Mining and Corporate Social Responsibility: Newmont Mining Corporation
Lawrence (Larry) Kurlander, senior vice president and chief administrative officer of Newmont Mining Company, understood that, even with the most advanced technology, it would be impossible to extract precious metals without causing some damage to the environment. He also believed that Newmont Mining was doing its best to minimize that impact.
Historically, the mining industry does not have a good track record when it comes to environmental matters. Today, however, disasters are the industry exception rather than the rule, although they provide opponents to mining with attractive ammunition. [footnoteRef:1] [1: Kurlander, Lawrence T., Newmont Mining: The social license to operate, University of Colorado: Denver, Institute for International Business and Global Executive Forum, Center for International Business Education & Research October 2001 (http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/InternationalPrograms/CIBER/GlobalForumReports/Documents/Newmont_Mining_Social_License.pdf Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Newmont’s disaster came on June 2, 2000, when a truck leaked 151 kilograms of mercury from the company’s Yanacocha mine in Peru along a road that passed directly through several communities. In the town of Choropampa, more than 1,000 residents later fell ill from mercury poisoning.[footnoteRef:2] Shortly after the spill, Kurlander criticized mining opponents for engaging in “destructive rhetoric” that unfairly portrayed the company’s safety record and its commitment to working constructively with local communities. [2: Russell, Emily, Newmont faces federal suits over mercury spill, Business News Americas, June 5, 2002 (http://www.bnamericas.com/news/mining/Newmont_faces_federal_suits_over_mercury_spill Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Newmont has adopted a set of principles that cover human rights, health and education, local employment, community involvement, transparency, and accountability. Many of the company’s social programs are related to health and education, and the majority of jobs are filled from the local population. [footnoteRef:3] [3: Kurlander, Lawrence T., Newmont Mining: The social license to operate, University of Colorado: Denver, Institute for International Business and Global Executive Forum, Center for International Business Education & Research October 2001 (http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/InternationalPrograms/CIBER/GlobalForumReports/Documents/Newmont_Mining_Social_License.pdf Accessed January 22, 2011)]
In an effort to set the record straight, Kurlander agreed to represent the company in a formal investigation of the spill. It proved a turning point for Kurlander, who, after years of “preaching that…we’re guardians of the environment,” suddenly discovered that “we’re not.” He later said it felt like someone had hit him “in the stomach real hard.”[footnoteRef:4] [4: Bergman, Lowell, Frontline World, Episode 404 Transcript, October 2005 (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/episodes/404_transcript.html Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Background
Peru
Peru’s mining history can be traced back to the Inca Empire when gold and silversmiths used “various elaborate metalworking techniques” to create exquisite objects reserved exclusively for elite members of Incan society.[footnoteRef:5] When the Spaniards arrived in the early 16th century, they “marveled at the technology and wealth of the Incas.”[footnoteRef:6] However, within a few years, the Inca would be decimated by a smallpox epidemic that claimed the lives of millions of indigenous inhabitants across the Americas. Many of those who survived were enslaved by the Spanish and forced to work in gold and silver mines. [5: Horz, G. & Kallfass, M. 2000. The treasure of gold and silver artifacts from the Royal Tombs of Sipan, Peru: a study on the Moche metalworking techniques. Materials Characterization, 45, 391-420.] [6: Somervill, B. A. 2009. Empire of the Incas, Chelsea House Pub.]
