SSC

SSC

Reading report assignment instructions
Following the instructions in the powerpoint, locate an academic journal article in a social science discipline that has something to do with

First, provide the following information—the authors, title of the article, title of the journal, and year and issue number. Please use the following format:

Watkins, David (2016). “Brilliant research,” Journal of Brilliant Research, volume 1, issue #1, pp. 1-20.

Then, answer the following questions to the best of your ability:

1)      What is they main claim of the article—what does the research presented here tell us that we didn’t know before?

2)      Describe the method the author uses to demonstrate this position or argument. What kinds of data were used, and how were they used, to make the point? What are the main sources of evidence used by the author?

3)      What are the strengths and weaknesses of the article, from your perspective? What would you like to know that the author of the article doesn’t answer?

Length: The answer to question #1 can sometimes be one sentence, although other times it will require further elaboration. In some cases, the author’s main point or thesis will be made very clear, but other times the author will be more circumspect. You should always use your own words, although brief quotations may be helpful. The total length should be 600-700 words, which may include some short quotations. (Be sure to give the page number when directly quoting the author). You may answer the questions in order, or write an essay that answers all of them in an integrated manner, whichever you prefer. If you are unsure if a particular article is suitable, please feel free to send me the reference–I’ll give you a thumbs up or a thumbs down.

” i did one but i didnt get good grade and this is what the professor said to me”
The problem here is that this isn’t a peer reviewed article. It’s a commentary in a scholarly newsletter. There is no original research here, just an author or a textbook explaining his process for what research to cite.  It’s also not about the social sciences, which is the topic for the course. That’s why it was difficult to write up–there’s very little there about scholarship

You can take partial credit here, or you can resubmit with a social science research article, preferably about globalization. To make it easier for you to complete, I’m happy to suggest some articles you could focus on.

Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 7 st C entury
Local Resistance in the Era
of Capitalist Globalization:
Clash of Cultures in the 21stCentury
With the collapse of the alternative ideologies of the 20th century, capitalism has had
several decades of unopposed influence across the globe. This has had an incre asing
result of changing the lives of people in the mold of the west to the dismay of many
people. No ideology unites them, no international organization can protect them
from armies and corporate militias and de ath squads. N ational governments call
those who resist “terrorists” and so class any actions of self-defense. We have entered
an era of global conflict between traditional people and corporations where one way
of life is being exterminated. While it is in general a continuation of the assault of
western colonialism, today’s indigenous rebels, inste ad of being considered devil
worshipers, are now often seen as minions of terror. Political rebellions, armed gangs
and drug lords and religious terrorism appe ar to form a range of types with conquest
of territory the goal on the one end and operational integrity (e.g., business) on the
other as in oligarchs morphing into warlords and presidents (as in Chechnya and
Ukraine). At the same time, international confrontations and competition for resources
are escalating. The defe at of the USSR is often described as a “collapse” of authority
and transition to a new civil entity, Russia, but like the defe at of the Ottoman Empire,
it has resulted in the dismemberment of the Soviet Empire. While the Middle East
remains unstable 100 ye ars after the Ottoman defe at, the Russian periphery has
become unstable in both independence movements along its southern borders as
well as those flanking Europe. The demise of both empires thre atens the stability of
the world today.
© 2015 Niccolo C aldararo. All Rights Reserved.
Niccolo Caldararo*
* Lecturer, Department of Anthropology, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, C alifornia, USA.
E-mail: calda raro@ aol.com
Introduction
Today, we find a rising thre at to the daily life of people from terrorism and anti-terror
activities by governments. Yet the only organized resistance to global development
exercised by transnational corporations, drug gangs and de ath squads and the
nations from which their power has risen, is incre asingly seen by the poor and
dispossessed of the world as al- Q a eda or similar entities. Similar local offshoots like
ISIS/IS have also appe ared, though remnants of Maoist movements persist in some
are as as in India with the N axalites.
1,2 Other guerrilla groups are remnants of states
failed in the Cold War struggle as in the case of Somalia and Yemen. Yet around
1 K Balagopal (1987), “A Tale of Arson”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 22, No. 29, July 18, pp. 1169-1171.
2 D Tilak G upta (2006), “Maoism in India: Ideology, Programme and Armed Struggle”, Economic and
Political Weekly, Vol. 41, N o. 29, July 22-28, pp. 3172-3176.
8 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
the world, from the uprisings in India by traditional people against the Vedanta mining
and development schemes,
3 the Ngobe-Bugle Indian tribe in Panama, to the recent
massacre in the Amazonas province of Peru, native people are striving to protect their
lands from resource extraction and environmental pollution.
4 We have entered an era
of global conflict between traditional people and corporations where one way of life
is being exterminated. While it is in general a continuation of the assault of western
colonialism, today’s indigenous rebels, inste ad of being considered devil worshipers
as they were in the past, are now often seen as minions of terror. The roots of
contemporary terror are not just seen in the disorder cre ated by colonialism, but in
the very form it has taken. Saudi Wahhabism was brought to power by the British in
their support of Abd al-Aziz or Ibn Saud with arms and advice before the First World
War to undermine Ottoman attempts to suppress the violent fanaticism of Abd alWahhab
and Muhammad Ibn Sa’ud that followed their uprisings after 1746.
5,6 What
is contradictory is that while the west concentrates on militant groups in various Islamic
countries that are fighting for Sharia law and an Islamic state, this is what Saudi Arabia
has now and has promoted abroad through its donations, foreign aid and educational
foundation activity. But as Doran7 notes, the Saudi government has a long history of
promoting conservative Islam, trying to balance its role in a secular and Christian
dominated world and yet attempting to limit the role of Shia Islam.
The consequences of this support have stemmed from the cre ation of the
totalitarian state of the Saudis and the spre ad of fanatic Wahhabism by the use of
oil money. In the past two decades, international confrontations and competition for
resources have escalated. Current assaults on national territories from Yemen to
Columbia in se arch of a pacification of activities that are seen as “terrorist” and
inconsistent with global capitalism often reflect a process of repression of local
political resistance to development. Actors are frequently left little recourse to
pe acefully resist after corrupt legal processes deny their standing to block
development. These pressures are bound together as in the case of Saudi-based
Wahhabi proselytizing and regional (e.g., Egyptian bombardment of Sa’dah) and
international intervention (Soviet and American client support).
