Literature review|Business Finance – Economics
Summary
I believe that mandatory attendance policies inhibit student learning and stifle instructor innovation. University students do not learn much from their garden-variety “chalk and talk” lecture-based courses. Substantial evidence indicates students learn very little from currently employed teaching methods. Eliminating mandatory attendance policies would alter student and instructor incentive structures and facilitate an improvement in faculty and student life satisfaction and student learning outcomes.
“Problem” or issue of concern
Mandatory attendance policies inhibit student learning and stifle instructor innovation. University students do not learn much from their garden-variety “chalk and talk” lecture-based courses. The vast majority of students “cram and forget” most material to which they are exposed in these courses. Students are not motivated to attend class and extract significant benefits from college courses in part because they are forced to attend class. Additionally, instructors fail to offer interesting and meaningful lectures and classroom exercises partly because professors protect themselves from competition by relying on mandatory attendance policies. I hypothesize that absent mandatory attendance policies: 1) students would be more likely to attend class; 2) students would be more likely to engage with course material in a more meaningful way thereby leading to improved learning outcomes; 3) instructors would improve their teaching methods; and, 4) instructors would focus on more interesting and fruitful course material and activities.
Literature review
Students do not learn much from taking the typical college course. The economics education literature supports this claim. Phillip Saunders (1980) conducted a study that compared “the performance of students who have taken a “typical” two-semester college course in introductory economics with the performance of similar students who [had] not taken such a course. The comparisons were made at three different times: (1) immediately after an introductory course in economics, when most students are sophomores; (2) two years after an introductory course in economics, when most students are seniors, (3) five years after students have graduated from college—some seven years after a sophomore economics course would have been taken” (p. 2). Saunders used a 33-question multiple-choice exam to measure the different levels of economics literacy between students who took a full year of economics principles courses and those who took no economics courses at all. He found that one year after completing an entire year of economics courses, students scored six points higher than students who did not take any economics courses. In other words, one year of coursework resulted in two more correct answers on a 33-question multiple-choice exam. Two years after completing the yearlong course sequence, students who completed it scored 4.76 points higher—meaning they answered roughly 1.3 more questions with correct answers. Saunders found that five years after students had graduated from college, those students who had taken an entire year of economics were able to answer one more question with a correct answer than those who never took an economics course during college. Furthermore, evidence indicates a downward trend in student learning. Employing measures similar to Saunders’, Greene, Stone, Yoho, & Zegey (2013) found that “student performance has declined significantly since 1968” (p. 9). Perhaps these disappointing outcomes are partly attributable to a lack of competitive pressures on instructors, a problem that dates back more than two centuries.
In The Wealth of Nations, the father of modern economics Adam Smith (1776) argued:
If in each college, the tutor or teacher, who was to instruct each student in all arts and sciences, should not be voluntarily chosen by the student, but appointed by the head of the college; and if, in case of neglect, inability, or bad usage, the student should not be allowed to change him for another, without leave first asked and obtained; such a regulation would not only tend very much to extinguish all emulation among the different tutors of the same college, but to diminish very much, in all of them, the necessity of diligence and of attention to their respective pupils. Such teachers, though very well paid by their students, might be as much disposed to neglect them, as those who are not paid by them at all or who have no other recompense but their salary.
If the teacher happens to be a man of sense, it must be an unpleasant thing to him to be conscious, while he is lecturing to his students, that he is either speaking or reading nonsense, or what is very little better than nonsense. It must, too, be unpleasant to him to observe, that the greater part of his students desert his lectures; or perhaps, attend upon them with plain enough marks of neglect, contempt, and derision. If he is obliged, therefore, to give a certain number of lectures, these motives alone, without any other interest, might dispose him to take some pains to give tolerably good ones.
Several different expedients, however, may be fallen upon, which will effectually blunt the edge of all those incitements to diligence. The teacher, instead of explaining to his pupils himself the science in which he proposes to instruct them, may read some book upon it; and if this book is written in a foreign and dead language, by interpreting it to them into their own, or, what would give him still less trouble, by making them interpret it to him, and by now and then making an occasional remark upon it, he may flatter himself that he is giving a lecture. The slightest degree of knowledge and application will enable him to do this, without exposing himself to contempt or derision, by saying any thing that is really foolish, absurd, or ridiculous. The discipline of the college, at the same time, may enable him to force all his pupils to the most regular attendance upon his sham lecture, and to maintain the most decent and respectful behaviour during the whole time of the performance.” (Smith, 1776, pp. 590-1)
The evidence regarding the effect of mandatory attendance policies on student learning appears to be mixed. On the one hand, there is a substantial body of evidence showing that extrinsic motivators (externally imposed rewards and punishments) crowd out intrinsic motivators and that intrinsically motivated students significantly outperform extrinsically motivated students across a wide variety of measurable outcomes (see Deci, Koestner, & Ryan (2001) and Bénabou & Tirole (2003)). On the other hand, the research on student attendance and its relationship to student performance on examinations indicate a positives relationship. Chen & Lin (2008) find that “the effect of attending lectures corresponds to a 9.4 percent to 18.0 percent improvement in exam performance for those who choose to attend classes” (p. 213). Marburger (2006) studied the effect of a mandatory attendance policy on exam performance of principles of economics students and found that “Although the attendance policy had virtually no effect on student performance in the first exam, the lack of an attendance policy increased the likelihood that a student would respond incorrectly to an exam question by 0.87 percent on the second exam and by 1.96 percent on the third exam” (pp. 153-4).
Incentive structures of major players: current
· Students want to attain satisfactory grades with minimal amount of effort and time expended.
· Instructors want to fulfill their teaching obligations with minimal effort and time expended.
Policy proposal
Eliminate the university attendance policy that states: “Students enrolled in freshman or sophomore level courses numbered 1000 or 2000 may during the spring and fall semester miss no more than twice the number of lectures, recitations, laboratory sessions, or other regularly scheduled class activities that would normally be scheduled during a week. Students who miss more than the maximum number of freshman or sophomore level classes may be assigned a grade of “F” for the course.” In addition, instructors should be prohibited from adopting and implementing mandatory attendance policies.
Incentive structures of major players: post-policy change
· Students will want to attain satisfactory grades with minimal effort & time expended, but some students’ motivation will be tilted toward intrinsic motivators as opposed to extrinsic motivators.
· Instructors will want to fulfill their teaching obligations with minimal effort & time expended, but some will also seek to minimize student absenteeism by improving their teaching effectiveness and incorporating lecture material which students find more interesting and fruitful.
Expected outcome of policy implementation
I expect the typical student will maintain their current performance, but that some students will improve their performance as measured by grades, class attendance, and degree completion. I also predict that some students will engage in deeper, more authentic learning activities. I also predict that while many professors will maintain their current level of performance, many will engage in instructor training programs and informal teaching effectiveness activities in order to improve their overall teaching effectiveness. I also predict that this policy will result in an overall improvement in student and instructor life satisfaction.
Proposed measures of policy effect
Student outcomes such as GPA, time to degree completion, and student retention could be used to measure the effect of the policy. In addition, student evaluations of instructors and general surveys of student and faculty life satisfaction can provide evidence on policy effects.
We can test for policy effectiveness by comparing GPA, time to degree completion, student retention rates, SEIs, and surveys of subjective well-being before and after policy implementation,
Criticisms
To be completed
Responses
To be completed
Conclusion
To be completed
