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Certain events in US history seldom come along that have such an impact that they fundamentally change the way society functions. If the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor could be counted as one such event, it launching the US into WWII circa 1941-1945, then the attacks of 9/11 would also fit this criterion, it ushering in the US-led, Global War on Terror. A difference between the two, however, and subsequently a characterization of the latter that makes it arguably even more impactful, is the fact it has been going on for more than 13 years. And while some would like the world to believe that the US has turned that ‘terrorist’ page in its history, highlighted by the successful assassination of Osama Bin Laden, it is becoming all too clear that the US, and the world, are smackdab in the middle of the story, with no clear conclusion in sight. The truth has unwelcomingly shone through with a clear consensus that “…Al Qaeda [is] stronger than ever.” 1 Adding to the terrorism problem is the emergence of another, more extreme group known as the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS). Despite ISIS’s extra-ordinary level of cruelty, its ideology has still managed to resonate with many around the world, evidenced by its increasing membership; it having garnered an estimated “20,000” new recruits from “90 different countries.” 2 Finally, while on the topic of past and recent, history-shaping events, it is the goal of the US and its Intelligence Community (IC) to prevent such events from happening in the future. One possible scenario that is becoming easier to visualize and closer to actualization, is Iran’s attainment and subsequent use of nuclear weapons. On the topic of a nuclear Iran, legal expert and Harvard Law School Professor, Alan Dershowitz, has said, “ISIS is nothing compared to [Iran]…[it] is a passing blip…If [Iran] become[s] a nuclear weapons power, they will become the most dangerous country in the world today.” 3 What, then, is to be done? In the face of the growing and current threat of terrorism, to the possible, future threat of a nuclear-armed Iran, what can be done? Is there a strategy that the IC can implement to eliminate and prevent these threats? The answers to these questions can be found by looking to an intelligence gathering discipline that is nearly as old as mankind itself, and one in which history provides
1 Ali Soufan, “The Sad Legacy of 9/11: ISIS and Al Qaeda are Stronger than Ever,” The Guardian, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/commentisfree/2014/sep/11/-sp-9-11-isis-al-qaida-13-years
2 Joshua Berlinger, “The Names: Who has been recruited to ISIS from the West,” CNN, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.cnn.com/2015/02/25/world/isis-western-recruits/
3 Courtney Coren, “Alan Dershowitz: ISIS is a ‘Passing Blip’ Compared to Iran,” News Max, 2015, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.newsmax.com/Newsmax-Tv/Alan-Dershowitz-Iran- ISIS/2015/02/26/id/627101/
ample examples of its effectiveness; that intelligence discipline being human intelligence (HUMINT). It is thus recommended, that in order to gain the advantage and eventually win the war on terror, as well as unveil the true intentions of Iran and its nuclear program, that the US and its IC must make HUMINT central to its intelligence gathering efforts.
From the Cold War to the Global War on Terror, HUMINT has quietly proven its worth time and time again. Even in the midst of the technological boom the world has been experiencing these last 20 years, experts continue see the unique value that only HUMINT can provide to the intelligence picture. This is not to say that all intelligence resources should completely shift to gathering and analyzing HUMINT, but rather the focal point of intelligence gathering should be focused on uncovering and unveiling the thoughts, goals, aspirations, intentions and minds of US enemies, something only HUMINT can produce. In the case of the terror groups Al Qaeda and ISIS, HUMINT will yield details regarding future, operational intent and targets in and outside of the US. In the case of Iran, only Israel seems to be unanimous in its belief that Iran wants to produce nuclear weapons, while in the case of other members of the international community, it is still a matter of debate. HUMINT against Iran will confirm or deny these accusations made by Israel and others, as well as provide US policy makers with the intelligence needed to take preventative action; action to prevent production of nukes, and/or action to prevent their usage.