8 Yemen was divided
into north and south portions between the British (south) and Ottoman (north) at
the beginning of the 20th century. Main resistance to outside control, whether
3 Anonymous (2014), “India—‘Foil Vedanta’ Protests Erupt in Delhi”, The Ecologist, July 7, available at
h t t p : / / w w w . t h e e c o l o g i s t . o r g / N e w s / n e w s _ r o u n d _ u p / 2 4 9 9 8 1 0 /
india_foil_v eda nta_protests_erupt_in_delhi.html
4 Alex Létourne au (2014), “Illegal Mining Severely Impacting Peruvian Environment”, Forbes, July 4,
av ailable at http: / /www.forbes.com/sites/ kitconews/2 014 /0 7 /0 4 /ill ega l-mining-severely-imp actingperuvian-environment/
5 Ayman S Al-Yassini (1982), “Saudi Arabia: The Kingdom of Islam”, in C arlo C aldarola (Ed.), Religions
and Societies: Asia and the Middle East, pp. 61-84, Mouton Press, Berlin.
6 Robert Wilson and Freeth Zahra (1983), The Arab of the Desert, Allen and Unwin, London.
7 Micha el Scott Doran (2004), “The Saudi Paradox”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 83, N o. 1, pp. 35-51.
8 Ayman Hamidi (2009), “Inscriptions of Violence in N orthern Yemen: Haunting Histories, Unstable Moral
Spaces”, Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 45, N o. 2, pp. 165-187.
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 9 st C entury
Ottoman in the 16th and 17th centuries or British, has been from the Zaydi. Yet Zaydi
influence has been contested by Sunni Wahhabi from Saudi Arabia and that conflict
has continued to the present.
9 The present Houthi rising can be seen as a
continuation of this conflict. And the Saudis have not escaped the consequences of
this export fanaticism, as Hegghammer10 notes, the rise of the Sahwa movement in
the e arly 1990s, especially after the arrival of US troops in the Gulf Wars, led to rising
tensions and violent confrontations.
The negative effects of culture change attendant to colonialism have long been
recognized. Bodley11 has published an effective cross-section of these effects of
interventions. Education has been one element in this process, partly positive in producing
a trained native cadre for postcolonial adaptation, but in many cases, as Goody12 has
shown from West Africa, individuals become educated but can find no jobs, yet do not
wish to return home to farm work and often fail to produce the traditional help and
aid for parents and family. In this context, the response of Boko Haram can be seen,
not as a mindless rejection of western knowledge and training in technical skills, but
as frustration with the economic and social consequences of such training.
The appe arance of ISIL/IS/ISIS parallels the evolution of some other rebel groups
in the past five decades where social issues are transformed by repression into armed
struggle and then support for military infrastructure and material requires economic
activities like kidnapping, drug trade, bank robbery, smuggling, especially in resource
extraction (logging, oil, minerals, etc.) and shadow banking. A recent report on ISIS’s
oil trading argues that it has taken over pre-existing networks of oil smuggling in
Iraq and Syria, but ISIS’s political and economic sophistication appe ars to outstrip
conventional rebel and criminal gang complexity.
13 Usually the evolution of criminal
gangs from illegal activities, as in alcohol in the USA in the 1920s and the 1930s, to
legitimate investments took new forms in the post-WWII period where drug lords, because
of the long existence of the drug war and increased demand, began to control extended
territories of land and business across countries like Columbia (see Figure 1).
14,15,16 ISIL/
IS’s complexity belies a longer history, one that may be part of state-sponsored regional
wars as in the Contras in Central America or U NITA in Angola.
17
9 King James Robin (2012), “Zaydi Revival in a Hostile Republic: C ompeting Identities, Loyalties and
Visions of State in Republican Yemen”, Arabica, Vol. 59, pp. 404-445.
1 0 Thomas Hegghammer (2008), “Islamist Violence and Regime Stability in Saudi Arabia”, International
Affairs, Vol. 84, N o. 4, pp. 701-715.
1 1 John H Bodley (1988), Tribal Peoples and Development Issues, Mayfield Publishing, Mountain View, C A.
1 2 Ja ck G oody (198 7), The Interface Betwe en the Written a nd the Ora l, C ambridge U niv ersity Press,
C ambridge.
1 3 Borzou Daragahi and Erika Solomon (2014), “Fuelling Isis Inc.”, The Financial Times, Monday, September 22.
1 4 Bruce Bagley (1988), “Colombia and the War on Drugs”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 67, N o. 1, pp. 70-92.
1 5 Rafa el Pardo (2000), “Colombia’s Two-Front War”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 79, N o. 4, pp. 64-73.
1 6 United States Department of the Tre asury (2004), “Tre asury Designates Financial Web of Columbian
Drug Lords”, Press C enter, O ffice of Public Affairs, September 14, available at http:/ /www.tre asury.gov/
press-center/ press-rel e ases /Pa ges/js1 91 5. aspx
1 7 Idean Salehyan (2010), “The Delegation of War to Rebel O rganizations”, The Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 54, N o. 3, pp. 493-515.
1 0 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
Wh at is n ew is the overwh elming uniformity of opposition to local control a nd
democracy by corporate power. Resistance h as ta ken the form, in th e world press,
as the combination of drug war, religious terror a nd new media . But what seems
also to be ignored is that everywhere in the world where there is ch ange driven
by global economics, th ere is unrest, and this unrest is a problem for th e West as
it is for C hin a and oth er “Brics”, and yet it is an opportunity for religious milit ants
lik e al- Q a eda for it could form the basis for a new ideological challenge to Christian
capitalism, as well as st ate capit alism (wheth er ideological as in China , or
opportunist as in Russi a) and “Third” forms of capitalism as in Japa n, a nd soci al
democratic capit alism (N G O philanthropy supported by l arge sovereign funds as
th at of N orway). All th ese forms are linked in an ideology of progress a nd
development. This “everywh ere” is not just th e hinterl ands, but th e massive
“underdeveloped” slums and sha ntytowns that surround the cities of the 21st
century.
18 The orga nization of forms of rebellion ca n be pl aced into a range of types
based on origins, support a nd ends (see Figure 2).
