Doesn’t utilitarianism make us into cold calculators of the consequences of actions, without any concern for the inner qualities that motivated those actions?
Pg. 18-19: But is such attention to the general social good (“public utility”) really possible? On pg. 18, he makes what seems to be a very anti-Kantian claim: “…the motive has nothing to do with
_____________, though much to do with __________.”
Pg. 20-21: Another objection goes like this: Doesn’t utilitarianism make us into cold calculators of the consequences of actions, without any concern for the inner qualities that motivated those actions? Mill responds. What does he say such character qualities are relevant for, and what they are they irrelevant for, making an estimation of? (pg. 20)
Pg. 21-22: Mill addresses the objection that utilitarianism is a “godless doctrine.” On what grounds does he argue that it is actually “more profoundly religious than any other”?
Pg 23 top: On what grounds does Mill argue that telling a lie (even if you get away with it) does harm to oneself?
Pg. 23-25: Another objection: Isn’t it impossible to do all the ‘pleasure calculation’ one would need to do, in order to determine what actions one should take on a day-to-day basis? How is there time to do this? Mill’s response is very funny, but also very serious