HUMINT, OTHER ‘INTs’, & THE INTELLIGENCE PICTURE
Human Intelligence, or HUMINT, is the collection and analysis of information from human sources. This includes, but is not limited to, information gathered from espionage, witness statements and interrogations. And while all intelligence gathering disciplines have the capability, to some degree or another, of revealing enemy intentions, it is HUMINT that is most suitably equipped to reveal these things. Imagery intelligence (IMINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and measurement and signature intelligence (MASINT), on the other hand, do not typically involve getting information directly from a human source, i.e. the president of a country, the leader of a terror group, etc. In the case of signals intelligence (SIGINT), and especially its sub-category, communications intelligence (COMINT) there can be a lingering degree of skepticism that the information being retrieved is not accurate. Take, for example, the scenario of a tapped phone conversation where one or both parties may be fully aware that their conversation is being recorded, so they start saying things to purposely mislead intelligence personnel. In the same type of scenario, the tap may be good; the individuals may be oblivious to it, but they may also be oblivious to just about everything else. As one observer put it, “Electronic intercepts are great, but you don’t know if you’ve got two idiots talking on the phone…” 4 In times past, most notably during the Cold War, these technologically-based platforms were typically enough to get the job done “because [the US] already knew the adversary’s intent…[but] in today’s environment, these capabilities are no longer sufficient.” 5 Gathering intelligence is much like creating a painting where the goal is to provide policy makers and other US officials with as much detail, color and depth as possible. Where non-HUMINT intelligence commonly provides an outline of the painting by providing data and statistics, it is HUMINT that provides the color, detail and the small nuances that can make all the difference between a generic painting and a masterpiece. In other words, HUMINT makes the painting move; it brings it to life. In its purest form, HUMINT acts as a psychologist, revealing the adversary’s heart and mind; revealing plans and intentions that would otherwise go unnoticed. Such information is crucial to winning a war against an enemy whose motives and ideology are largely foreign to the masses. As Secretary of State, John Kerry, recently stated, “You cannot defeat what you don’t understand.” 6
HUMINT: PROVING ITS WORTH OVER TIME In spite of the US’s justified reliance on IMINT and SIGINT during the Cold War, the climax of the war, The Cuban Missile Crisis, and its resolution was dependent upon information provided by an insider; a HUMINT source. Many believe, and they are partially correct in their belief, that it was simply a U-2
4 Matthew M. Aid & Cees Wiebes, “The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War,” APUS, accessed February 27, 2015, https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-studies- common/INTL%20421/CONTENT/Week%202/Wiebes%20Introdcution%20The%20Importance%20of%20Signals %20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf
5 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT communication information systems for complex warfare,” Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communication+information+systems+for+complex+warfare &source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi- bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
6 Patrick Goodenough, “Kerry: You Have to Understand Terrorists to Defeat Them,” CNSNews, 2015, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.cnsnews.com/news/article/patrick-goodenough/kerry-you-have-understand- terrorists-defeat-them
reconnaissance plane that just so happened to be in the right place at the right time when it captured photographic evidence of Soviet nukes in Cuba. This is not the complete story, however, as the U-2 was specifically directed on where to go and what to look for thanks to the detailed information provided by GRU Colonel, Oleg Penkovsky: “Penkovsky’s debriefing sessions produced about 1,200 pages of transcripts,…[were] immensely valuable,…[and] allowed [President] Kennedy to pursue a diplomatic option…Penkovsky and HUMINT had averted a disaster and saved the world from nuclear destruction.” 7 Thanks to this HUMINT source, clearer heads prevailed, and as a result, it was not the “last Saturday [Mr. McNamara] would ever see,” 8 nor, thankfully, anyone else’s.
Another example of HUMINT’s worth is found by looking at the events that led to the successful assassination of Osama Bin Laden. The hunt for the most wanted man in the world lasted over ten years. In spite the US’s technological tools i.e. satellite imagery, UAV reconnaissance, communications intercepts, electronic intercepts, etc., Bin Laden was able to avoid capture by staying relatively low-tech, and by using simple encryption devices to throw off US intelligence services. The IC, realizing its difficulties in tracking Bin Laden down, knew it had to shift its intelligence-gathering focus. This shift eventually led to the capture and interrogation of the supposed mastermind behind the 9/11 attacks, Khalid Sheikh Mohammed. With the aid of enhanced interrogation techniques, Khalid eventually provided the CIA with names of others who were involved, and also information regarding Bin Laden’s personal courier. The information gained from Khalid, along with the information gained from those he named provided the IC with a target (the courier) to focus their efforts on. The result, of course, was the US sending in Navy Seals to finish the job, but initially, it was the information received from these human sources that gave the manhunt a guiding compass to follow.