Figure 2: Organization of Forms of Rebellion in the 21st Century
Drug G a ngs Warlords De ath Squads Ideological Rebels Religious
Entrepreneurial ********Cold War or Colonial, State*****Indigenous
Social Unrest ? Rebellion ? Warlords ? Drug War ? Terrorism
Social Unrest ? Rebellion ? Seizure of Power ? Protracted Civil War
Figure 1: Fragmentation of Mexico by Drug Lords
1 8 Robert N euwirth (2006), Shadow Cities: A Billion Squatters, a New Urban World, Routledge, N ew York.
Source: Financial Times, May 8, 2015
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 1 1 st C entury
While the combination of terror and drugs is not new, having become a relatively
successful business plan among Latin American rebels of left and right,
19 the
combination of these methods and a religious, and not specifically political ideology,
has begun a new trend.
20 These often have the character of the millenarian
movements of the 19th and e arly 20th centuries, especially those of Melanesia 21 but
their le adership and their we apons and methods are specifically a product of global
technology and late modernity group organization, most notably in the recent
transformation of a bre ak away group from al- Q a eda in the form of ISIS/IS. They
show parallels despite different religious clothing, as in the case of the Lord’s
Resistance Army in Uganda and its combination of local history of the Acholi spe akers
and millenarian Christianity.
22,23 Suppression of indigenous religious movements in
colonial possessions (e.g., Africa and Melanesia) has produced multiple local and
regional rebellions.
24
Socialist and communist movements attempted to unite indigenous movements in
a coherent ideology in the 20th century, but were largely coopted by the nationalism
of the First and Second World Wars. No ideological or political movement has
succeeded in producing constructive me ans of intervention on behalf of local
communities and indigenous peoples. Individual nations have been able to block
international agencies’ efforts as have multinational corporations in canceling legal
redress.
25,26 Where law and diplomacy have failed, what are the alternatives? O ne
could imagine a new movement like the Khmer Rouge only projected internationally
where the main ideological ide a is the protection of indigenous culture and local
control couched in a political analysis where we alth inequality and an identified
transnational ruling elite are pictured as the enemy. This is not far from the world
view of Boko Haram. A similar rejection of western education and culture appe ared
in what C aldarola 27 called the “Modernist” period of Islamic history, especially in the
writings of al-Afghani and Muhammad Abduh. But there is nothing new about this
situation and reminds one immediately of the situation in the first century of our
1 9 William M Leo Gr ande and Kenneth E Sharpe (200 0), “Two Wa rs or O ne? Drugs, G uerrillas, a nd
Colombia’s N ew Violencia”, World Policy Journal, Vol. 17, N o. 3, pp. 1-11.
2 0 Stephen Ellis and G errie ter Ha ar (2004), Worlds of Power, Religious Thought and Political Practice in
Africa, Oxford University Press, N ew York.
2 1 Annemarie de Wa al Malefijt (1968), Religion and Culture: An Introduction to the Anthropology of Religion,
MacMillan.
2 2 Frank Van Acker (2004), “Uganda and the Lord’s Resistance Army: The N ew O rder N o O ne O rdered”,
African Affairs, Vol. 103, N o. 412, pp. 335-357.
2 3 Alfred G N hema (2008), The Resolution of African Conflicts: The Management of Conflict Resolution &
Post-Conflict Reconstruction, O hio University Press.
2 4 Brian Morris (2006), Religion and Anthropology: A Critical Introduction, University of C ambridge Press,
C ambridge.
2 5 Aman G upta (2005), Human Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Isha Books, Delhi.
2 6 Human Rights Watch (2001), Violence and Political Impasse in Papua, Vol. 20, N o. 10, July.
2 7 C arlo C aldarola (1982), “Introduction”, in C arlo C aldarola (Ed.), Religions and Societies: Asia and the
Middle East, pp. 9-58, Mouton Publishers, Berlin.
1 2 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
common era when millions of Jews had fled religious intolerance, political chaos and
tribal conflict that led to the Roman occupation and later the two “insurgent” wars
against fanatic nationalists.
28 What is significant is the failure of the west to consider
the causes of the current rising successes of insurgents to recruit and expand their
operations. The fact that al- Q a eda’s North African branch appe ars to be engaged
in transporting drugs as reported by Devlin Barrett (Associated Press, December 19,
2009) is only a natural evolution of the blindness that afflicts Western governments.
In America, the war on drugs has turned most of South and Central America into
a battlefield and, allied with the operations of authorities under the Patriot Act, erodes
American civil liberties.
Anti-knowledge or science movements are not rare in the history of other sects
of the Judeo-Christian tradition as the history of the Inquisition demonstrates, or the
acts during the 30 Ye ars War and other periods during the Protestant Reformation,
or the anti-C atholic violence and destruction of the monasteries during the English
Revolution. Parallels can also be seen in America in the violence of the First and
Second Gre at Awakening or the purging of te achers and scientists in the 1950s
during the Red Scare and House Un-American Activities Committee. Murder and
violence have characterized the fanaticism of the anti-abortion movement with the
killing of doctors, bombing of clinics and homes of Planned Parenthood workers and
supporters across the country, especially in the 1980s and the 1990s.
29,30
Together counter-insurgency operations and drug eradication and interdiction
assaults have turned the world into an open American attack plan. The fallout from
these operations, not only in loss of lives but income and the chaos and corruption
that has followed, is cre ating the new armies that America and the west face everyday
in new fields of resistance. Most of the casualties have been in tribal are as or where
tribal populations have been pressed into urban masses. The conditions of life in
these are as only fuel rebellion more. As Dupree 31 noted in his work on Afghanistan
in the 1970s, it has been the fantasies of the west over drugs and tribes that have
led to the most serious disasters and mistakes in foreign policy in the past 200 ye ars.
The Italian example in Libya is an instructive one 32 and informs us of the pattern
in other locations as in the Belgian Congo or in the Americas in the extermination
and pacification of native peoples during colonialism.
33,34
2 8 Josephus Titus Flavius (1959), The Jewish War, Penguin Classics, Penguin, London.
2 9 Merle Hoffman, Laura Flanders and Ruth Rosen (2001), “Welcome to My World”, Women’s Review of
Books, pp. 8-9.
3 0 Terri Sollum and Patricia Donovan (1985), “State Laws and the Provision of Family Planning and Abortion
Services in 1985”, Family Planning Perspectives, Vol. 17, N o. 6, pp. 262-266.