When the Spanish crown outlawed slavery, Peru became the first colony to rise up in insurrection in 1544. Since then, Peru has seen numerous wars and insurrections over indigenous rights and natural resources. Among the many uprisings that occurred during Spanish occupation, the most famous was the Tupac Amaru rebellion in 1780.[footnoteRef:7] [7: The insurrection led by José Gabriel Tupac Amaru II, who claimed to be a descendant of the last remaining Inca rulers, was suppressed by the colonial army. After his execution in 1781, Tupac Amaru II became an important symbol in the struggle for indigenous rights. Leon, G. C. 1976. The Army of Peru and the Túpac Amaru Revolt, 1780-1783. The Hispanic American Historical Review, 56, 31-57]
Peru’s independence from Spain in 1821 did little to quell the violence. The most recent civil war occurred in the 1980s during the rise of the Shining Path Maoist guerilla movement, which purportedly “fought in the name of Peru’s poor” and was often (incorrectly) identified as an indigenous movement. In reality, the Shining Path demonstrated open hostility toward indigenous traditions, values, and customs, banning traditional religious and spiritual practices, replacing tribal elders with people’s councils, and kidnapping children to be fighters in the liberation army. At the same time, government troops routinely attacked rural villages, killing “all inhabitants” to avoid witnesses to human rights abuses.[footnoteRef:8] [8: Garcia, M. 2005. Making indigenous citizens: identities, education, and multicultural development in Peru, Stanford Univ Pr.]
The demise of the Shining Path in 1992 brought about significant economic improvement. Rural industries that had been depressed by the insurgency, such as mining and agriculture, saw the greatest improvements.
Mining accounted for as much as half of Peru’s export earnings, but generated little employment, while agriculture was weighed down by low wages. As a result, the country’s economic wealth tended to be concentrated in the hands of the fortunate few and only served to exacerbate the disparity between rich and poor.
In 2000, Peru’s then President Fujimori fled Peru amid a corruption scandal and mounting disaffection with his authoritarian policies. In the years that followed, Peru saw its greatest economic improvement in decades, with average annual growth of 4.6 percent. The rate of growth accelerated further in 2005 to 6.3 percent. Much of the country’s newfound wealth was reflected in increasing consumption by urban dwellers. For example, new car sales surged by 48 percent in 2005. The country’s recent growth and stability helped reduce overall poverty by about 3 percent, but again the effect was mainly limited to large cities, with Lima seeing the largest improvement.[footnoteRef:9] [9: Riordan, J. T. 2003. Attacking Poverty: A Market Approach, Universidad del Pacífico, Centro de Investigación.]
Rural development was constrained by a general lack of infrastructure. Only 14 percent of the country’s roads were paved, and most of its paved roads remained in a state of disrepair. Instead of upgrading its existing road system, the government focused on new projects, such as a highway system between Peru and Brazil.
Newmont Mining Corporation
Founded in 1916, Denver, Colorado-based Newmont Mining Corporation quickly grew to become one of the world’s leading mining companies, with key interests in gold and copper. Newmont had more than 35,000 employees on five continents. In 2009, the company posted record revenues of $7.7 billion on sales of 6.5 million ounces of gold and 507 million pounds of copper.[footnoteRef:10] Its stated values included “leadership in safety, stewardship of the environment and social responsibility” (See Exhibits 1 & 2).[footnoteRef:11] [10: Source: Company at a Glance, Newmont Mining Corporation (http://www.newmont.com/about/company-glance Accessed February 22, 2011)] [11: Source: About Newmont, Newmont Mining Corporation (http://www.newmont.com/about/history Accessed February 22, 2011)]
The Yanacocha Gold Mine
Newmont was the majority shareholder in the Yanacocha gold mine in Cajamarca, Peru, believed to be the second largest gold mine in the world (see Exhibit 3). Located on 27,000 hectares of land at an altitude of more than 13,000 feet, the Yanacocha project began in 1993 with the forced relocation of 26 families from farms and ranches to the city of Cajamarca, approximately 30 miles to the south.
