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In this short paper, which reflects on one of my contribu6ons to the systems literature in 1992 (Pluralism and the Legi<ma<on of Systems Science), I discuss the context at that 6me. Systems scien6sts were embroiled in a paradigm war, which threatened to fragment the systems research community. This is relevant, not only to understanding my 1992 contribu6on, but also because the same paradigms are evident in the complexity science community, and therefore it poten6ally faces the same risk of fragmenta6on. Having explained the context, I then go on to discuss my proposed solu6on to the paradigm war: that there are four domains of complexity, three of which reflect the compe6ng paradigms. The problem comes when researchers say that inquiry into just one of these domains is valid. However, when we recognise all four as part of a new theory of complexity, we can view them as complementary. The four domains are natural world complexity, or “what is” (where the ideal of inquiry is truth); social world complexity, or the complexity of “what ought to be” in rela6on to actual or poten6al ac6on (where the ideal of inquiry is rightness); subjec6ve world complexity, or the complexity of what any individual (the self or another) is thinking, intending or feeling (where the ideal of inquiry is understanding subjec6vity); and the complexity of interac6ons between elements of the other domains of complexity in the context of research and interven6on prac6ce. Following a discussion of the relevance of this theory for complexity scien6sts, I end the paper with a final cri6cal reflec6on on my 1992 paper, poin6ng to some theore6cal assump6ons and terminology that I would, in retrospect, revise.
I would like to start by thanking Kurt Richardson, the editor of Emergence: Complexity and Organiza<on (E:CO), for asking me to write this introduc6on to my own paper, Pluralism and the Legi<ma<on of Systems Science . It is very rare to have the opportunity to publicly reflect, 25 years later, on one’s own older work, and I am honored that Kurt considered the paper significant enough to be included in E:CO’s “classic papers” series.
Below, I will do three things. First, I will explain the context in which I wrote the paper, as the whole framing of it might be puzzling for those reading this in 2016 or later.
Second, I will briefly summarize what I believe is of value in this paper for complexity theorists and prac66oners. The paper was not intended as a contribu6on to the literature on complexity (it was primarily aimed at the systems science research community), but I was aware at the 6me that, if researchers were to follow up the implica6ons for developing our understanding of complexity, it might lead complexity scien6sts down a considerably different road than the one that the majority have taken. This is now a chance to start that follow up discussion — be[er late than never!
Abstract
Introduction
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Author Gerald Midgley
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The third and final sec6on below explains what I would do differently if I could go back 25 years and write the paper again. Back then I was nearing the end of my doctoral studies, and this paper and three others together summarize the arguments in my PhD disserta6on . I smile now at the number of theore6cal assump6ons and uses of terminology that I would revise today, if wri6ng the paper again with the benefit of hindsight.
Having said this, I s6ll believe that much of my 1992a analysis of four types of complexity stands up to scru6ny today, even if I now ques6on some of the social/linguis6c theory that I drew upon to develop it. Further, I reckon that the argument has prac6cal implica6ons for understanding how complexity theory can be translated into methodology and prac6ce in new ways.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, systems scien6sts were dealing with what might be termed an “existen6al crisis”, with the clashing of several incommensurable paradigms and a consequent fragmenta6on of their research community into compe6ng camps. The history of this paradigm war is instruc6ve, not just because it provided the context for my own contribu6on to the literature at that 6me, but also because we can see the same divisions in complexity science today , and hence the poten6al is there for the fragmenta6on of the complexity research community too.
In brief, following the consolida6on in the 1940s and 1950s of some important transdisciplinary theories in the fields of systems science , cyberne6cs and complexity science , there was a push in the systems community to embody these theories in methodologies for interven6on to support systemic organiza6onal and social change. These methodologies included systems analysis , systems engineering , system dynamics and viable system modelling . The authors of these methodologies tended to adopt an approach that assumed the need for expert-driven modelling of real world complex systems, and they strove for comprehensiveness in their models while emphasizing quan6fica6on, predic6on and control .