3 1 Louis Dupree and Linette Albert (1974), Afghanistan in the 1970s, Pra eger Press, N ew York.
3 2 E E Evans-Pritchard (1954), The Sanusi of Cyrenica, The Clarendon Press, Oxford.
3 3 Tzvetan Todorov (1984), The Conquest of America, Harper Perennial, N ew York.
3 4 John Hemming (1978), Red Gold: The Conquest of the Brazilian Indians, 1500-1760, Harvard University
Press, C ambridge.
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 1 3 st C entury
Nineteenth century Europe and its colonial spin-offs saw tribalism as its main
enemy. To eliminate local power structures—kinship relations—would result in
acculturation and order. This has largely been the strategy and rationale for
globalism and staying in both Iraq and Afghanistan. Eliminate tribalism and you get
docile workers, more profit and an end to resistance and terror. Instead, the 21st century
is reaping a harvest of uprisings driven and magnified by the very acculturation that
was expected to be so positive (profitable?). Drugs and money play a significant role
in the acceleration of that process. The intensity of the rebellion has created a determined
and well-organized model seen in Syria especially in the destruction of major urban
centers as in Aleppo and Damascus which presages future urban warfare in other
locations as in Nigeria’s Kano. The nature of this resistance can be found in the failure
of national governments as in Nigeria to respond proactively to local crisis, especially
in the northeastern provinces and to the disruptions in local economic and political life
by global investment. The assassination of the leader of Boko Haram and many of his
early followers is a powerful motivation here and can go far to explain current
conditions.
35
As sociologist Max Weber36 noted in the middle of the 19th century, pe asants
removed from their lands become docile and easily adapted to new forms of work,
and Starr37, referring to the e arly 20th century found that the invention of mass media
made the manipulation of masses of rootless people an effective substitute for police
and military action. C anetti
38 found that mass media conditioned people to act as crowd
elements and has promoted a consciousness of crowd in modern society. The lack of
reason and response to fact that we are seeing in American political debate is evidence
of how far this has developed. From crowd consciousness to mob action is only a small
step. Murdock with his Fox News and Murphy of Liberty News instill this way of thinking
every day. This “invasion of corporate news”, as Edgecliffe-Johnson39 has termed it,
has taken shape largely in the last two decades. However, media has come to be the
voice of not just nations, but religions and ideologies. The cross-purposes and new
techniques seem to be capable of motivating people to mass murder as in Rwanda
and the states of the former Yugoslavia. However, all that is missing is a me ans to
organize this resistance and for al- Q aeda-like or Boko Haram-like organizations to
see the opportunity and to fabricate an ideology that can be translated across cultural
and religious barriers. ISIL (or IS) has produced a sophisticated media presence on
the Internet and in publications as in its financial report.
40 The outcome of such an
3 5 Abimbola Adesoji (2010), “The Boko Haram Uprising and Islamic Revitalism in Nigeria”, Africa Spectrum,
Vol. 45, N o. 2, pp. 95-108.
3 6 Max Weber (1958), The Protestant Ethnic and the Spirit of Capitalism, Trans. Talcott Parsons, the Scribner
Library, N ew York.
3 7 Kevin Starr (1985), Inventing the Dre am, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
3 8 Elias C anetti (1962), Crowds and Power, Viking Press, N ew York.
3 9 Andrew Edgecliffe-Johnson (2014), “The Invasion of Corporate News”, The Financial Times, September 20.
4 0 Roula Khalaf and Sam Jones (2014), “Selling Terror: How ISIS Details its Brutality ”, Financial Times,
June 17.
1 4 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
ideology might be a collapse of social complexity in urban wars, where fanaticism and
millenarianism like that of the Christian right blend with the visions of a nuclear
apocalypse.
4 1
Using religion and ideology as a we apon is not new and currently the US is
engaged in such a program that may backfire. Major G eneral Douglas Stone told
reporter Woods42 of plans developed by the US Army to utilize prisoners in the various
camps held by the military for a grand reorganization of Islam into a more pe aceful
religion. Possessing a doctorate in public administration, and a degree from Stanford
Business School and having made a fortune in Silicon Valley, G eneral Stone outlined
how the military would win the “ battlefield of the mind.” Under his direction, military
prisons like Abu Ghraib were transformed, after 2006, into seeing their detainees
as strategic assets that could be reshaped to spre ad the seeds of a new Islam to
the Middle East and Asia. Aided by the Rand Corporation, Stone and the US military
have undertaken a re-education process and successfully rele ased their charges
(prisoners/students) back to their home countries. Of the 8,000 men rele ased since
2006, only 24 have been recaptured, what Stone considers to be proof of success,
interpreting this as a recidivism rate of less than 1%. While this ide a of Stone’s and
the program he describes may be simply a US military disinformation project specially
designed to discredit those returning or to incre ase suspicions among anti-US groups
in the Middle East, the concept is of interest as it reflects for the first time in history
that one military has used a religious sect as a counterintelligence movement. The
issue of ethics aside, the ide a of using religion as a we apon wielded by an enemy
is dangerous. Though during the Counter Reformation there were some efforts that
came close to the effect if not the intent they were hardly successful. There is a liability
to the le aders of al- Q a eda, ISIS or Boko Haram. By diluting their messages to
encompass such a wider ideological perspective, they may lose their core population
support. Like the e arlier effort of the Soviet Comintern, control of locally appropriated
issues and movements is difficult and can have considerable unintended
consequences.
Disintegration of Empires: USSR and Ottoman Equals Chaos
While it is cle ar that the collapse of the Ottoman Empire has cre ated continuing
violence and unrest over the past 100 ye ars, the dismembering of the USSR is proving
to be just as destabilizing. This is true not just in the various uprisings against Russian
dominance as in Chechnya but the lingering tensions in former Soviet Republics like
Ukraine. While religion and a lack of a history of self-government are factors, so
too is the history of repression of ethnicity and language. The second outcome is
the desire of Russian politicians and a segment of the population to recre ate the
4 1 See John Hagee (1996), Beginning of the End: The Assassination of Yizhak Rabin and the Coming of the
Antichrist, Thomas N elson Publishers, N ashville.