Newmont requested international development assistance to cover initial capital expenditures, receiving a 5 percent equity investment from the International Finance Corporation (IFC) of the World Bank. As a condition of the investment, Yanacocha had to meet IFC guidelines in areas such as health and safety, water resources and quality, natural ecosystems, handling of hazardous materials, worker safety, reclamation and closure. In addition, “significant assistance was provided [to displaced families] through relocation assistance, priority hiring, production intensification on remaining land, and participation in various assistance programs administered by the Company’s rural development program.”[footnoteRef:12] [12: Summary of Project Information, International Finance Corporation, The World Bank Group (http://www.ifc.org/ifcext/spiwebsite1.nsf/0/F0235F25F6B14D50852576C10080D11B Accessed February 22, 2011)]
Reclamation typically involved backfilling exhausted open pit mines with waste rock from newer sites. The old site was then graded, capped, and revegetated. However, Peru’s fragile alpine ecosystem made reclamation difficult and costly. Even the most ambitious reclamation projects had limited success in returning open pit mines to productive non-mining uses.[footnoteRef:13] [13: Riehm, D. J. 2002. High altitude reclamation at the Antamina Mine, Peru. B.C. Mine Reclamation Symposium 2002. Dawson Creek, British Columbia: The University of British Columbia]
Although Cajamarca was the fastest growing state in Peru at 7 percent annual growth, Yanacocha generated few employment opportunities for local residents. In 1996, it required only 100 workers to produce $300 million in gold. In addition, most available positions required education and skills that area residents lacked.[footnoteRef:14] In many parts of rural Peru, more than 30 percent of the population was illiterate.[footnoteRef:15] In Cajamarca, more than 77 percent of the region’s population lived below the poverty line, and chronic malnutrition in children increased from 38.7 percent to 42.8 percent between 1996 and 2000.[footnoteRef:16] [14: McMahon, G. 1998. Mining and the Community: Results of the Quito Conference, World Bank, Energy, Mining and Telecommunications Department. April 1998] [15: Chirinos, A. 1997. An experience of indigenous literacy in Peru. Indigenous Literacies in the Americas: Language Planning from the Bottom Up, 251–266] [16: Zegarra, P. M. A. 2004. Impacts Of Minera Yanacocha’s Activities on Water Resources and the Affirmation Of Citizen Rights, Grupo de Formación e Intervención Para el Desarrollo Sostenible, Cajamarca – Perú (http://openfsm.net/projects/destinoamazonia/articles-varies/Derecho-al-Agua-y-Mineria-English.doc Accessed February 23, 2011)]
The Choropampa Incident
On June 2, 2000, a truck left the Yanacocha mine carrying several large containers of elemental mercury that were to be exported to Spain for use in thermometers and other devices. As the truck wound its way down the dusty mountain roads on its way to the city of Lima, several of the poorly secured containers fell over and began to spill their contents onto the road. The driver stopped in the small town of Choropampa to rest. By the time he resumed his journey, 151 kilograms of mercury had been spilt along 25 miles of roadside.[footnoteRef:17] Many of the residents of Choropampa, who had never seen elemental mercury, believed it to be some valuable metal from the mine. Others thought it has medicinal value. Children played with and tasted the shiny silver beads. [17: Final Report on the Risk Assessment of the Mercury Spill in Northern Peru, Shepherd Miller, November 2002 (http://www.kusko.org/documents/3.%20Mining/Risk%20Assesment%20on%20Mercury%20Spill.pdf Accessed February 22, 2011)]
As soon as it discovered the spill, the mine offered residents $30 per kilogram to collect the mercury, usually with their bare hands. Later, it hired a team of day laborers to conduct a more thorough cleanup, but failed to provide workers with protective clothing or training in the safe handling of mercury. Mine employees, like toxicologist Michael Kosnett, went on Peruvian television to assure people that the mercury was not dangerous. “Once someone is removed from exposure,” he said, “we would expect their symptoms to resolve within a matter of weeks; maybe at most a month or so.”
