Women’s economic security at risk in America

Women’s economic security at risk in America

The faltering safety net in a reluctant nation: Women’s economic security at risk in America

Lisa A. Morris⁎, Luisa S. Deprez Muskie School of Public Policy, University of Southern Maine, P.O. Box 9300, Portland, ME 04104, USA

a r t i c l e i n f o s y n o p s i s

Available online 15 December 2013 While the U.S. has always been a reluctant welfare state, political opposition to the safety net is at an all-time high. Many safety net programs in the U.S. have either been downsized or eliminated or are being threatened with such. Women are especially at risk. The safety net is an essential source of support for them, especially women with children, poor and working class women, and women of color. In this paper we describe the U.S.’s long-standing ambivalence towards the safety net and its impact on women. We explore how a romanticized devotion to “traditional” work and family norms, complicated by class and race, influence and shape public attitudes, and continue to be inscribed in the design and delivery of safety net programs. We also review proposed changes and evaluate their potential to either help or undermine women’s control over their lives and their ability to achieve economic security.

© 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

“As the nineteenth century waned and the twentieth dawned, women were prominent among proponents of a principle that was hitherto nearly alien to American ideology but that has now, a century later, come to be an accepted part of our political views: the government and, they increasingly argued, the national government, have a responsibility to promote the general welfare actively by providing initiative and support where necessary. The degree and types of support remain, perhaps more now than then, matters of profound political contention, but in the late twentieth century even the most conservative ideologies tend to agree that government must provide a ‘safety net’ for its people.”

[Sapiro, 1990: 36]

Introduction

Things in the United States have changed rather dramat- ically since Virginia Sapiro wrote these words in 1990. While

the U.S. has always been a somewhat reluctant welfare state, political and public support for the safety net are currently at an all-time low (Pew Research Center, 2012; Stokes, 2013). Aside from temporary expansions to some programs in response to the recession, over the past several decades many safety net programs in the U.S. have either been downsized or eliminated or are being threatened with such. Most of the changes have been to programs serving the poor, but calls for reform are beginning to reach even the once untouchable Social Security programs (Aaron, 2011; Edsall, 2013; Galewitz & Fleming, 2012; Greenstein, 2012a; Parrott, 2013; Schott & Cho, 2011; Sherman, 2009; Trisi & Pavetti, 2012).

For women, the current times are particularly unsettling. The safety net is an essential source of support for them, especially for women with children, working class women and women of color (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Burt & Nightingale, 2010; Cohen, Steuerle Eugene, & Carasso, 2001; Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, 1994). Moreover, increas- ing opposition to the safety net is broadening to threaten other essential services and programs upon which women rely. Programs that provide family planning and women’s health care services are under attack as a conservative agenda seeking to control women’s reproduction and birth

Women’s Studies International Forum 47 (2014) 255–268

⁎ Corresponding author.

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control options gains momentum (Guttmacher Institute, 2013; Sonfield, Hassdedt, Kavanaugh, & Anderson, 2013). Affirmative action policies, both in the workplace and espe- cially in university admissions, are under review in response to allegations of “reverse” race and gender discrimination (Slater, 2013). A pay equity law has been blocked by Republicans in Congress twice in recent years, first in 2009 and again in 2012 (Steinhauer, 2012).

Particularly troubling is that this is occurring at a time when poverty rates among women have been increasing. From 2000 to 2010, the poverty rate among women climbed from 11% to 15%, the highest rate in over 17 years. For women of color and women with children, the situation is worse. In 2010 the poverty rate for Black and Hispanic women the rate reached 26% while for white women it was 10%. Among female heads of households, the rate increased even more: as of 2010, 33% of white single mothers were poor and nearly half of all Black (48%) and Hispanic (50%) single mothers were poor. And while the poverty rate among women 65 and older declined slightly between 2000 and 2010, going from 12% to 10%, the poverty rate among elderly women remains higher than that for men, which during this same period remained steady at 7% (National Women’s Law Center, 2012).

And, after years of progress, wages and workplace equality between men and women have stalled. In 2011, women working full-time year-round took home annual earnings that were only 77% of what their male counterparts earned— the same level since 2009 and up only 3% since 2000. As a percentage of full-time median weekly earnings of white men, white women make only $81 in comparison to a man’s $100; and the wage gap is even larger for Black women — 68% and Hispanic women — 59% (Hegewisch & Edwards, 2012). Even as women close the academic achievement gap (National Center for Education Statistics, 2012) they continue to crowd into “pink collar” jobs, workplaces which tend to be both female and family “friendlier” but ones where wages are lower (Blau, Ferber, & Winkler, 2009). However, even in occupations where the majority of workers are women, as a percentage of median weekly earnings among full-time workers, the gender wage gap persists: among registered nurses women earn 96% of what male nurses earn, among social workers the gender gap is 89%, administrative support staff, 86%, and school teachers, 91% (Hegewisch & Edwards, 2012).