4 2 Andrew Woods (2008), “The Business End”, Part I and Part II, The Financial Times, June 28.
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 1 5 st C entury
Soviet Empire as is seen today in Ukraine. This le ads to international tensions as
the west, which has won the Cold War and imposed and overseen the disintegration
of the USSR, attempts to extend its control as with its institutions like the Europe an
Union and N ATO. O ne can say that just as the Ottoman collapse disintegrated the
moral and political traditions of pe aceful interaction of minorities based on the millet
system,
43 le ading to the past 100 ye ars of minority violence that has led to massacres
and then totalitarian postcolonial regimes, the Soviet collapse has produced a similar
vacuum of authority and cooperation le ading to ethnic violence from Ukraine to
Chechnya.
The most important fact of the current world order is the problem of the nations
of the former USSR and the stability of Russia. Russia lacks an internal logic or
ideology as both the Russian Empire and the USSR were expansionist in nature.
A variety of tensions cre ate an opportunist national government led by oligarchs often
derived from the security apparatus of the USSR, but religion and kinship are in
resurgent form in Russia as in the former Soviet Republics.
44,45 We have to keep in
mind that the USSR was defe ated and dismembered but unlike the experience of the
Turks with the defe at of the Ottoman Empire, dismemberment was experienced at
a time of invasion of the victorious allies of World War I. That invasion was defe ated
by Turkish forces led by Kemal Ataturk. The ability of the Young Turks to revitalize
Turkey and defe at the invasion is essential to understanding contemporary Turkey.
It also informs us of Russia today, as Russia has had no unifying figure like Ataturk
nor a coherent ideology to replace communism. It has rather in some assessments
become a Kleptocracy like some third world states that are failed postcolonial entities,
not even nations.
46, 47
As is, Russia appe ars as a modern industrialized nation with a formidable military
but a shattered civic life and poorly functioning institutions. At the same time, Turkey
seems to be descending into a process to reverse the westernization that Ataturk
fashioned with a President who has cre ated a powerful foundation from which to
rule the nation and mimic the former Ottomans. While the Soviet Union disintegrated
into a number of unstable states on the periphery of Russia with violent eruptions
punctuating the transition from communism, Turkey exists surrounded by the chaos
and repression that the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire has cre ated and been
sustained by the occupation, both military and economic, of western forces.
4 3 Yucel G uclu (2010), Armenians and the Allies in Cilicia: 1914-1923, Utah Series in Turkish and Islamic
Studies, University of Utah Press, Salt Lake City.
4 4 G ee Gretchen Knudson (1995), “G eography, N ationality and Religion in Ukraine: A Rese arch N ote”,
Journal for the Study of Religion, Vol. 34, N o. 3, pp. 383-390.
4 5 Katherine R Metzo (2006), “Exchange in Buriatia: Mutual Support, Indebtedness, and Kinship”, Ethnology,
Vol. 45, N o. 4 (Fall), pp. 287-303.
4 6 Patricia Gloster-Coates and Linda Q uest (2005), “Kleptocracy: Curse of Development”, International
Social Science Review, Vol. 80, N os. 1 & 2, pp. 3-19.
4 7 Andrei Shleifer and David Treisman (2005), “A N ormal Country: Russia After Communism”, The Journal
of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 19, N o. 1, pp. 151-174.
1 6 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
Modernity and Rebellion
We are seeing a combination of effects, drugs, religion, ideology and mass media,
all promoting anti-government action and directed toward specific “enemies.” The
drug war and expanding resource exploitation are motivating factors in rebellion
worldwide. What efforts might defuse the avalanche of conflict? McDermott
48 and
Hatzfeld49 have documented the process by which ordinary people become terrorists
in an environment of economic and political transformation. The US invasions of Iraq
with the continued occupation of military bases in the Saudi peninsula along with
the invasion of Afghanistan and ongoing Isra eli-Palestinian conflict have cre ated an
aroma of crisis.
Middle Eastern conflict, however, has been simmering since World War I due to the
conditions of division,
50 with betrayal and assassinations molding the many kingdoms
carved out of the Ottoman body.
51 The context for the defe at of the Soviets in
Afghanistan was a clear road to future instability and chaos across the region which
was obvious from history at the beginning.
52,53 If fact, western involvement in
Afghanistan, Iran, Pakistan and Iraq has been so disastrous that the history re ads
as folly.
54,55,56 Russian campaigns to attempt to stabilize their southern tier have been
brutal and expensive 57 but presage future problems as immigration spre ads the fallout
across the country and the globe as Mackinlay58 has predicted from all the Middle
Eastern adventures of the west. Even countries like Algeria have purchased relative
quiet at a tremendous price in blood59,60 and it is a quiet that reeks of a hidden thunder
as Josephus described the Roman suppression of Palestine 2,000 ye ars ago.
Beheadings Versus Drones
Every period of history seems to have its characteristic form of terror: for the ancient
world it was crucifixion; for the medieval, burning at the stake or drawing and
quartering; for America hanging, or tar and fe athering in different times and regions;
in the modern period, gas chambers, throwing people from helicopters or napalming
4 8 Terry McDermott (2005), Perfect Soldiers, HarperCollins, N ew York.
4 9 Je an Hatzfeld (2005), Machete Se ason: The Killers in Rwanda Spe ak, Farrar Straus Giroux.
5 0 Patrick Se ale (2010), The Struggle for Arab Independence, C ambridge University Press, C ambridge.
5 1 Ali Allawi (2014), Faisal I of Iraq, Yale University Press, N ew Haven.
5 2 Rodric Braithwaite (2009), “The Familiar Road to Failure in Afghanistan”, Financial Times, December 22.
5 3 G eorge Crile (2003), “Charlie Wilson’s War”, Atlantic Monthly, N ew York.
5 4 William Dalrymple (2013), Return of a King: The Battle for Afghanistan, Bloomsbury, N ew York.
5 5 Ahmed Rashid (2000), Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil, and Fundamentalism in Central Asia, N ew Haven, Yale
University Press.
5 6 Rajiv Chandrase karan (201 2), Little America: The War Within the War for Afghanistan, Bloomsbury,
N ew York.
5 7 Ahmed Rashid (2002), Jihad: The Rise of Militant Islam in Central Asia, Penguin Books, N ew York.