If they are not ill now, it is not the case that they have a risk of becoming ill in the future. For example, there is no future risk of developing cancer. They don’t have to be worried about their risk to have healthy children in the future. They wouldn’t develop problems a year from now or two years from now because of what happened recently, as long as they are no longer exposed and the mercury is cleaned up, which has happened.[footnoteRef:18] [18: Cabellos, Ernesto and Stephanie Boyd, Choropampa: The Price of Gold (film), Icarus Films, New York, 2002]
Kosnett’s assurances conflicted with the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), which warned that “elemental mercury is a hazardous metal that can cause serious health problems” including “tremors; emotional changes (e.g., mood swings, irritability, nervousness, excessive shyness); insomnia; neuromuscular changes (such as weakness, muscle atrophy, twitching); headaches; disturbances in sensations; changes in nerve responses; performance deficits on tests of cognitive function. At higher exposures there may be kidney effects, respiratory failure and death.”[footnoteRef:19] Even “a relatively small amount at room temperature in an enclosed space can evaporate and result in dangerous levels of mercury vapor,” the agency warned. [19: Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency (http://www.epa.gov/mercury/effects.htm Accessed February 22, 2011)]
[It] can continue to evaporate slowly over time, resulting in elevated concentrations of mercury in the air, thus presenting the threat of chronic exposure. Symptoms of chronic exposure to elemental mercury include personality changes (irritability, shyness, nervousness); tremors; vision changes; deafness; lack of muscle coordination; loss of sensation; and memory difficulties.[footnoteRef:20] [20: U.S. EPA Mercury Response Guidebook (http://www.epa.gov/hg/spills/ Accessed February 23, 2011)]
In the United States, spills as small as a few grams, such as those caused by broken medical devices, required an EPA decontamination response (see Exhibit 4).
Not surprisingly, more than 1,000 residents of Choropampa were sickened by the mercury, which caused “blindness, neurological damage, memory loss, muscular pain and other health problems.”[footnoteRef:21] Environmental consultants hired by Newmont in 2002 determined that several kilograms of mercury remained unaccounted for and would likely find its way into the nearby Jequetepeque River watershed,[footnoteRef:22] which provided water to 3,000 families and irrigation for 15,000 hectares of farmland.[footnoteRef:23] [21: Hecht, Peter, Peasants in Peru near showdown on mercury spill, Miami Herald, March 5, 2005 (http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=1384 Accessed February 22, 2011)] [22: Final Report on the Risk Assessment of the Mercury Spill in Northern Peru, Shepherd Miller, November 2002 (http://www.kusko.org/documents/3.%20Mining/Risk%20Assesment%20on%20Mercury%20Spill.pdf Accessed February 22, 2011)] [23: Ramirez, M. 2007. Andean system on basins: Watershed profiles. Enhancing agricultural water productivity through strategic research, International Potato Center, Lima, Peru, pp. 77-78]
Immediately after the spill, President Alberto Fujimori declared that the mining company and the transportation company would be held accountable. Luisa Cuculiza, Peruvian minister for women’s affairs, traveled to Choropampa to assure victims that the government was doing everything in its power to return the community to health. “I am here to personally ensure that no one remains ill,” she told a crowd in the Choropampa town square. “The president sent me here to tell you to not trust lawyers, because the best lawyer is your president. And the president always keeps his word.”[footnoteRef:24] [24: Cabellos, Ernesto and Stephanie Boyd, Choropampa: The Price of Gold (film), Icarus Films, New York, 2002]
Several months later, President Fujimori fled Peru amidst a corruption scandal that included links to mining interests. He was later sentenced to more than 30 years in prison for embezzlement, extrajudicial killings, and abuse of power. The Choropampa spill not only became a symbol of the social and environmental cost of the Yanacocha mine, but “a rallying cry for demonstrations against several foreign mining interests over alleged negative social and environmental impacts and political corruption.”[footnoteRef:25] [25: Hecht, Peter, Peasants in Peru near showdown on mercury spill, Miami Herald, March 5, 2005 (http://www.minesandcommunities.org/article.php?a=1384 Accessed February 22, 2011)]
The Social License
The mercury spill “served as a wakeup call for us,” Kurlander told a group of executives in 2001.
It made us realize that our relationship with the local people needed rebuilding. However, in a society where distrust is the rule rather than the exception, this was not something we could undertake on our own. [footnoteRef:26] [26: Kurlander, Lawrence T., Newmont Mining: The social license to operate, University of Colorado: Denver, Institute for International Business and Global Executive Forum, Center for International Business Education & Research October 2001 (http://www.ucdenver.edu/academics/InternationalPrograms/CIBER/GlobalForumReports/Documents/Newmont_Mining_Social_License.pdf Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Kurlander worked with the Compliance Advisor/Ombudsman (CAO) for the World Bank’s International Finance Corporation (IFC) to review the company’s mining practices and safety procedures in Peru. As the investigative team began to undertake their audit, Kurlander assured investors that Newmont would act in a socially responsible way.