This whole approach ran into problems in the 1960s and 1970s, and strong cri6cisms were advanced of the assump6ons built into it . As a consequence, the late 1970s and early 1980s saw the emergence of a new paradigm with its own methodologies based on very different assump6ons. The expert researcher was replaced by a facilitator, whose role was to include stakeholders in par6cipa6ve, qualita6ve modelling . The meaning of the term “exper6se” was thereby democra6zed to refer to relevant knowledge held by those involved in and affected by a problema6c situa6on . The emphasis was no longer on systems as real world en66es, but instead a[en6on was switched to how collabora6ve groups could develop beGer systemic understandings of poten<al ac<ons: a “system” became a useful way of viewing the world rather than something that can be assumed to exist objec6vely . With this shif came recogni6on of the inevitable lack of comprehensiveness in every analysis , and hence a relaxa6on in assump6ons about predic6on and control, with more of an emphasis on the need for be[er mutual understanding between stakeholders , dialogue and learning . It was at this 6me that the terminology of “hard” and “sof” systems was first proposed , with hard systems methodologists being those who wanted experts to quan6fy analyses of real world systems, and sof systems methodologists being those who wanted facilitators to support dialogue around different ways of seeing systems and possible ac6ons to change them. Thankfully, in more recent years, this divisive language has become largely redundant .
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Of course, the advocates of the first paradigm didn’t go away when the second one was proposed, and a paradigm war ensued. By the 6me we had hit the late 1980s, when I wrote my own first contribu6ons to the literature on systems methodology , it was evident that the war was tearing the systems research community apart, with advocates of the different paradigms denigra6ng their opponents and refusing to par6cipate in cross-boundary dialogues. It was in this context that a new paradigm called “cri6cal systems thinking” was proposed , and this had two principle aims: first, to deepen our understanding of how power rela6ons can be addressed during interven6on , given that both previous paradigms were arguably rather naive in their analyses of power; and second, to develop an adequate theory and prac6ce of methodological pluralism so we could transcend the paradigm war and draw upon the best from both previous paradigms to create a much more flexible and responsive approach to systemic interven6on .
My 1992a paper was a rela6vely early contribu6on to cri6cal systems thinking, with a specific focus on developing a theory of complexity to underpin the prac6ce of methodological pluralism, and thereby transcend the paradigm war. My proposal was for the iden6fica6on of four domains of complexity, and the methods from the various compe6ng methodologies could be aligned with these according to the ideal of inquiry they embodied. More details are provided below. It is my conten6on that this argument may be of value to complexity theorists and prac66oners who may have to deal with paradigma6c divisions in the complexity research community along similar lines to those that were previously encountered and addressed in the systems community.
The four domains (or types) of complexity that I proposed in my 1992a paper were:
“Natural world” complexity, or the complexity of “what is”. The ideal of inquiry into this form of complexity is truth — but note the term “ideal” which, following Popper , indicates that truth is something we aim for, but we can never know for certain whether it has been achieved.
“Social world” complexity, or the complexity of “what ought to be” in rela6on to actual or poten6al ac6on. The ideal of inquiry into this form of complexity is rightness.
“Subjec6ve world” complexity, or the complexity of what any individual (the self or another) is thinking, intending or feeling. The ideal of inquiry into this form of complexity can be called understanding subjec<vity.
We very ofen have to deal with interac<ons between phenomena in the above three domains of complexity. This means that there is also the meta-level complexity of these interac<ons, which needs to be a focus of inquiry. However, it’s important to note that, in the context of interven6on (rather than just observa6on), meta-level analyses may not stay “meta” for long: communica6on of them, and ac6on upon them, may feed back to change the original pa[ern of interac6ons.