STRAYING FROM HUMINT & THE NEED FOR ITS RETURN
Too often it seems that the IC tends to lose sight of the vital role that HUMINT plays. This problem is likely caused by the constant technological developments made in human society which naturally bleed over to advancements in the intelligence/military world. So much has technology
7 Rich Disabatino, “Interview: Rich Disabatino, PBS, 2001, accessed December 27, 2014, “http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorism/interviews/disabatino.html
8 “Cuban Missile Crisis,” History Channel, accessed August 29, 2014, http://www.history.com/topics/cold- war/cuban-missile-crisis
imbedded itself into everyday life that it would be neigh impossible for the average person to function without the internet, social media, cell phones, GPS navigation and so on. It is not just the IC, military or the average citizen who has become heavily reliant on technology, but terror groups as well. In fact, according to lecturer Clive Best, a group like Al Qaeda could not even function today without the internet. 9
Due to this situation, it is the best interest of the IC to constantly improve its technological capabilities, but at what cost? Certainly not at the cost of sacrificing the quality and quantity of HUMINT, for “some of the worst intelligence failures…can be attributed to an absence of human intelligence,” 10 including the attacks of 9/11. In an interview, it was asked of Rich Disabatino, Director of Intelligence Support Group, Ltd., to give his thoughts on the topic. He said: “At one point in time, we thought that electronic intelligence was going to replace human intelligence. I think we’re seeing right now that you can never replace human intelligence. Electronic intelligence will only augment it.” 11 Others have made similar statements as to the importance of HUMINT with the following quote specifically geared towards the recently emerged threat of ISIS: “the…art of collecting human source intelligence has in large part become lost thanks to…intelligence technology…This lack of HUMINT might have something to do with the lack of warning about ISIS’s summer blitz through Iraq and Syria.” 12 Lastly, from an official report to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the Minority Leader, it was concluded that the “CIA did not sufficiently penetrate the al-Qa’ida organization before September 11th .” 13 This issue needs to be addressed in the cases of Al Qaeda, ISIS and Iran. The IC cannot afford to make the same type of mistakes as it has in the past, especially in determining Iran’s true nuclear intentions, for nuclear war is a possible price of failure.
9 Clive Best, “Open Source Intelligence,” Video Lectures, 2007, accessed February 23, 2015, http://videolectures.net/mmdss07_best_osi/
10 Gabriel Margolis, “The Lack of HUMINT: A Recurring Intelligence Problem,” Global Security Studies, 2013, accessed February 27, 2015, http://globalsecuritystudies.com/Margolis%20Intelligence%20%28ag%20edits%29.pdf
11 Rich Disabatino, “Interview: Rich Disabatino, PBS, 2001, accessed December 27, 2014, “http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/terrorism/interviews/disabatino.html
12 Robert Caruso, “Here’s How the US Can Build the Intelligence Capabilities Needed to Defeat ISIS,” Business Insider, 2014, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.businessinsider.com/the-us-needs-better-humint-to- beat-isis-2014-9
13 “Counterterrorism Intelligence Capabilities and Performance Prior to 9-11,” Federation of American Scientists, 2002, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2002_rpt/hpsci_ths0702.html,accessed4Aug.2008.