In this paper we describe the U.S.’s long-standing ambivalence towards the safety net and its impact on women. We review the work of safety net scholars examin- ing how gender and long-held gender roles, complicated by class and race, influence and shape public attitudes, feed this ambivalence toward the safety net and continue to be inscribed in the design and delivery of safety net programs. After describing the overall safety net and the politics therein, we examine the evolution of three key programs – Social Security retirement benefits, Unemployment Insurance, and Temporary Assistance to Needy Families – and reflect on how they have shaped and continue to shape the experiences and lives of women who rely on them. In the context of looking at these programs, we also review some recently proposed changes and evaluate their potential to either help or undermine women’s economic security. We conclude with recommendations to improve the safety net for women.

The safety net in the United States

As Theda Skocpol’s (1992) history of the safety net shows, the United States has never been a “welfare state” in the full sense of the term. The role of the federal government has always been limited and universal programs rare. The earliest safety net programs, established by a mix of federal and state efforts during the late 1880s and into the early 1900s, included disability and old-age benefits for veterans of the Civil War and their survivors, and for workers hurt in industrial accidents. The first universal programs were established with the passage of the Social Security Act of 1935 (SSA) in response to widespread hardship caused by the Great Depression and the inability of government and organizations at the local and state levels to meet the increased need. The legislation created programs to provide benefits to the unemployed, the elderly, widows and fatherless children. Benefits for disabled workers and depen- dent disabled children 18 and over and their caregiver mothers were added in 1956. Over time, additional expan- sions and additions have occurred through the initiation of block grants to states to provide social services to at-risk populations and public health insurance programs to cover seniors, the disabled, the poor, and the children of poor and near-poor families (Gordon, 1994; Katz, 1986; Skocpol, 1992; U.S. Social Security Administration, Compilation of the Social Security Act Laws, n.d.).

Much as it was when first established, the U.S. safety net today remains a patchwork of programs, each implemented using a mix of federal, state and local funding and administrative requirements. Some are universal programs while others are means-tested to target low-income workers and the poor. Some are entitlement programs with funding sufficient to provide benefits to all eligible individuals and families seeking assistance; others are funded by federal block grants to states and local governments, a form of funding that caps spending and is not automatically adjust- able even during economic downturns. Benefits range from monthly cash payments to in-kind benefits (e.g., food, housing, energy assistance) and services (e.g., job prepared- ness, substance abuse and mental health treatment). Pro- grams for the poor are more likely to provide in-kind benefits and services while programs for the nonpoor are more likely to provide cash assistance and health insurance (Burt & Nightingale, 2010; Skinner, 2012; Zedlewski, 2012a).

Because over time much of the authority has been devolved down to the state and local levels, benefit types and amounts, eligibility rules and requirements, and admin- istrative and service delivery structures vary considerably throughout the nation (Burt & Nightingale, 2010; Skinner, 2012). Adding to this complexity is the fact that federal, state and municipal governments frequently contract with private sector, community-based organizations – both nonprofit and for profit as well as faith-based – to deliver benefits and services.1 Consequently, there is wide variation in terms of how well programs reach their intended populations (Zedlewski, 2012a), with access to support especially limited in poor communities and predominantly African-American and Hispanic neighborhoods (Allard, 2008, 2009).

Specific programs that comprise the American safety net include the Social Security program, an entitlement program

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for older and disabled Americans established in 1935 as part of the Social Security Act. In 1939 the program added benefits for married spouses and surviving spouses (and their dependent children) of qualified workers. Medicare, a health insurance program for older Americans, was added in 1965. Retirement and disability benefits are funded by earmarked payroll taxes established by the Federal Insur- ance Contributions Act (FICA); Medicare is funded by a mix of FICA payroll taxes, premiums paid by retirees and general tax revenues (U.S. Social Security Administration, Online Social Security Handbook, n.d.; Tamborini & Whitman, 2007).2

Unemployment Insurance (UI), a program providing monthly cash benefits to the temporarily and involuntarily unemployed, was also established under the 1935 Social Security Act (U.S. Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration, Unemployment Insurance, n.d.). In addition, there are federal and state “worker’s compensation” programs providing partial wage replacement as well as medical treatment and vocational rehabilitation to eligible workers or their dependents who experience work-related injury or occupational disease (U.S. Department of Labor, Office of Workers’ Compensation Programs, n.d.).

Programs specifically targeting the poor include the Supplement Nutritional Assistance Program (SNAP), an enti- tlement program that provides food assistance to poor individuals and families. The federal government covers the full cost of benefits plus half the administrative costs (states cover the other half). Administration is carried out at the state level. In addition to monthly food vouchers, the program also provides free and reduced school meals and nutritional education services (Skinner, 2012; U.S. Department of Agriculture, Food & Nutrition Service, n.d.).