We’ve long prided ourselves on our ability to engage in continuous improvement in our operations – lowering costs and increasing efficiency. The same continuous improvement is now being applied to areas of social responsibility as we set goals for ourselves and continually measure our performance against those goals.[footnoteRef:27] [27: Ibid.]
However, the audit revealed that Newmont’s mining operations in Peru met neither U.S. nor Peruvian mining standards. “There were water issues, there were air issues, there were road issues, there were health issues – all arising out of the mining operation,” Kurlander explained (see Exhibit 5). He also warned that Newmont executives could be subject to “criminal prosecution and imprisonment” for the company’s actions in Peru.[footnoteRef:28] [28: Bergman, Lowell, Interview: Larry Kurlander, Frontline World, October 2005 (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/peru404/kurlander.html Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Although Newmont agreed to spend $40 million to remedy the problems outlined in the report, it was not enough. In a letter to CEO Wayne Murdy, Kurlander explained that the financial cost was less important than building trust in the local communities. “[The mercury spill] has cost us our hard-earned reputation,” he wrote, “a reputation that will be stained for years to come.” In his opinion, the company had violated its “social license” with local communities.
[The] social license …in my opinion is far more important than the government license, because the social license is granted by the people of the community. And unlike the government license, it’s renewable every day. And without building a trust with the people who live there and work there and who have lived there for centuries, you’re going to have trouble. [footnoteRef:29] [29: Bergman, Lowell, Interview: Larry Kurlander, Frontline World, October 2005 (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/stories/peru404/kurlander.html Accessed January 22, 2011)]
Roque Benavides, President of Minas Buenaventura (Newmont’s Peruvian joint venture partner), disagreed. He hated the term “social license.”
I do not understand what “social license” means. We essentially apply social responsibility, caring for people. But a social license? I expect a license from the authorities, from the minister of mines. I expect a license from the regional government. But I don’t expect a license from the whole community. [footnoteRef:30] [30: Bergman, Lowell, Frontline World, Episode 404 Transcript, October 2005 (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/episodes/404_transcript.html Accessed January 22, 2011)]
The Battle for Cerro Quilish
Realizing that Yanacocha’s gold reserves would soon decline, in the 1990s Newmont and its partners began purchasing land and permits for nearby Cerro Quilish (Quilish Mountain), believed to hold millions of ounces of gold. For Newmont, Cerro Quilish was the company’s best hope for maintaining production levels in Peru.
However, for the people of Cajamarca, Cerro Quilish was a sacred mountain “regarded as a god that has provided water to its children since pre-Incan times.”
In the village of Porcón, where residents (Porconeros) still speak the Inca language of Quechua, the community holds a ritual procession to the mountain during periods of drought. Porconeros carry images of Catholic saints, most prominently Cristo Ramos, to Cerro Quilish and chant prayers to ask for water. The dark clouds that announce the coming of the rain are said to be the spirit of Quilish answering their prayers.[footnoteRef:31] [31: Corbin, Amy, Mount Quilish, The Sacred Land Film Project, February 1, 2006 (http://www.sacredland.org/mount-quilish/ Accessed February 23, 2011)]
Secular residents regarded Cerro Quilish as an important source of drinking water for the rapidly growing city of 100,000. When the municipal government learned of the company’s plan to level the mountain, it quickly declared Cerro Quilish a protected area.[footnoteRef:32] [32: Gurmendi, A. C. 1996. The mineral industry of Peru. Washington, DC: US Geological Survey, Minerals Information (http://minerals.er.usgs.gov/minerals/pubs/country/2004/pemyb04.pdf Accessed February 23, 2011)]