ALL INTs WORKING TOGETHER – HUMINT AS THE FOCAL POINT
It is clear that there is a special level of attention that needs to be given to HUMINT in order to have a successful strategy to face current and future threats. With that said, however, it should also be made clear that all intelligence gathering disciplines are needed to create a complete intelligence picture. Looking back at the two examples above that highlighted the track record of HUMINT’s worth, a closer inspection of those events show that there is a little more to their stories. In the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, U-2 reconnaissance missions to capture photographs of soviet missiles in Cuba were underway well before Oleg Penkovsky dropped the ‘a-bomb of information,’ so to speak. Likewise, after Penkovsky informed the CIA and Britain’s MI6 of the nukes in Cuba, confirmation of Penkovsky’s claims were needed since he was, after all, a Colonel in Russia’s GRU; not one that exactly comes from a trustworthy background. This confirmation was in fact provided by more U-2 reconnaissance photos, or IMINT.
In the case of the hunt for Osama Bin Laden, the information extracted from Khalid Sheikh Mohammed and the other interrogated suspects were undoubtedly critical in finding the target. Their information, however, was only a portion of the ingredients that made for the overall success of the mission. Once CIA personnel operating in Pakistan identified the courier as Sheikh Abu Ahmed, much of the work was then passed to the NSA and its COMINT team to “[intercept] telephone calls and emails between [Ahmed’s] family and anyone inside Pakistan.” 14 The combined efforts of COMINT and HUMINT did not end there as a monitored satellite phone call would prove to lead the CIA to the doorstep of Bin Laden’s 3-story hideout. From there, GEOINT and IMINT played their respective roles as advanced satellite imagery took “high-res and infrared images of the compound” in order to map its layout. With the blueprints in hand, the CIA had a replica of the compound built in North Carolina and which would be used as a training ground for the Navy Seals. So accurate was the GEOINT and IMINT-produced layout, that the Seals were told what floor of the structure they would likely find Bin Laden on. 15
14 “Timeline: The Intelligence Hunt Leading to Bin Laden,” BBC, 2011, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-south-asia-13279283
15 Emily Smith, “How did the CIA Find Bin Laded?…” The Blaze, 2011, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.theblaze.com/stories/2011/05/02/how-did-the-cia-find-bin-laden-a-phone-call-a-courier-and-years-of- detective-work/
Thus in both examples it is seen that relying wholly on one intelligence gathering discipline would largely be unproductive, but when a combination is used, it is a completely different story with the results often changing the course of a conflict or war. What is also evident is HUMINT’s key role, having played the ‘initiator’ in both scenarios in the sense that HUMINT got the ball rolling; it provided direction and clarity where before there was little or none whatsoever. It is for these reasons why it has been said that “…correlating HUMINT data with that of signals intelligence (SIGINT), geospatial intelligence (GEOINT) and measurement and signatures intelligence (MASINT)…is a key criterion for generating the right knowledge.” 16
HUMINT NEEDED AGAINST AL QAEDA AND ISIS
“To win this war on terrorism and to find people, HUMINT is first among equals.” 17 Why, then, has there been such a reluctance to employ espionage tactics against the threat of terrorism? As it turns out, there are, indeed, valid reasons; one being that espionage is extremely risky, where the result of being caught usually means death. Between the US and its allies during the Cold War, for example, thousands of agents were lost to the Soviets and N. Korea. 18 While it is safe to assume that Soviet Russia was not kind to American spies, it is not hard to imagine an outcome that is even more brutal if Al Qaeda or ISIS captured a US spy hiding within its ranks.
What adds to this danger is the fact that there is the matter of a complete social, cultural, religious, linguistic and racial disparity between people from the Middle East, including Muslim extremists, and people from the US, including HUMINT intelligence operators. This is not to say that it is impossible for a CIA operator to penetrate a terrorist cell, but that it would be extremely difficult, and may not be worth the risk if there are other viable options.
16 Robert Ackerman, “Defense HUMINT Needs Technology, Too,” AFCEA, 2006, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.afcea.org/content/?q=node/1202
17 Ibid
18 Matthew M. Aid & Cees Wiebes, “The Importance of Signals Intelligence in the Cold War,” APUS, accessed February 24, 2015, https://edge.apus.edu/access/content/group/security-and-global-studies- common/INTL%20421/CONTENT/Week%202/Wiebes%20Introdcution%20The%20Importance%20of%20Signals %20Intelligence%20in%20the%20Cold%20War.pdf
One of these ‘other’ options, is working directly with allied nations, for “inter-operability with…allied HUMINT organizations is fundamental to effective HUMINT operations.” 19 Furthermore, it would be in the best interest of the US to work with allied nations located in the Middle East; with a people and in a place where this extreme disparity does not exist.