5 8 John Mackinlay (2009), The Insurgent Archipelago, Columbia /Hurst, N ew York.
5 9 Martin Evans (2011), Algeria: France’s Undeclared War, Oxford University Press, Oxford.
6 0 Jennifer E Sessions (2011), By Sword and Plow: France and the Conquest of Algeria , Cornell University
Press, C ornell.
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 1 7 st C entury
children and most recently, extraordinary renditions.
61
Figure 2 sends a message intended to control the viewer
who receives it. As the Bure au of Investigative
Journalism reported in January,
62 the number of drone
killings under the O bama administration was over
2,400, mostly targeted political le aders or active
members of organizations the administration considers
terrorist. This does not include other drone killings
controlled by nations sharing the technology like Isra el
that attack often the same organizations. While
behe ading was a frequent me ans of dispatching rebels
in England, as in the famous behe ading of Wat Tyler or Mary Q ueen of Scots,
a behe ading with a sword differs little from the use of a device like a guillotine, except
the latter is more effective and usually produces a uniform and effective end.
Behe ading was often practiced by colonial powers for slave rebellion.
63 Debating the
issue of how humane such methods of execution are is only symbolic of relative
power.
64,65 Other behe adings by organizations who used the media as a vehicle to
promote terror include some of the Mexican drug gangs.
66 Mutilations were common
under colonial regimes by the colonial powers and were
often arbitrary (Figure 3 is an example from Belgian
Congo67
), ISIS’ use of similar methods should be seen in
the context of response to colonial violence. One cannot
terrorize populations for 400 years and then believe that
in a few post colonial decades all will be well.
There is currently a media blitz spre ading
misinformation regarding the power and presence of alQ
a eda in various Middle Eastern and African countries,
including Libya and Mali. The Mali situation was
consonant with my discussion above. The indigenous
Tuareg have faced a variety of challenges from the
central government and from competition for resources between a number of
adjacent nations, including Libya (under G addafi) and Chad. The Tuareg have
responded with demands via a variety of civil me ans and with rebellions, the most
Figure 2: Beheadings
Figure 3: Mutilations
6 1 Alan W Clarke (2012), Rendition to Torture, Rutgers University Press, N ew Brunswick.
6 2 Jack Serie (2014), “Drone Warfare: More than 2,400 De ad as O bama‘s Drone C ampaign Marks Five
Ye ars”, Bure au of Investigative Journalism, January 23.
6 3 Greg Grandin (2014), The Empire of Necessity: The Untold Story of a Slave Rebellion in the Age of Liberty,
O neworld, Metropolitan Press, N ew York.
6 4 O gechi E Anyanwu (2005), “Crime and Justice in Postcolonial Nigeria: The Justifications and Challenges
of Islamic Law of Shari’ah”, Journal of Law and Religion, Vol. 21, N o. 2, pp. 315-347.
6 5 Michel Foucault (1977), Discipline and Punish, Vintage Books, N ew York.
6 6 Raisa Bruner (2012), “Cartel Rivals Behe ad Zetas on Camera”, ABC News, June 28, 2012, available at http:/
/ abcnews.go.com/Blotter/drug-cartel-rivals-behe ad-zetas-camera /story?id = 16670584.
6 7 Adam Hochschild (1998), “King Leopold’s G host: A Story of Greed, Terror, and Heroism in Colonial
Africa”, Houghton Mifflin, Boston.
1 8 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
recent was quite successful though it was overtaken by the more organized al-Q a eda
affiliates. Due to the inability of nation states in the area to mount effective border
controls, the area is infested with illegal trade of every kind.
Thousands of indigenous problems fester across the globe like the Tuareg story, and
yet it is the nature of the west’s view of the world that allows it to ignore the fundamental
economic problems of people and promote repression.
68,69
ISIS and Rapid Conquest
There has been much emphasis in the press over the rapid expansion of the ISIS
(it has also called itself ISIL or Islamic State) in the past ye ar. A variety of explanations
have surfaced, but one that is consistent with the history of the are a refers to the
numerous times a mobile force has caused the collapse of empires and states.
Braudel
70 notes that the Macedonian cavalry in Alexander the Gre at’s army was more
of a factor in the defe at of Darius’ forces than the phalanx and cites later conquests
of the e arly Muslim, Mongol and Turks as being dependent on a use of cavalry without
respect to typical fighting tactics.
What appe ars on the horizon of terror is a relationship between state terror and
local responses. Whether western military and intelligence cre ated al- Q a eda to fight
the Soviets the effect has been the same. We are told that documents seized in Iraq
prove that the gre atest number of “jihadis”, not al- Q a eda (but that does not matter
to most commentators), came from Libya 71 which were supposedly from al- Q a eda
or “linked” groups and first published by the Combating Terrorism Center (CTC) at
West Point. What is the authenticity of these documents? They had the function, like
the “proofs” for Saddam’s we apons of mass destruction, to build support for the
war at home. From the beginning, the sources used to identify the existence and
history of al- Q a eda are the same as the ones used to give background to the
development of the mujahideen in Afghanistan. Bill Moyers’s sources are an
example.
72 Most are written by journalists like that by Abdel Bari Atwan (The Secret
History of al-Q aeda) who has had a long career employed by Saudi family entities.
Others are by people like Bruce Hoffman,
73 someone whose background is steeped
in both the profits of a war contractor and in the history of the Middle East struggle
of Isra el against her neighbors. Like many following this line of re asoning, he argues,
“It amazes me that people don’t think there is a cle ar adversary out there, and that
our adversary does not have a strategic approach.” A worldwide conspiracy of an
invincible organization stalks a pe aceful world. The image could be turned upside
6 8 Thomas Ke an and Lee Hamilton (2006), Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9 / 11 Commission,
Alfred A. Knopf, N ew York.
6 9 Lawrence Wright (2006), The Looming Tower: Al- Q a eda and the Road to 9 / 11, Alfred A. Knopf, N ew York.
7 0 Fernand Braudel (2001), Memory and the Mediterrane an, Rosellyne De Ayala and Paule Braudel (Eds.),
Trans. Sian Reynolds, Vintage Books, Random House, N ew York.