Medicaid, a program providing health insurance coverage to poor children and their parents and pregnantwomen, is also an entitlement program jointly funded by the federal (using a formula that provides more support to poor states) and state governments, and managed by states (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, n.d.). The federal government imposes minimum income thresholds and requires states to cover certain population groups: children under 6 in families with annual incomes below 133% of the of the Federal Poverty Level (FPL) (currently $25,975 for a family of three), children 6 to 18 living below 100% of the FPL ($19,530), and pregnant women whose incomes fall below133%of the FPL ($15,282 for a singlewoman without children). States can choose to expand coverage beyond federal minimums and all fifty states have done so for children: the average Medicaid income eligibility level for children is 241% of the FPL (currently $46,872 for a family of three). Thirty-nine states also provide coverage for pregnant women up to 185% of the FPL ($21,256 for a single woman without children). States are less generous when it comes to parents: thirty-three states limit Medicaid eligibility to less than 100% of the FPL, with 17 of those states limiting eligibility to less than 50% of the FPL (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012, 2013).

The 2010 Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (ACA), often referred to as “Obamacare”, has the potential to significantly expand the role of the safety net in health care. The ACA calls for states to extend Medicaid eligibility to all

adults with incomes below 138% of the FPL, with the federal government covering 100% of the cost for new enrollees for the first few years and 90% after that. The new law also subsidizes the purchase of private insurance by low and moderate income workers (those between 100 and 400% of the FPL) and stipulates that beginning in 2014 all citizens purchase health insurance or pay a “shared responsibility payment” to the government. The constitutionality of this “individual mandate” was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court in the summer of 2012. The Supreme Court did not, however, uphold the ACA’s threat to cut Medicaid funding to states that refused to expand their programs. Thirteen states – all Republican led – have either already opted out of the Medicaid expansion or are leaning towards not participating. Of the thirty-one states that have voted to participate in the ACA expansion or are leaning towards participating or proposed alternative Medicaid expansions, twenty are led by Democrats and eleven by Republicans (Kaiser Family Foundation, 2012; Rand Health, 2013).

Another federal-state safety net program called Tempo- rary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF) provides a mix of cash assistance and social services to poor single-parent families; in most states, dual-parent families are eligible if one of the parents is disabled and unable to work (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Office of the Administration for Children & Families, Office of Family Assistance, n.d.). Not an entitlement program, TANF is funded annually at a fixed amount through a federal block grant to the states and assistance is means-tested, time-limited, and subject to strict eligibility rules. While the federal govern- ment sets minimum guidelines, states have broad discretion to determine eligibility and benefit levels as well as time limits andwork and other requirements. As a result, access and benefits vary considerably across the states. With regard to cash assistance, eligibility is especially restrictive with only very poor families qualifying for benefits. Some states use the FPL ($1544 per month for a single parent with two children) to establish initial eligibility but most states have much lower income cutoffs, with politically conservative and poorest states using the most restrictive eligibility standards. For example, Alabama’s income limit is $215 per month for a single mother and two children; Arkansas’s is $223, Louisiana’s, $240, and Mississippi’s, $368 (Kassabian, Whitesell, & Huber, 2012).

There are also a number of federal block grant programs which provide child care, housing assistance (rent subsidies and public housing) and energy assistance programs to low-income and poor households (Greenberg, Lombardi, & Schumacher, 2000; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office of Child Care, n.d.; U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office of Community Services, n.d.). While in most states TANF recipient families automatically receive Medicaid and food stamps, participation in these other benefit programs is not universal due to limited funding under the block grant structure. Only an estimated 17% of income-eligible families, for example, receive child care subsidies (Skinner, 2012).

The largest cash support program for the poor is the federal Earned Income Tax Credit (EITC) program. Enacted in 1975, the EITC is targeted to low-income and working poor families with children and intended to offset payroll taxes

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and increase their take-home pay. Twenty-four states sup- plement the federal EITC with their own EITC. State EITCs are set at a fixed percentage of the federal EITC ranging from 3.5% in Louisiana to 50% in Maryland. The federal EITC and some state EITCs are fully refundable, meaning when the credit exceeds the amount of taxes owed the worker receives the difference as a tax refund. In addition to the EITC, there are federal income tax credits for child and dependent care expenses; these are not means tested and are available to all workers who paid for care for a spouse, child, or other dependent (U.S. Internal Revenue Service, n.d.).

There is no federally supported cash assistance safety net program for poor chronically unemployed adults who are not disabled enough to qualify for Social Security disability benefits. Thirty states have General Assistance (GA) pro- grams which provide cash assistance to those not eligible for Social Security. Benefits under GA are, however, very low; in all but one of the 30 states offering GA, the maximum benefit is below half of the federal poverty line (currently $5745) and in many states the benefit is below one-quarter of the FPL. Over the past several decades most states have either eliminated GA programs or sharply reduced either benefit levels or eligibility or both (Schott & Cho, 2011).