In my 1992a paper, I drew upon Habermas’s linguis6c theory of ‘three worlds’ to underpin the first three of the above domains of complexity (the fourth comes about because the first three interact). In brief, Habermas argues that any sentence intended for communica6on has three implicit validity claims: a claim that its proposi6onal content is true; that it is the right thing to say in the context; and that the speaker is sincere in
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The value of the paper for complexity theorists and practitioners
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saying it. These validity claims refer to three worlds: our external natural world; our norma6ve social world; and my (or your) internal subjec6ve world. According to Habermas, a ra6onal, free and fair dialogue is one where anything that is said can, in principle, be opened up to cri6que on the basis of truth, rightness or sincerity. When some aspect of poten6al cri6que is repressed (for example when a company allows its employees to par6cipate in discussing the means to achieve already-given ends, but those ends are not open for discussion), this produces ‘distorted communica6on’.
In three short, logical steps, we can move from Habermas’s linguis6c theory to my own proposal for the first three domains of complexity above. First, we can view Habermas’s three “worlds” as foci for research and inquiry, and not just ra6onal argumenta6on in dialogue. Second, this broadening of the focus beyond dialogue means that we have to be concerned with more than just the sincerity of speakers when we consider subjec6vity: it is the whole panoply of inten6ons, thoughts and feelings that come to be of interest in inquiry. Third, why would we need research and inquiry if there were no uncertain6es, and hence underlying complexi6es, to deal with? Seeing Habermas’s “worlds” as the first three domains of complexity therefore makes sense — and, as we have seen, the fourth domain of complexity concerns how phenomena in the other domains interact.
Now, Habermas said his theory was ontological, as he claimed that it is the intrinsic proper6es of language that enable us to dis6nguish between the natural, social and subjec6ve worlds. In 1992, I therefore labelled the fourth (meta) level of complexity ‘ontological complexity’ to indicate that all three of the other forms of complexity and their interac6ons are essen6al to consider when dealing with any non-trivial issue requiring systemic ac6on research: ignoring one or more of the domains will result in missing a significant source of complexity, and this will impoverish analysis, understanding and ac6on.
I think the implica6ons of this for complexity theory are clear. There are now mul6ple complexity paradigms represented in the literature , and most of these focus on just one of the “worlds” iden6fied in my 1992a paper. Indeed, it is arguably s6ll the case that the majority concentrate on describing the generic characteris6cs of complex adap6ve systems, network interac6ons, etc., and then either apply their theories to interpret empirical findings, or refine their theories through the analysis of findings. Essen6ally, they produce theories of “natural world” complexity, guided by the ideal of truth (acknowledging, of course, that their truth judgements are not absolute, as any reasonable scien6st would). However, for the most part, they do not inquire into the norma6ve social world of moral judgements concerning ac6ons that people might want to take. The kind of research needed for this would be substan6ally different: in a par6cular context, it would involve exploring the complexi6es and uncertain6es around possible human ac6ons that people can envisage, and the perceived moral implica6ons of these or the focus might be on how people’s values contribute to the selng of purposes that then limit their framing of issues, and both values and framings can be shifed through ac6on research . Because the social world is about what “ought to be” in the context of ac6on, exploring these things in ac6on research mode makes sense. It is also worth asking, how much complexity research has a focus on the purely subjec6ve perspec6ves of individuals? As far as I am aware, there is very li[le, although Snowden is a notable excep6on, advoca6ng the collec6on of mul6ple individuals’ stories and then looking for pa[erns across these. There are major opportuni6es for developing new theories rela6ng to the social and subjec6ve complexity domains, and the biggest challenge of all is arguably to produce theories that explain repea<ng paGerns in the interac<ons between the three types of complexity. We might thereby be able to offer generic insights into the fourth (meta) domain of complexity, as well as enable bespoke analyses of the interac6ons that are relevant to
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par6cular local and temporary contexts of prac6ce.
For complexity prac<ce, the dis6nc6on between the four domains could also be valuable. Remember that, in 1992, I advocated the theory of the four domains of complexity to support methodological pluralism: drawing upon and mixing methods from across a range of systems (and other) approaches. It would be possible to reinterpret and harmonize the exis6ng complexity paradigms in terms of the first three domains of complexity (concerning the natural, social and subjec6ve worlds), thereby making them complementary. It is then reflec6ng on the interac<ons between the three types of complexity (i.e., beginning to get to grips with the fourth domain of complexity) in any ac6on research project that can guide the mixing of methods to support inquiry and change in prac6ce.