Nations such as Jordan and Lebanon each have their own intelligence agencies, agencies that are manned by natives of the country and region. These individuals know the religion, culture, history and all other social aspects that the terrorists are familiar with, having grown up there as well. Professor Walid Phares, who was born in Lebanon, expounds on this idea, and also why he feels he is personally able to understand the mindset of these terrorists:
It was not difficult for me to read the mind of the leader of al Qaeda. I had read the same history books he read. We have looked at the same pictures, heard the same legends over and over. I listened to the same type of Friday preaching (khutba), read the same Qu’ran and Hadith, and devoured the same Salafi accounts that he did; so did millions of others around the Middle East. 20
This coordination with friendly nations, along with the familiarity these nations have with Al Qaeda and ISIS members are the keys to penetrating terrorist cells. The result will be the attainment of vital HUMINT regarding the intentions and plans of Al Qaeda and ISIS leaders. In the case of Jordan, there is much at stake as it “is the next major target for [the Islamic State], and [Jordanian] King Abdullah knows it.” 21 On a positive note, “[Jordan’s] intel is very good on some things…and they work…Humint hard. They likely have al Qaeda penetrated at some level.” 22 The US
19 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT communication information systems for complex warfare,” Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communication+information+systems+for+complex+warfare &source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi- bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
20 Walid Phares, “Future Jihad: Terrorist Strategies Against America,” APUS, 2005, accessed February 28, 2015, http://site.ebrary.com/lib/apus/reader.action?docID=10135448
21 Rowan Scarborough, “NSA intercepts key to locating…” Washington Times, 2014, accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/sep/23/nsa-scores-victory-in-foiling-khorasan-groups-us- t/?page=all
22 Ibid
needs to reach out to Jordan, a long standing US-ally, and begin a bilateral, HUMINT intelligence effort to gain the intelligence Jordan has and continues to obtain. Once the US becomes privy to the existing Jordanian intelligence on the terrorist groups, the US can begin augmenting Jordan’s HUMINT effort with funds, equipment, and the backing of the CIA and NSA which includes GEOINT, MASINT, IMINT, and SIGINT capabilities.
Another opportunity for HUMINT arises from the relationship between Lebanon and the Shi’ite, terrorist community, Hezbollah. Hezbollah primarily resides in Lebanon and even holds seats in Lebanon’s Parliament. 23 Currently, the US has a good standing relationship with Lebanon as it acts as a huge financial support of Lebanon’s. On the other hand, however, the US has officially categorized Hezbollah as a terrorist organization. Hezbollah’s feelings towards the US are largely mutual as Hezbollah leader, Hassan Nasrallah, recently suggested that the CIA is a direct supporter of ISIS. 24 The glimmer of hope for coordination arises from other comments made by Nasrallah, namely that he has “call[ed] on the people and governments of the region in order to work together to confront the [infidel/ISIS] threat.” 25 Adding to this hope is the fact that ISIS has recently declared war on Lebanon, Hezbollah’s resident state. Taking all these factors into consideration, Hezbollah may see the benefits of working with the US, especially if Lebanon used some of its political leverage to persuade Hezbollah to move towards the US’s direction.