7 1 See, “Sinjar Documents”, available at http:/ /tarpley.net/ docs/ CTCForeignFighter.19.Dec07.pdf
7 2 http: / /www.pbs.org /moy ers/journ al /0 72 72 00 7 / a lq a eda .html
7 3 http:/ / en.wikipedia .org/…
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 1 9 st C entury
down with e ase and we could view the entire anti-terrorist edifice as one gre at
conspiracy to deprive the world of pe ace, freedom and prosperity. O ne of the glaring
consequences of the post-9/11 world is the dramatic incre ase in we alth inequality
and if we follow the money, the vast funneling of funds into security and military
hardware since 9/11 has benefitted a select sector of investors.
The Tail Wagging the Dog
As an anthropologist re ading over this literature on al- Q a eda, I find it has certain
interesting qualities. In other words, the al- Q a eda story has the mirror structure of
many myths: for example, al- Q a eda is so well organized that it cannot be infiltrated
and yet we know all about it because we have certain unnamed or elusive sources
that can be counted on to produce detailed information about the organization.
Usually, such organizations are found in the popular press as conspiracy theories
of one kind of illuminati cre ation myth or another dating back to either the beginnings
of civilization or the founding of America; but what is more disturbing is the fact that
many individuals arrested or involved in terrorist acts or sect associated with al- Q aeda
have been found to be government plants or recruited by government agents.
74,75
A more cre ative view is found in Robert She a and Robert Wilson’s books. A paranoid
personality is required to believe such tales and yet all the world believes in the alQ
a eda cre ation myth. In these conspiracy myths, everything can be explained by the
secret organization. This is true of al- Q a eda. The defe at of the Soviets in Afghanistan,
a number of terrorist attacks from the 1980s and the 1990s and the substantial
organization necessary for 9/11 and then a host of others since of varying quality
of execution and goal. No internal logic is necessary to unite the events or the actors.
Goals and ends are secret knowledge and cannot be determined.
The failure of al- Q a eda to take advantages of opportunities that are obvious that
would further their power and build a movement is generally ignored. Al- Q a eda has
not linked with the international drug movement or illicit arms trade as underground
leftist terrorists are supposed to have done in the 1970s, the 1980s and the 1990s.
O ne could assume this is due to their superior analysis that such involvements were
detrimental to the movements that did, but this is open to interpretation. The same
lack of action is true in regard to incidents of terror against the poor and
disenfranchised in places like Central and South Africa, India and Central and South
America, or any presence in labor struggles in the Middle East. Their supposed
presence in Iraq and Afghanistan has been their central image, but in these are as
their ability to produce any substantial base or victories is curious. Again, al- Q a eda
seems more like a myth, a brutal Robin Hood who seldom wins anything but is always
present to take the blame for everything. And now with ISIS, there could not be a
7 4 Sam Stanton and Denny Walsh (2014), “Lodi-Are a Terror Suspect Says He Would N ot Have Acted Against
His O wn Country ”, The Sacramento Bee, August 26.
7 5 C ahal Milmo and Kim Sengupta (2013), “Terror in Woolwich: MI5 ‘Tried to Recruit Suspect in Kenyan
Jail’”, The Independent, May 26.
2 0 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
more perfect bogeyman. It is obvious that al- Q a eda and it affiliates in the Yemen
and Somalia as well as Malia have been able to take advantage of failed states to
intensify the degradation of civil life and the potential for the redevelopment of order
and productivity. Unlike organizations like the Muslim Brotherhood, al- Q a eda has
not shown any ability to cre ate sustained local organizations for charities or business
to aid local populations.
Al- Q a eda /ISIL and bin Laden are the re ason for the loss of freedoms in several
western countries, most notably represented in the American Patriot Act and yet his
pursuit (now the pursuit of ISIS as bin Laden is de ad) is the definition of the struggle
to regain it. A more coincident construction to Eric Blair’s book, 1984, would be hard
to fabricate. Like a religion, belief in the existence of al- Q a eda cannot be proven
or disproven and skeptics are worse than heretics or the old unbelievers of
international communism being behind every protest or uprising of the 1950s. Such
attitudes define “fellow travelers” in the anti-communist vernacular of “unpatriotic
coconspirators.” Yet if we use logic to address the ideology of the “ al- Q a eda
conspiracy”, we might find that the very policies that have been invented to fight
terror have cre ated more, from Saddam to bin Laden to ISIS, and there seems to
be no end to this. Is there a way out of this straightjacket the world finds itself in?
Demands of the USA and western forces in general to defe at or destroy ISIS are
just as naïve or based in conflict of interest as those which led to the invasion of Iraq
in 1990, 2003 and Afghanistan in 2001. Eradication of ISIS, Boko Haram, the N axalites
and others yet to come, is not possible using force. What will eventually happen will
be more urban wars and major modern cities like Damascus and Aleppo will suffer
months if not years of armed struggle and repression by western forces. Such an
enterprise would be like the attempted effort to have Ottomans influence the Wars of
the Reformation, had they aided or attacked the early Protestants. They did neither,
for in 1525 the French were destroyed at Pavia and their king, Francis was taken
prisoner. Martin Luther declared to Charles V’s face the fanaticism that was to rend
Europe in a gre at war. But a rising fanaticism in the Ottoman e ast caused Selim the
Grim to be occupied suppressing Shite rebellions until 1520 when his son, Suleiman
the Lawgiver (magnificent in most Europe an histories), came to the throne.
Selim the Grim had consolidated the world of Islam, from Persia to Spain and became
the Caliph and Commander of the Faithful. Islam was at its political and cultural height.
Just as Suleiman crushed the Knights of St. John on Rhodes and began his assault on
Hungary, he received a letter from the imprisoned King Louis in Spain asking his help,
which he rejected. In 1526, Suleiman exterminated the Hungarian army at Mohacs and
stormed Buda. In 1529, Suleiman advanced against Vienna with 200,000 troops, but
while the Christian kingdoms were divided (and the Pope abandoned the defense to
concentrate on suppressing Florence) they set aside difference enough to produce an
effective, yet desperate defense of Vienna.
76
7 6 Fletcher Pratt (1956), The Battles that Changed History, Dolphin Books, G arden City.
Local Resistance in the Era of C apitalist Globalization: Clash of Cultures in the 21 2 1 st C entury
Suleiman failed and yet the worst of the Wars of the Reformation were yet to come.