While the systems research community has placed considerable emphasis on the development of methodologies and methods to support systemic inquiry over the past 60 years , I suggest that less emphasis has been placed on this by complexity scien6sts. Methodology and methods provide a bridge from theory to prac6ce, and more concentra6on on this by complexity scien6sts would be useful — not just to inform prac6ce with complexity theories of the natural world, but to support the explora6on of norma6ve and subjec6ve complexi6es too.
Having said earlier that I s6ll believe that much of this theory of the four domains of complexity stands up to scru6ny today, it is perhaps unsurprising that I would now, with 25 years of hindsight, choose to change some assump6ons and terminology.
Over the years, I have developed an increasing skep6cism of “grand theories”: sweeping theories of universals in human nature and society (see Skinner, , for an examina6on of grand theories in the social sciences). For a start, many theories of supposedly “universal” characteris6cs of human beings or socie6es have been found to be culture dependent in light of evidence from compara6ve anthropology. Perhaps the most famous recent example concerns color percep6on, where it now appears that discrimina6ng between colors has a lot to do with expecta6ons of colour dis6nc6ons established in linguis6c categories that have evolved in par6cular ecological and social contexts . One of the problems with grand theories is that a lot of the par6cular, unique complexity in social situa6ons is passed over in favor of rela6vely simple generic observa6ons: almost the reverse of the old adage that “we cannot see the wood for the trees”. With grand theories, it’s mostly wood and the trees become blurred.
Even when I wrote my 1992a paper (and indeed my 1992c PhD thesis, which I was wri6ng at the same 6me), I struggled with a dilemma. I was unsure whether or not to accept Habermas’s ontology, which (in the typical manner of a grand theory) roots categories of inquiry in the universal proper6es of language. I was advoca6ng methodological pluralism, and of course different methodologies draw upon different (some6mes incompa6ble) theories, so would it then be contradictory to say that there is one theory of language that can organize all the methodological diversity?
In the end I found a way through this. As I saw it, simply accep6ng a diversity of methodological paradigms and
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Reflections on theoretical assumptions and terminology with the benefit of hindsight
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saying we can draw upon them pragma6cally as we see fit meant also accep6ng all the incommensurable philosophical assump6ons that come with those paradigms. Can we credibly say that our knowledge reflects a real world (the epistemological assump6on of much “hard” systems science) and also, at the same 6me, believe that we only have access to our subjec6ve and inter-subjec6ve understandings, which cannot necessarily be assumed to reflect anything real at all (the epistemology of much “sof” systems thinking)? Surely this leaves us in a philosophical muddle. This is plurality without any theory that explains how and why the various aspects of the plurality are valid or legi6mate. I therefore decided, afer much reflec6on, to go for a unifying theory through which the plurality of methods (not methodologies, with all their accompanying, poten6ally incommensurate theories) could be explained. I argued that any unifying ontology had to be ‘mul6-faceted’ in order to have the requisite variety to contextualize methods drawn from different paradigms . I therefore moved beyond Habermas’s purely linguis6c theory, arguing that the external natural world, the norma6ve social world and our internal subjec6ve worlds all exist, and indeed it is possible to show that the existence of each of them is dependent on the existence of the other two .
The other issue I struggled with at the 6me of wri6ng my 1992a paper, but I ended up ignoring my first ins6ncts on this, was that judgements concerning beauty cannot be reduced to one of the three ideals of inquiry: truth, rightness and understanding subjec6vity. Where did aesthe6c judgement fit in Habermas’s analysis of the inherent validity claims in any sentence intended for communica6on? I was already aware that Habermas’s ontology could be viewed as a “grand theory”, which might not be such a good thing, and the fact that beauty wasn’t recognized as an ideal of inquiry suggested that his theory could be overly reduc6ve.