Defined more broadly, the safety net also includes programs that seek to equalize opportunity and create lasting economic self-sufficiency. Using this broader definition, the U.S. safety net also includes programs like Head Start (U.S. Department of Health, Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office of Head Start, n.d.), a federal program that funds school-readiness and other child devel- opment services for preschool-aged children from poor and low-income families, and Pell Grants and subsidized tuition loan programs for low and middle-income college students (U.S. Department of Education, Office of Federal Student Aid, n.d.). The Workforce Investment Act of 1998 (which replaced the Job Training Partnership Act of 1982) is a joint federal- state program that provides job search assistance and limited education and skills training tounemployedandunder-employed persons, including TANF recipients. In addition to child care subsidies, the federal Child Care and Development Fund block grant also provides funding for states and communities to enhance child care quality through training of child care workers (U.S. Department of Health, Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office of Child Care, n.d.). Home-visiting services to improve health and development outcomes for children aged 0 to 5 were recently authorized by the federal government under the Affordable Care Act (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Health Resources and Services Administration, Maternal & Child Health, n.d.). None of these programs are universal entitlement programs; consequently, only a portion of those in need receive benefits.

Safety net politics in the United States

Despite this rather extensive number of programs, the United States has long been a reluctant welfare state. Preferring block grants with capped funding, private sector solutions and local governance, the U.S. safety net is a disaggregated patchwork of programs targeting different populations and missing altogether some of those in need. Intended only as a supplement to individual earnings and

private charity benefits are kept low and eligibility restricted. After a brief period of expansions during the 1960s, the safety net has since been under attack, with political opposition currently especially vehement (Abramovitz, 1988, 2006; Burt & Nightingale, 2010; Pew Research Center, 2012).

Opposition is coming from both political parties but it is particularly strong among Congressional and gubernatorial Republicans. Back in 1996, when bipartisan legislation replaced Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC), an entitlement program for poor single parents and their children, with the less generous time-limited block grant program (TANF), a number of Republicans on the House Ways and Means Committee responded to criticisms about the risk to poor children by arguing that the food stamps program (the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program, SNAP) would offset the loss of other supports and prevent any real harm (Greenstein, 2012a). Now though, Republicans refer to President Obama disparagingly as the “food stamp President”3 and propose to devolve the program down to the states as a block grant program and cut spending by $133.5 billion over the next ten years (Greenstein, 2012a; U.S. House of Representatives & Committee on the Budget, 2013).

Congressional Republicans have also recently introduced proposals to reduce federal funding for Medicaid by 34% before 2022 and by 50% before 2030 (Greenstein, 2012a). They also propose downsizing Social Security retirement benefits and Medicare by raising the age of eligibility, reducing benefit levels, or through partial or full privatization (Aaron, 2011; Edsall, 2013; U.S. House of Representatives & Committee on the Budget, 2013; Republican National Convention, 2012). Safety net programs are also being dismantled at the state level. For example, a number of states have cut benefits and restricted eligibility for Medicaid (Galewitz & Fleming, 2012; National Governors Association, 2012) and scaled back their EITC programs (Johnson & Williams, 2010; Skinner, 2012). State-based General Assis- tance programs, “the safety net of last resort” for childless adults, have also been weakened considerably in recent years (Schott & Cho, 2011: 1).

Citing cost concerns and recent increases in spending on safety net programs for the poor, critics argue that the U.S. is an overly dependent society. Yet nearly 90% of spending goes to people who are either too old or disabled to work or are members of working but poor households (Greenstein, 2012a, 2012b; Greenstein & Kogan, 2012; Sherman, Greenstein, & Ruffing, 2012). Moreover, recent spending spikes are largely the result of greater need caused by the global recession that began in 2007 and from which U.S. economy is still slowly recovering (Nichols & Zedlewski, 2011; Pavetti, Trisi, & Schott, 2011).

While recession-related expansions are temporary, those related to rising health care costs and the aging “baby boom” generation do present longer-term fiscal challenges (Aaron, 2011; Greenstein, 2012a; Greenstein & Kogan, 2012). Some analysts contend, however, that budget shortfalls have been strategically created through continued tax cuts on income and wealth that have disproportionately favored the wealthy in order to pave the way for deep cuts to the safety net (Huang & Frentz, 2012; Linden, 2012; Ruffing & Friedman, 2013; Stiglitz, 2012). Recent proposals to close future budget

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shortfalls facing Social Security and Medicare through privat- ization and means-testing rather than simpler and more effective FICA tax increases (Aaron, 2011; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2010), suggest that the real motivation is to reduce public support by turning them from universal programs to welfare programs serving only the non-affluent (Edsall, 2013).

Mirroring the declining support among politicians and policymakers, support for the safety net among the American public is also waning — declining from 69% in 2007 to 59% today (Pew Research Center, 2012). Americans are notori- ously wary about the proper role of government in society. This is aggravated by a tension “between Americans’ philosophical commitment to individual responsibility … and (an) acknowledgement that individuals can be the victims of forces beyond their control” (Stokes, 2013: 9) The 2012 Pew survey found that while 59% of “the public believed that it is the responsibility of the government to take care of people who cannot take care of themselves … (they also) overwhelmingly agreed that individuals, not society, are to blame for their personal failures” (Stokes, 2013: 7–8).