Europe was left to fight it to the end. The nations of Islam cannot do this with the
interference of the west, yet such a consolidation would likely continue the recent
Arab Spring and sweep away not only the western-le aning Arab kingdoms, but also
the colonial boundaries producing a new configuration for the people of the Middle
East. Whether the west can continue to constrain these peoples and prevent such
a transformation is as unlikely as Suleiman’s attempt to conquer Europe. It often
seems as if western policies are built on the model of the Mahdist transformation77,
where a triumphant and revolutionary messianism that had defeated the British army
in Sudan to establish an indigenous regime was eventually compromised by colonial
intrigue into a collaboration partner. That process was initiated by a failure of the
Mahdist movement to expand, especially to Ethiopia where the Christian Emperor,
Yohannes IV, offered an anti-Europe an alliance that was rejected by the Mahdist
le aders. Inste ad, their ideology, constructed around Islam, led them to invade
Ethiopia and waste both nations’ energies and resources. The British reinvasion was
successful but given the international situation required some interaction with former
Mahdist followers.
78 The ide a of some accommodation, the “preservation of foreign
investments”, is an attempt to retain aspects of colonial control and perpetuate client
allies and institutions against complete “reindigenation.” The danger of this was less
during the period of Soviet competition as communism is a form of western
progressivism as Jomo Kenyatta re alized.
79 Like the Mahdists, ISIS’s ideology prevents
it from constructing wider alliances and limits its ability to integrate a global critique
to achieve an anti-colonial expansion. The parallel with the Khmer Rouge also is of
interest where an extreme anti-western interpretation of Marxism led to a failed
attempt at decolonialization of the population.
For students of civilization, the problems caused by the collapse of the Ottoman
and Soviet Empires will be the focus of attention for ye ars to come, yet they provide
a fruitful source of analysis to the study of social complexity and its fragility. Yet as
Moyo80 has noted, development and foreign aid is driving change and chaos across
the developing world along with the conflict that missionary work brings. Missionaries
are often seen a agents of foreign colonialism81,82,83 and their behavior in criticizing
7 7 Harold B Barclay (1982), “Sudan: O n the Frontier of Islam”, in C arlo C aldarola (Ed.), Religions and
Societies: Asia and the Middle East, pp. 147-171, Mouton Publishers, Berlin.
7 8 Abdel Salam Sidahmed (2006), Sudan: The Contemporary Middle East, Routledge, London.
7 9 Bruce Berman (1996), “Ethnography as Politics, Politics as Ethnography: Kenyatta, Malinowski and the
Making of Facing Mount Kenya”, CJAS, Vol. 30, N o. 3, pp. 313-344.
8 0 Damisa Moyo (2009), De ad Aid, Farrar, Straus and Giroux, N ew York.
8 1 Robert Frykenberg (2003), Christians and Missionaries in India: Cross-Cultura l Communication Since
1500, Eerdmans, C ambridge.
8 2 Firoze Manji and C arl O ’Coill (2002), “The Missionary Position: N G Os and Development in Africa”,
International Affairs, Vol. 78, N o. 3, pp. 567-583.
8 3 N ancy Fix Anderson (2004), “Review of Christians and Missionaries in India”, Anglican and Episcopal
History, Vol. 73, N o. 4, in “Anglicans and Lutherans: The N ew World Experience of Two O ld World
Traditions”, Anglican Lutheran Conference Papers I, Chicago, June 2004 (December 2004), pp. 529-531.
2 2 The IUP Journal of International Relations, Vol. IX, N o. 3, 2015
local indigenous religions or other major world religions (especially Islam) feeds local
tensions as money and personnel for missionary work comes from abroad and has
always represented colonial issues versus local initiative and ideology. What seems
cle ar is that unless some international entity can be cre ated that can control
international finance and limit the rights of international corporations, then the lack
of local justice will continue to produce terror across the globe.
The behavior of some of the current rebel groups, for example ISIS, shows definite
lapses in organization and knowledge of how to implement state formation
operations. Soloman84 describes some of these deficiencies, yet this is not significantly
different from local operations that evolved from drug organizations in places like
Columbia in the 1990s. Parallels in sophistication of economic control and
organization can be gle aned from other examples in history, like the crime lords of
Chicago in the 1920s.
85 With the world awash in former military highly trained
operatives, the potential for improving personnel quality and operational efficiency
is quite good. With ISIS alre ady franchising operations in some of its periphery,
86
the pattern is alre ady well established. Governments might consider suppressing or
tightly regulating the operations of private security services as they are incre asingly
being used as virtual armies across the globe by both legitimate businesses87 and
governments as well as those in gray are as of legality, as in the Poroshenko /
Kolomoisky affair in Ukraine 88 and outright mercenary operations for profit.
89 Some
of these have evolved from military downsizing in the west and the extensive use of
contract services since the 1980s in the USA.
Loyalties of such organizations are certainly questionable as are their chain of
command and responsibility. As certainty of messaging and financial information
become more vulnerable to hacking, issues of control by governments will become
more unstable and involvement of citizens distant. Access to ownership
documentation in identity theft has risen in sophistication as well and thre atens to
bre ach the bastions of banking as more value is shifted to dark money and shadow
financial entities. This complex scenario of the future, where war and non-war
violence and electronic sabotage of varied loyalties and semi-legal entities, has been
sketched vividly by Wittes and Blum (2015).
90
Reference # 55J-2015-07-01-01
8 4 Erika Soloman (2015), “Meet the Boss”, Financial Times, January 6.
8 5 Ethan N adelmann (2007), “Drugs”, Foreign Affairs, N o. 162 (September-O ctober), pp. 24-26, 28, 30.
8 6 Soloman (2015), op. cit.
8 7 Editorial, “Te a Industry ’s Private Army ”, Economic and Political Weekly, Vol. 27, N o. 42, O ctober 17,
1992, p. 2 273.
8 8 Roman O le archyk (2015), “Poroshenko Warns Rival O ver ‘Pocket Army ’”, Financial Times, March 24.
8 9 David She arer (1998), Private Armies and Military Intervention, Oxford University Press, N ew York.
9 0 Benjamin Wittes and G abriella Blum (2015), The Future of Violence, Basic Civitas.
?
Copyright of IUP Journal of International Relations is the property of IUP Publications and its
content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the
copyright holder’s express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email
articles for individual use.