “Family Formation Fund,” (107th Cong., 2nd Sess., Washington, D.C., 2002),

(A)(i). 23. Daniel T. Lichter, “Promoting Marriage,” (Washington, D.C.: Democratic LeadershipBlueprint Magazine

Council, January 22, 2002), at (accessed Januarywww.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=250087&kaid=H4&subid=144 22, 2002).

24. Data gathered from U.S. Census Bureau, America’s Families and Living Arrangements: Population (June 2001), especially table 2: “Family Groups by Type and Selected Characteristics of the Family.”Characteristics

25. In 1999, 25.4 percent of non-Hispanic white single-mother families lived below the poverty line as compared to 46.1 percent of African American and 46.6 percent of Latina single-mother families. U.S. Census Bureau, Poverty in the

(Washington, D.C.: U.S. Census Bureau, 2000), table B-3.United States, 1999

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http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2002/02/welfare-reform-announcement-book.html
http://www.ndol.org/ndol_ci.cfm?contentid=250087&kaid=H4&subid=144

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