Although I set aside these concerns about aesthe6cs in 1992, it finally dawned on me in the late 1990s that I had been right to be concerned. I set out to write a history of systems thinking in a chapter of a book , and I was discussing how three long-standing tradi6ons had informed the various systems paradigms: pure science (which tried to establish truth claims), applied science (which was also concerned with truth, but with a view to informing right ac6on) and psychoanalysis (which is much more focused on understanding the subjec6ve perspec6ves of individuals). It suddenly occurred to me that what Habermas might have done when he produced his ontology was to observe the major analy6cal tradi6ons that ma[ered to him in society and then reflected the validity claims associated with those tradi6ons in his theory of the universals of language! Although I cannot prove that his logic went in this direc6on (from the analy6cal tradi6ons to the ontology, rather than the other way around), it makes some sense of the way in which Habermas talks about those tradi6ons; and the absence of beauty as an ideal of inquiry is arguably because Habermas does not view art and aesthe6cs as a major analy6cal tradi6on in the same sense as the sciences and psychoanalysis.
So today I am lef feeling somewhat equivocal about my 1992a argument. On the one hand, I think that the idea of four domains of complexity stands up to scru6ny and could be useful for understanding how complexity science could develop into the future. On the other hand, I am much more cri6cal than I once was of Habermas’s linguis6c ontology, although I was already looking for ways to go beyond this in 1992 (such as viewing the natural, social and subjec6ve worlds as real rather than as mere reflec6ons of the universal capaci6es of language). It might be more appropriate to simply think about historical tradi6ons, such as science (oriented to the ideal of truth), poli6cs (oriented to the ideal of rightness) and therapy (which, when undertaken with individuals, is oriented to the ideal of understanding subjec6vity), and we can then argue that these are embodied in the first three complexity domains, with the fourth domain being concerned with their interac6on. With this introductory paper, I am pulng both interpreta6ons into the literature, and I leave it to the reader to
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judge which is the most useful and appropriate.
Incidentally, one other thing that I would change about my 1992 paper is discussion of ‘ecological harmony’ . Gunderson and Holling persuasively argue that ecological systems cycle between periods of conserva6on (when the complexity of interrela6onships grows steadily over 6me), release (when there is an external perturba6on and the complexity of interrela6onships makes the ecosystem “bri[le” and vulnerable, causing some of these interrela6onships to break), reorganiza6on (when fresh interrela6onships are formed), exploita6on (when new complexity starts to burgeon quickly), and back to conserva6on again. In the context of this dynamic pa[ern, Gunderson and Holling argue that the word “harmony” connotes the maintenance of an equilibrium that does not actually exist. In retrospect, I would perhaps have talked about living within sustainable limits, which does not preclude a cycle that, in all its phases, remains within those limits.
In conclusion, I recommend my 1992a paper to you, with the proviso that you read it cri6cally, understanding that it is a product of its 6me. My hope is that the basic argument for four domains of complexity is s6ll relevant now for researchers asking where complexity theory remains under-developed and could go in the future.
I also hope that the argument for methodological pluralism is just as relevant for complexity prac66oners as prac66oners in the systems community. Certainly this paper, and many other books and papers on cri6cal systems thinking , helped us win the argument for methodological pluralism in the systems community. While there are s6ll live debates about the theory underpinning the prac6ce of methodological pluralism , it is undoubtedly the case that most people now accept it as preferable to both a paradigm war and the limita6ons on prac6ce that come with believing that only a narrow range of methods has validity. If complexity scien6sts need to transcend a paradigm war themselves in coming years, they do not need to start with a clean slate: there is a lot of prior work in the systems literature, including my own 1992 paper , reprinted next.
A PDF of the original paper “Pluralism and the Legi6ma6on of Systems Science” can be downloaded from here.
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6. Midgley, G. and Richardson, K.A. (2007). Systems thinking for community involvement in policy analysis. Emergence: Complexity and Organization, 9(1-2), 167-183.
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