Ironically, support for the safety net is declining even as more Americans rely on its programs. In 2010 almost half of all Americans lived in families receiving government income- maintenance benefits, up from 38% in 1998 (Greenstein, 2012a). Moreover, support is falling despite growing in- equality and obvious structural causes for this increased dependence including an aging demographic, a modernizing and globalizing market that is increasingly competitive, and, more recently, a deep global recession with an exceptionally slow recovery (Stiglitz, 2012).

This ambivalence is in large part due to the stigma associated with reliance on public support (Davis & Hagen, 1996; Moffitt, 1983; Zedlewski, 2012b). Like politicians, many Americans also mistakenly believe that the bulk of safety net spending is for the poor and in particular, the able-bodied but nonworking poor (Burt & Nightingale, 2010). The misconception that most of those who rely on the safety net are not working persists despite the fact that the safety net in the U.S. has largely become a “work-based safety net” (Greenstein, 2012a; Sherman, 2009; Sherman et al., 2012), with eligibility linked towork requirements. Evenwhen looking only at means-tested programs for the poor, Greenstein (2012a, footnote 2) reports that that 83% of spending goes to the disabled or elderly, or to members of households where at least one adult worked at least 1000 h during the year.

Public opposition towards safety net programs also reflects concerns, albeit not empirically well supported (Moffitt, 1992), that the provision of support discourages marriage and is a major cause of the rise in single mother households in the U.S. (Murray, 1984, 2012). Public opposi- tion is further inflamed by racist stereotypes and misinfor- mation about poverty and welfare dependency among people of color (Abramovitz, 2006; Gilens, 1999; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001; Quadagno, 1994; Roberts, 1996; Sherman et al., 2012).

There is, however, strong support among the American public for universal entitlement programs like Social Security and Medicare. Surveys show that majorities of both Repub- licans (74%) and Democrats (88%) support raising taxes (Tucker, Reno, & Bethel, 2013) – especially on the wealthy

(Kaiser Family Foundation, 2013) – to protect these pro- grams. Support for these programs is strong because recipients are considered “deserving” since the benefits they receive when they retire are based on the contributions they made as workers through earmarked payroll taxes. It could be argued, however, that recipients of means-tested programs which are paid for out of general tax revenues also “paid into the system” through income taxes as well as sales, property and other taxes.

Women and the safety net

While the United States is especially reluctant about providing support for poor adults, women have generally had greater access to public assistance than men because of their greater likelihood of being a custodial parent and hence getting support through programs primarily designed to protect children. These benefits, however, are meager and the rules of participation are restrictive, prompted by concerns that support undermines family, marriage, and personal responsi- bility. In this section we trace the gendered evolution of the safety net by focusing on three key programs – Social Security retirement benefits, Unemployment Insurance, and Tempo- rary Assistance to Needy Families – and reflect on how they shaped and continue to shape the experiences and lives of women who rely on them.

Social Security

As a safety net program for older Americans, Social Security retirement benefits provide partial income replace- ment through monthly cash assistance once a person becomes eligible. The program was originally intended to supplement private retirement saving; however, because of lower lifetime earnings and greater longevity, Social Security benefits make up a more significant component of many women’s retirement income. For over 40% of women beneficiaries, Social Security is virtually their only source of income compared to 30% of men (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007). In the absence of the program, 48.3% of older women would be in poverty: with Social Security only 10.7% are poor (Van de Water & Sherman, 2012).

Eligibility for both Social Security retirement benefits and Medicare depends on both reaching a certain age – 65 or 67, depending on when you were born – and earning enough Social Security “credits” by working and paying Social Security FICA taxes. For those born in 1929 or later, 40 credits are needed to qualify. If a person stops working, they stop earning credits until they return to work. The credits are based on earnings: a worker receives one credit for each $1160 of earnings, up to the maximum of four credits per year (U.S. Social Security Administration, Retirement benefits, n.d.). Benefits are based on how much a person earned during their 35 highest-paid years. In general, the greater the amount earnedwhile working, the greater the benefit upon retirement, although there is some progressivity in the benefit formula determination (U.S. Social Security Administration, Retirement Benefit Amounts, n.d.).4

Premised on a male breadwinner/female homemaker model, the program provides the highest benefits (relative to FICA contributions) to one-earner couples and to couples

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with a primary earner. Spousal benefits also have differential distributional effects. Under current rules, a qualified worker’s spouse is eligible to receive a benefit equivalent to 50% of the earner spouse’s benefit, without ever having paid FICA taxes. If the spouse worked during his or her lifetime, they receive either their own benefit or their spouse’s benefit, whichever is greater. Divorced women may also receive these benefits as long as their marriages lasted at least 10 years. Survivor benefits are important to married and divorced women with low earnings or interrupted earnings histories, in particular those married to high-earning men. However, survivor benefits provide no protection for never-married women, same-sex married women or women married less than 10 years (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Favreault, 2005; Tamborini & Whitman, 2007).