There are a few primary reasons as to why such a complex and comprehensive effort should be made to create an alliance with Hezbollah, even if it is a temporary one. For one, Hezbollah is “probably the world’s largest, most sophisticated, wealthiest and most militarily capable terror organization” in the world. 26 Along these lines, it also has formidable HUMINT capabilities, so much so, that as recently as 2006, it successfully infiltrated the state of Israel, “manag[ing] to recruit valuable information” which led to
23 Jonathan Masters and Zachary Laub, “Hezbollah,” Council on Foreign Relations, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.cfr.org/lebanon/hezbollah-k-hizbollah-hizbullah/p9155
24 Edwin Mora, “Hezbollah Chief…,” Breitbart, 2015, accessed February 28, 2015, http://www.breitbart.com/national-security/2015/02/17/hezbollah-chief-urges-middle-east-unity-in-anti-isis-fight- accuses-cia-and-israels-mossad-of-backing-isis/
25 Ibid
26 Shai Oseran, and Stephane Cohen, “Don’t be fooled. Hezbollah is bigger and badder than ever,” The Tower, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.thetower.org/article/dont-be-fooled-hezbollah-is-bigger-and- badder-than-ever/
successful attacks against Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). 27 Potentially having HUMINT assets inside Al Qaeda and ISIS that already have extremist Islamic/terrorist roots could be extremely beneficial, and likely lead to bigger intelligence opportunities. Their familiarity with terrorist operations could, in the long run, lead to promotions, quickly moving up the ranks, and even leading missions. This would undoubtedly lead to them attending meetings with Al Qaeda/ISIS leaders and, in turn, being privy to information regarding major operations. As much of a long shot as an alliance with Hezbollah may be, a genuine effort needs to be made, for the potential information that could be obtained would possibly have as great of effect as Penkovsky’s submissions to the CIA had in his day.
Another suggestion on how to gather HUMINT on these Middle Eastern terrorists would be to look south – south to the notoriously insecure US-Mexico border, and the Central/South American nations that fall below it. It is well known that Al Qaeda and ISIS have turned to the drug trade as a method to fund their operations, and because of the countries they are in, business with natives naturally and commonly occur. Drug deals around the US-Mexico border is where the focus should be, as there is a higher potential for the buyers to be American. Herein lies opportunities: looking to Bosnia as an example, it was shown that “[Bosnian] intelligence services entities…involve[ed] themselves in crime as a profitable sideline.” 28 It is probably unrealistic expect the CIA to get involved in organized crime, especially as a ‘profitable sideline,’ but it would not be unrealistic for it to place an insider in a criminal organization, or insiders in multiple organizations that do business with Al Qaeda and/or ISIS drug cartels. These HUMINT assets will likely have the opportunity to place tracers and/or listening devices on the terrorists or their vehicles. These devices will lead the CIA to their bases of operations where communications regarding future operations between them and their leadership in the Middle East will likely happen. SIGINT/COMINT equipment can be used to trace phone calls and intercept email traffic, all the while revealing names, dates, locations and other pertinent information. Though in the end this
27 David Eshel, “Hezbollah’s Intelligence War,” Defense Update, 2007, accessed March 1, 2015, http://defense-update.com/analysis/lebanon_war_1.htm
28 Luc Pigeon, Clark Beamish, and Michel Zybala, “HUMINT communication information systems for complex warfare,” Defense Technical Information Center (DTIC), 2002, accessed February 27, 2015, http://www.google.com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=HUMINT+communication+information+systems+for+complex+warfare &source=web&cd=1&ved=0CCMQFjAA&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.dtic.mil%2Fcgi- bin%2FGetTRDoc%3FAD%3DADA467646&ei=usLwVJDVLcb9yQTKi4KIBw&usg=AFQjCNFdMVLbHBBScA tUjVWuF2AcjZiruw&bvm=bv.87269000,d.aWw&cad=rja
would end up primarily as a SIGINT operation, the original key to success would be due to HUMINT efforts.
The final suggestion for HUMINT operations against Al Qaeda and ISIS would also be based in the Central and South American regions. Not only do these terror groups have their own drug cartels, but they also attempt to recruit like-minded and impressionable individuals in these areas. Often enough, however, some of these recruits do not share the same level of enthusiasm or commitment. In other words, one could ‘count them out’ for going on ‘one-way-ticket’ missions. It is these individuals that the US can target for recruitment, for many of them may be involved just for the money they make from assisting in drug deals. As such, the US can financially reward and bribe these individuals for information: locations of terrorist camps, bases of operation, names, email addresses, phone numbers, etc. These contacts can be made through similar means as described above i.e. tracers, listening devices, bugs.