Newmont took the case to Peruvian federal court, and in 2004 it won the right to mine Cerro Quilish. To begin its expansion, the mine “closed the La Ramada irrigation canal, depriving 240 families of water.” [footnoteRef:33] “The public reaction was swift and intense [with protests culminating] in a region-wide strike that included a mass mobilization of approximately 10,000 people in the public square in Cajamarca,”[footnoteRef:34] the largest protest ever against the mine. With mining operations virtually paralyzed, the company was forced to withdraw. “We have no plans to go in and enter Cerro Quilish again,” declared Brian Hinze, general manager of the Yanacocha mine. “Now, will it ever be mined? I don’t know. I can’t answer that.”[footnoteRef:35] [33: Cited in: Zegarra, P. M. A. 2004. Impacts Of Minera Yanacocha’s Activities on Water Resources and the Affirmation Of Citizen Rights, Grupo de Formación e Intervención Para el Desarrollo Sostenible, Cajamarca – Perú (http://openfsm.net/projects/destinoamazonia/articles-varies/Derecho-al-Agua-y-Mineria-English.doc Accessed February 23, 2011)] [34: Sohn, J., Herz, S. & La Vina, A. 2007. Development Without Conflict, World Resources Institute, Washington, DC (http://www.sarpn.org/documents/d0002569/WRI_Community_dev_May2007.pdf Accessed February 23, 2011)] [35: Bergman, Lowell, Frontline World, Episode 404 Transcript, October 2005 (http://www.pbs.org/frontlineworld/about/episodes/404_transcript.html Accessed January 22, 2011)]
The company, which had been forecasting an increase in gold production, was forced to issue new guidance. “Based on the forecast, we now expect Yanacocha production to decline from 3.25 million ounces in 2005 to 2.6 million ounces (previously 2.7 million ounces) in 2006, and 1.9 million ounces (previously 2.5 million ounces) in 2007 due to declining oxide reserves and grades.” The company also warned that its future in Peru could be in jeopardy as community support for mining deteriorates and voters shift support to left-wing candidates.[footnoteRef:36] [36: Peru’s Yanacocha gold mine ’06,’07 output to drop –UBS, Metals Place, January 26, 2006 (http://metalsplace.com/news/articles/3671/perus-yanacocha-gold-mine-0607-output-to-drop–ubs/ Accessed February 23, 2011)]
“Devastating News”
In October 2010, the company’s worst fears were realized when leftist candidate Gregorio Santos won the governorship of Cajamarca. Santos, who helped lead the 2004 protests, was viewed as a strong anti-mining candidate. “This is devastating news,” exclaimed Hans Flury, president of the National Mining, Oil and Energy Society.[footnoteRef:37] [37: Paez, Angel, Mining Firms Alarmed at Election of Leftist Governor, Inter Press Service, November 11, 2010 (http://ipsnews.net/news.asp?idnews=53529 Accessed February 22, 2011)]
Exhibit 1
Newmont Mining Corporation
Vision, Mission, and Values[footnoteRef:38] [38: Source: Company at a Glance, Newmont Mining Corporation (http://www.newmont.com/about/company-glance Accessed February 22, 2011)]
Vision: We will be the most valued and respected mining company through industry leading performance.
Mission: We will build a sustainable mining business that delivers top quartile shareholder returns while leading in safety, environmental stewardship and social responsibility.
Values:
· Act with integrity, trust and respect.
· Reward creativity, a determination to excel and a commitment to action.
· Demonstrate leadership in safety, stewardship of the environment and social responsibility.
· Develop our people in pursuit of excellence.
· Insist on and demonstrate teamwork, as well as honest and transparent communication.
· Promote positive change by encouraging innovation and applying agreed upon practices.
Exhibit 2
Newmont Mining Corporation
Environmental and Social Responsibility[footnoteRef:39] [39: Source: Our Code of Conduct, Newmont Mining Corporation (http://www.newmont.com/about/values/code-of-conduct/our-commitment-to-communities/environmental-social-responsibility Accessed March 24, 2011)]
Our strategy for managing the environmental and social aspects of our business focuses on the incorporation of environmental and social considerations into the full range of our operations’ decisions throughout the mine development life-cycle, including exploration, mine development, operations, and closure and reclamation. One of our core values is to demonstrate leadership in safety, stewardship of the environment and social responsibility. Performance evaluations for all employees include an appraisal of their demonstration of living to this value.