Women in general disproportionately benefit from the program’s spousal benefits and its progressive benefit formula as well as its guaranteed lifetime payments since they earn on average less than men, live longer and are more likely to get married (Favreault, 2005; Cohen et al., 2001; Tamborini & Whitman, 2007). Nonetheless, the average annual Social Security income of a retired woman is $12,155 while men averaged $15,620 (Estes, O’Neill, & Hartmann, 2012). Black and Hispanic women work more than white women but at lower average wage rates and so their benefits are even lower. In addition, Black women do not benefit as much from Social Security’s redistributive aspects because they do not live as long and are less likely to receive spousal benefits. Even when they do receive spousal benefits, their husbands on average earned less than the husbands of white women (Cohen et al., 2001).

Because of projected future budget shortfalls, there are a number of proposals to reduce expenditures currently being debated by policy makers, including increasing the age of eligibility to 70 or more (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 2010; Estes et al., 2012). Most analysts assume that men, particularly those with lower levels of education, will be harmed more by this proposal because they tend to work in jobs requiring manual labor. However, women with low levels of education also often work in jobs difficult for older workers to perform, including nurses’ aides, personal care attendants, and housekeepers (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2012a).

Other proposals call for reducing benefit levels, either through across-the-board reductions in benefit formulas (currently 90%, 32%, and 15%, see endnote iv) or less generous annual cost-of-living increases. These proposals would also have larger negative impacts for women because their monthly benefits are on average lower and because Social Security makes up a larger proportion of their retirement income than it does men’s. Additionally, because women on average live longer than men, their accumulated lifetime benefits would also be disproportionately impacted by reductions in cost-of-living adjustments (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Estes et al., 2012).

Another proposal to reduce expenditures involves partial or full privatization of the program. This plan would require younger workers to divert some or all of their payroll taxes out of Social Security and into private retirement investment

plans. Again, women, and particularly women with children, women of color, and women with lower levels of education, would be disproportionately harmed by this proposal because their contributions to private funds would be smaller. In addition, because of their greater longevity, women are more likely to outlive private retirement funds (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Estes et al., 2012).

Unemployment insurance

Also established by the 1935 Social Security Act, the Unemployment Insurance (UI) program provides time-limited partial wage replacement to workers who become unemployed. It is funded by federal and state taxes levied on employers, with states providing monthly cash benefits according to broad federal guidelines. Like Social Security, UI is also based largely on the male breadwinner/female homemaker sexual division of labor. Hence, for reasons primarily related to their dispropor- tionate responsibility for family and care work, women are less likely to meet eligibility requirements (Stone & Chen, 2013).

Eligibility for UI is restricted to those who lose their job through “no fault of their own”. As Abramovitz (2009) points out, for women especially, some “voluntary quits” are not actually fully voluntary. Most states consider individuals who left jobs or were fired for reasons related to family or work– family conflict to have “voluntarily” quit. In the 1970s as a result of the women’s movement, some states made changes to UI eligibility rules which made themmore accommodating (Abramovitz, 1988; Lindner & Nicols, 2012). For example, Connecticut’s UI law specifically states that while there are very few non-job-related reasons for quitting under which a person might still be approved for UI benefits, exceptions may include “quitting to care for a spouse, child, or parent with an illness or a disability.” While this does not address quits involving typical family care, it does at least recognize that some job separations result fromwork-family conflict. On the other hand, Mississippi’s UI law specifically states that “Marital, filial, or domestic circumstances are not considered good cause for leaving employment.” (U.S. Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration, 2012).

As well as job separation eligibility, applicants must also meet monetary eligibility requirements based on earnings and employment minimums during the base period (usually the first 4 out of 5 quarters prior to becoming unemployed).5

The majority of states require that applicants have worked sometime during at least 2 quarters during the base period: most states also require total earnings minimums. Women with children, women of color, and women with less education are more likely to be working part-time or intermittently and are therefore less likely than men to meet these eligibility requirements (Gould-Werth & Shaefer, 2012; O’Leary & Kline, 2008; Stone & Chen, 2013). In addition to job separation and earnings requirements for initial eligibility, for continued eligibility almost all states require recipients to be actively seeking full-time work and to regularly report on their job search efforts as well as any job offers refused. While some states permit recipients to continue to receive (reduced) benefits if they are working part-time, they are still required to be actively seeking a full-time job or a second part-time job (Stone & Chen, 2013; U.S. Department of Labor, Employment & Training Administration, 2012).