The information gained from these HUMINT contacts, as well as from the communications between terrorist drug dealers and their leadership in the Middle East will garner invaluable intelligence. Such intelligence should be of particular value considering the many security issues that plague the US- Mexico border. In other words, the US-Mexico border is as good a place as any for a terrorist attack to occur, and therefore one that should be guarded with the utmost effort.
HUMINT NEEDED AGAINST IRAN
For decades, Iran has had its heart set on establishing a fully operational nuclear program. It has repeatedly stated that its desire for having such is strictly for peaceful, economic purposes. It is the justified suspicion of many, however, that a nuclear-powered Iran would by synonymous as a nuclear- armed Iran. Iran does not help its case, either, as its leaders have frequently made threats against US ally, Israel. It is because of these threats, at least in part, that the Prime Minister of Israel, Benjamin Netanyahu, has been the most vocal opponent of a nuclear Iran. In fact, he has recently said that “a nuclear threshold [Iran]…is a threat to the entire world…and it is much worse than the threat of Islamic State.” 29 Another matter that fuels suspicions regarding Iran’s true intentions is the fact that it has illegally built nuclear reactors in the past. At least one of these facilities was believed to be a nuclear reactor specifically designed to construct nuclear weapons, so much so that Israel sent in jet fighters, destroying the facility in 2007. 30
If the threats against Israel and the illegal building of nuclear facilities was not enough, Iran also has significant ties to the terror groups Hezbollah and Hamas. One particular point of concern here is that it is common knowledge that state actors, such as Iran, use non-state actors, like Hezbollah and Hamas, to push their political and militaristic agendas against their enemies. In this case, it is quite possible that Iran may be reluctant to deploy a nuclear weapon against Israel in fear of a nuclear- retaliation from Israel, or even the US. This being the case, Iran could manufacture a nuclear device and secretly hand it over to Hamas or Hezbollah, and allowing one of them to use it on Israel.
Despite all of these indicators – indicators that point to Iran’s nuclear intentions being hostile in nature – many in and out of the US do not see any real danger in granting Iran’s wish for a fully operational nuclear program. Thus, official negotiations have begun and progressed, as of late, in which the US, Iran and other nations around the world have come together to see if an agreement can be made to allow Iran to proceed with its desired nuclear program. The conflict is clear, and so, too, is the path to resolve it. Unveiling and verifying Iran’s true nuclear intentions is the only way to truly settle this issue, and it must be settled; the stakes are too high to let this situation ‘play out’ without intervention. And though intelligence on and against Iran has improved lately, “there are still…critical gaps in what [the US] know[s] about what is going on inside the country, especially in the realm of the CIA’s HUMINT operations in Iran.” 31
When a nation knows it is the primary target of a sworn enemy, it is going to fight back more vigorously than any secondary target. Seeing the example of this in Jordan’s response to ISIS, namely
29 Herb Keinon, “Netanyahu warns world powers: A nuclear threshold Iran is a bigger threat than ISIS,” Jerusalem Post, 2014, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.jpost.com/Israel-News/Netanyahu-warns-world-powers- A-nuclear-threshold-Iran-is-a-bigger-threat-than-ISIS-379211
30 Noah Klieger, “A Strike in the Desert,” YNet News, 2012, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.ynetnews.com/articles/0,7340,L-3799227,00.html
31 Matthew Aid, “Spying on Iran,” MatthewAid.com, 2012, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.matthewaid.com/post/20716455365/spying-on-iran
its aggressive HUMINT campaign against the terrorists, the US can fully anticipate Israel having the same level of fervor in its espionage campaign against Iran. The information and intelligence gained by Israel’s Mossad agents needs to be shared with US officials to fill-in these ‘critical gaps.’ In return, the US IC needs to fully support Israeli-HUMINT operations against Iran as if the operations were their own. This includes any cyber-espionage support, such as a Flame-style virus which has been useful against Iran’s nuclear facilities in the past, 32 nuclear-MASINT support to read and monitor any significant changes or abnormalities emanating from existing Iranian nuclear facilities, and any other technologically-based intelligence platform that can augment, support and help verify the intelligence garnered from Israeli, HUMINT sources. The information the Mossad will uncover, and subsequently shared with the US, will likely play a key role in the determining the outcome of current nuclear negotiations had between the US and Iran. In other words, if Israeli intelligence uncovers that Iran is, indeed, attempting to make a nuclear bomb, then negotiations would be terminated, drastically reducing the fear of a nuclear equipped Iran and a possible nuclear war.