To realize this value, we have globally adopted sound policies, standards and procedures that demand compliance with the law, as well as define and establish acceptable minimum performance standards. These standards can be found at www.BeyondtheMine.com. We all need to be familiar with these policies and standards, and must keep abreast of revisions to them.
In addition, Newmont is a signatory to various voluntary international initiatives with which we have agreed to conform, including the International Cyanide Management Code, the United Nations Global Compact, the United Nations Declaration on Human Rights and the Voluntary Principles on Security and Human Rights.
Each of us is responsible, within the bounds of our control, for compliance with all applicable laws, rules, regulations, permits and licenses and with Newmont’s environmental and social management plans designed and implemented in conformance with our standards. In this regard, we must:
· Comply with all applicable environmental and social requirements.
· Request guidance from the environmental and social responsibility (ESR) department when uncertain of what those requirements are in a given situation.
· Report violations, or suspected violations, of environmental and social requirements to the ESR department or the compliance line.
· Ensure, within the bounds of our control, that environmental compliance systems are properly implemented.
In addition, managers are responsible for ensuring that all employees, equipment, facilities and resources within their area of responsibility are managed in a manner to ensure compliance and conformance with ESR requirements.
Exhibit 3
Photographs of the Yanacocha Mine near Cajamarca, Peru
Sign at the entrance of the Yanacocha Mine
“What really contaminates the water?
Throwing garbage in the river contaminates the water. Modern mining does NOT contaminate.”
The city of Cajamarca is the capital of Cajamarca State, located at an altitude of nearly 9,000 feet above sea level. It is home to approximately 130,000 people.
The Yanacocha Mine open pit mine covers approximately 250 km2
Yanacocha Cyanide Leaching Pit
Photographs by Bill Farren (used with permission)
Exhibit 4
Select EPA Mercury Response Photographs
EPA contractor in protective gear photographs scene
Mopping with HgX solution to remove mercury
All bags and clothing are removed for screening
Removal of contaminated carpeting
Removal of mercury beads using a mercury vacuum
Excavation and removal of contaminated soil
Source: United States Environmental Protection Agency Mercury Response Guidebook
Exhibit 5
Notable Water Issues Attributed to the Yanacocha Mine
DATE
EVENT
LOCATION
September 1998
Trout deaths in the Llaucano River
La Paccha Sector, Hualgayoc province
January 2000
Arsenic. Fish deaths over 180 km. in the Jequetepeque water basin and of 12,000 trout in the Granja Porcón fish farm.
Granja Porcón to Gallito Ciego
January 2001
Death of 10,000 trout in El Ahijadero fish farm
Llaucano River basin
January – March 2001
Halting of fishing activities in the Gallito Ciego dam. Intoxication of local residents. Petroleum and hidrolina spills.
Jequetepeque River
March 2001
Heavy metals in Grande River and acidic pH levels in the water. Death of trout in the Grande River and Posada del Puruay fish farm
Puruay, located 4 km from the city of Cajamarca
August 2001
Strong acidity in the water. Massive trout deaths.
Granja Porcón fish farm
May 2002
Death of 8,000 trout.
Granja Porcón fish farm
August 2002
Death of 2,200 trout.
Granja Porcón fish farm
October – Nov. 2002
Water turbidity. Death of more than 26,5000 trout
Granja Porcón fish farm
Sources: ECOVIDA archives.Yanacocha. “Balance Social.” 2002 Dirección Regional de Pesquería de Cajamarca (Cajamarca Regional Fisheries Department) [footnoteRef:40] [40: Cited in: Zegarra, P. M. A. 2004. Impacts Of Minera Yanacocha’s Activities on Water Resources and the Affirmation Of Citizen Rights, Grupo de Formación e Intervención Para el Desarrollo Sostenible, Cajamarca – Perú (http://openfsm.net/projects/destinoamazonia/articles-varies/Derecho-al-Agua-y-Mineria-English.doc Accessed February 23, 2011)]