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Recent changes to federal Unemployment Insurance law have attempted to address some of these issues. The Unemployment Modernization Act, part of the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009, provided financial incentives to states to encourage them to “modernize” their UI systems (Abramovitz, 2009; Boushey, 2011; National Employment Law Project, 2012). Specifically, the Act pro- vides money to states who change their rules to provide benefits to persons who leave their jobs for “compelling” work-family reasons, such as to care for ill or disabled family members or to relocate with a spouse whose jobs has moved. The law also provides incentives to encourage more states to reduce the wage eligibility requirement barriers facing part-time workers and to maintain UI eligibility for persons who are seeking part-time work, changes especially benefi- cial to women with children who want or need to work part-time. According to a 2012 report by the National Employment Law Project, 33 states accessed the full amount of federal money available to modernize their UI programs, 6 states accessed partial funding, and 12 states have not made the changes required to access these incentive funds.

Other aspects of the UI program also have implications for women. Monthly benefits are usually about 50% of wages (based on earnings during the base period) up to a maximum amount, although some states are more generous and replace as much as two-thirds of previous earnings. Because women, and especially mothers, tend to earn considerably less, the 50% replacement rate is unlikely to provide sufficient support. On the other hand, some states provide additional benefits based on the number of dependents (called depen- dent allowances). Because women are more likely to be custodial parents, these family allowances are important, although states that do not provide additional benefits for dependents tend to also be less generous overall. For example, the most generous state is Massachusetts with a maximum weekly benefit of $653, without dependents, and $979 with dependents. The least generous is Mississippi with a maximumweekly benefit of $235, regardless of dependents (Stone & Chen, 2013).

Importantly, the duration of UI eligibility – 26 weeks in most states, with limited extensions made available through the federal government during periods of high employment – can also pose a hardship for women. Women in general, but again, especially women with children and women of color, face greater labor market discrimination than do men and thus may need a longer period of support while they seek reemployment. For women with children, it may take even longer to find suitable reemployment due to both the difficulty of balancing family and job search efforts and finding a “family-friendly” job (Boushey, 2011; Blau et al., 2009).

Aid to parents and children

Government aid to families with children began earlier than the Social Security Act with “mothers pensions” established during the early 1900s, after women reformers successfully lobbied for aid for “deserving” poor single mothers: widows, and more reluctantly, abandoned wives. Never married, divorced or separated women were generally not eligible. These reformers, mostly white and middle-class,

designed a program which reflected their privilege. Based on the prevailing sexual division of labor among their class, support was intended to keep the mothers out of the workforce and in the home caring for their children. The premise that men were the sole breadwinners devalued women’s work (outside the home) and ignored the realities of working class women and women of color for whom employment was a necessity, single or married (Abramovitz, 2006; Gordon, 1994; Katz, 1989; Mink, 1994; Roberts, 1996; Skocpol, 1992).

Reformers based their advocacy in part on the contention that poor mothers should be compensated for their valuable service to society as mothers and caregivers. But from the beginning, reservations about the value of poor women’s mothering and homemaking, as well as concerns that such aid discouraged marriage, influenced the design and delivery of the programs. Benefits were kept low and recipients were subjected to often elitist instruction about “proper” parenting and “appropriate” feminine behavior. Reflecting the program’s racist roots, and not just gendered and classist roots, immigrant women were subjected to even more moral scrutiny by reformers and social workers, and Black mothers, for the most part, were not even eligible (Gordon, 1994; Katz, 1989; Mink, 1994; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001; Roberts, 1996; Skocpol, 1992).

Mothers’ pension programs were eventually replaced by the federal program Aid to Dependent Children (ADC), an entitlement program for poor single parents established by Title IV of the federal Social Security Act of 1935; however, the reluctance to help persisted. As reflected in its name, ADC was primarily intended to protect poor children and only grudg- ingly provided for their mothers. States, local authorities, and social workers were permitted to set their own eligibility requirements including the exclusion of “undeserving” families from receiving aid. Recipients were often required to meet “stable home” tests which typically meant evaluating recipi- ents’ parenting styles as well as their sexual and relationship behaviors (Gordon, 1994; Mink, 1994; Roberts, 1996; Skocpol, 1992). By 1939, a separate program to aid widowswas created and ADC became the program for “undeserving” unmarried or separated mothers (Blank & Blum, 1997).

As the caseload shifted from widows to mostly divorced and never-married mothers, concern that the program undermined marriage and encouraged nonmarital child bearing began to grow (Gordon, 1994; Murray, 1984). As early as the 1950s, at least 19 states instituted family caps denying additional benefits for children born to unwed mothers (Blank & Blum, 1997). In the early 1960s the name was changed from ADC to AFDC, Aid to Families with Dependent Children and eligibility was expanded to provide support for children in two-parent families where the primary earner was unemployed (AFDC-UP). These changes occurred not out of increased concern and generosity towards these poor families, but out of concern that the program discouraged marriage (Gordon, 1994; Winkler, 1995).