Another way HUMINT can be collected on Iran is by looking to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). The IAEA is an agency that acts as the world’s nuclear police, in a sense, in that it monitors nuclear usage, verifies that nuclear power is being used for peaceful purposes, and develops standards that all nations using nuclear power must abide by. The IAEA is intimately involved in the Iranian situation, often having personnel in Iran to inspect its nuclear facilities. Having a CIA officer, who is studied in uranium enrichment and nuclear weapons production, covertly be a part of the IAEA team tasked to inspect Iran would essentially put the US inside Iran’s nuclear facilities that are commonly in question. This would give intelligence analysts the type of firsthand data and information that viruses and monitoring devices simply cannot supply, and hopefully help form some indication as to the true intentions surrounding Iran’s nuclear ambitions. If there are strong suspicions and indicators that Iran may be producing nuclear weapons, additional HUMINT may be necessary for verification. This can be done by the CIA’s, IAEA insider by providing names, addresses and places frequently visited by the lead scientists working in these facilities.
32 “Flame Virus Explained: how it works and who’s behind it,” Russia Today, 2012, accessed March 1, 2015, http://rt.com/news/flame-virus-cyber-war-536/
These bits of information will be used in the overarching effort to set up a time and place where one of these Iranian scientists can be securely kidnapped and interrogated for information regarding possible nuclear weapons production.
A near identical operation was conducted by the CIA in 2009 when “Shahram Amiri, [an] Iranian nuclear scientist…was kidnapped by secret agents” in Saudi Arabia. 33 Keeping in step with the 2009 kidnapping, CIA operatives will look for every effort to initiate this kidnapping outside of Iran and in a friendly nation to reduce any unnecessary risk. Also, the CIA team involved must utilize extreme caution in protecting their identities and national origins. This is so because the Iranian scientist, upon his eventual return to Iran, will undoubtedly be debriefed. As such, the CIA will only want its name mentioned as ‘suspected’ kidnappers, nothing more. Additionally, this will give the US plausible deniability when Iran starts to point fingers, allowing future negotiations to still take place. In other words, the last thing the US wants is for Iran to know the CIA was directly involved, giving Iran an excuse to retreat into the shadows, and thereby cutting off all communicative efforts with the US, leaving the US with even more ‘critical gaps’ than before.
CONCLUSION
The threats and attacks faced today from ISIS and Al Qaeda are growing in number, in frequency and in their level of barbarity. Additionally, if what is said by Prime Minister Netanyahu and Professor Alan Dershowitz is true, namely that the threats posed by ISIS and Al Qaeda pale in comparison to the threat of a nuclear Iran, then there is no time to delay. Increased HUMINT operations against these threats need to commence and not cease until the world is secure.
Foundationally speaking, these present and future threats are not new, for similar enemies were faced during WWII with Nazi Germany, and through the Cold War where the world looked down the barrel of nuclear war with Soviet Russia. And similar to the case of the Cuban Missile Crisis, which was defused by the words of a Soviet Colonel, so too can the threat of terrorism and threat of Iranian nukes be defused by human intelligence. Time and time again, HUMINT has stood the test of time as a unique and
33 Richard Spencer, “Iranian Nuclear Scientist Recounts CIA Abduction,” The Telegraph, 2010, accessed March 1, 2015, http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/middleeast/iran/7890697/Iranian-nuclear-scientist- recounts-CIA-abduction.html
undeniably effective intelligence gathering platform. It is able to penetrate the minds and thoughts of its targets, revealing the true intentions and operational plans against the US’s greatest enemies. For these reasons, HUMINT needs to be the central, intelligence gathering figure in the fight against today and tomorrow’s threats.
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