In the context of the Civil Rights and women’s move- ments, policymakers were pressured to strengthen programs serving the poor (Mink, 1994; Roberts, 1996). Consequently, during the 1960s and early 1970s AFDC benefits were expanded and federal authority over eligibility was increased to ensure more equitable access to support. During this time,

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market wages began to stagnate and the expanded AFDC benefits – now bundled with Medicaid and food stamps – became relatively more attractive to entry-level, low-wage jobs (Moffitt, 1992). But, as caseloads grew and the proportion of Black families increased, a public and political backlash developed, threatening a program that had only had tepid support to begin with (Abramovitz, 2006; Blank & Blum, 1997; Gordon, 1994; Roberts, 1996; Quadagno, 1994).

Increasing labor force participation among women in general, and especially among mothers, began about the same time to alter public perceptions about women’s work, eventually leading to eligibility restrictions and increased work requirements (Abramovitz, 2006; Blank & Blum, 1997; Gordon, 1994). In the 1960s, women on AFDC were only required to work if their youngest child was 16 or older. By 1979, women with children 6 or older were required to work, and, in 1988, work requirements were extended to women with children 3 or older (Blank & Blum, 1997; Waldfogel, 2007). As Roberts (1996) and others point out, work requirements were not instituted because policy reformers had suddenly discovered the value of women’s work outside the home, but because of the perception that welfare recipients were work avoidant. The home and family work of poor women – especially never-married mothers – had never been seen as valuable. Black women, especially, were seen as less fit mothers. Requiring more work from them was not seen as particularly harmful to their children or families (Abramovitz, 2006; Mink, 1994; Neubeck & Cazenave, 2001; Roberts, 1996; Quadagno, 1994).

In reality, because benefits were so low, most recipients combined welfare and work to support themselves and their children, working intermittently between welfare spells, or part-time while receiving welfare (Edin & Lein, 1997; Moffitt, 1992; Zedlewski, 2012b). Nonetheless, the perception that welfare recipients were work avoidant persisted as did concerns that the program was responsible for rising numbers of female-headed households, and in 1996, Congress passed sweeping changes with the enactment of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act (PRWORA). With PRWORA, the shift from supporting poor mothers and their children to increasing work and ending welfare dependence was firmly established (Abramovitz, 2006; Zedlewski, 2012a, 2012b).

PRWORA eliminated the automatic entitlement of support for poor single parents by replacing AFDC with Temporary Assistance to Needy Families (TANF). The legislation also returnedmuch of the authority over benefits and eligibility to the states. In response, some states restricted eligibility and cut benefits in addition to imposing stricter and expanded work requirements, family caps, sanctions and other diver- sionary tactics. And while the federal government created maximum lifetime limit of 60 months, some states imposed shorter time limits while others have extended eligibility beyond 60 months for certain families (Haskins & Blank, 2001; Kassabian et al., 2012; Loprest, 2012; Zedlewski, 2012a, 2012b). As Neubeck and Cazenave (2001, 2002) note, political support to enact PRWORA relied heavily on misin- formation about welfare use amongminority families and the persistent characterization of African-American recipients in particular as “welfare queens” who were work avoidant and sexually immoral.

As a result of these policy changes as well as an increased stigmatization brought about by the politics surrounding PRWORA, caseloads declined dramatically (Spalter-Roth & Hartmann, 1994; Zedlewski, 2012a). The percentage of those eligible who receive assistance dropped from 86% in 1992 to 36% by 2007 (Loprest, 2012). And while earlier attempts at welfare-to-work programming during the 1970s and 1980s had been hampered by slack labor markets, PRWORA was implemented during a period of strong labor demand (Haskins & Blank, 2001; Moffitt, 1992; Ziliack, 2009). Overall, research studies reveal that the1996 policy changes did increase labor force participation among poor single mothers but that strong labor demand (Zedlewski, 2012b; Ziliack, 2009) and simultaneous expansion of the EITC (Grogger, 2003; Meyer & Rosenbaum, 2001) had even larger effects.

Welfare reform did not, however, effectively address deeper problems facing many TANF recipients including low education levels and the difficulty balancing work and family. Low wages and the high cost of childcare, transportation, and health insurance continue to undermine efforts to create lasting independence from welfare and economic security. Evaluations show that despite the 1996 policy changes, time spent on TANF remains about the same today as it was under AFDC, with most families leaving within 2 years and the majority leaving by the time their youngest child reaches school age; single parents with low levels of education and poor wage prospects continue to use TANF intermittently as part of their work–family strategy (Frogner, Moffitt, & Ribar, 2009; Loprest, 2003; Zedlewski, 2012b).

From the beginning, welfare-to-work efforts never fully supported recipients in work or enabled them to balance work and family, but under TANF things got worse. Currently, only two states exempt single parents with a child less than two years old from work requirements. Thirty-eight states exempt single parents with a child 12 months or younger, 14 states exempt those with a child under six months, and 10 states provide no exemptions at all (Kassabian et al., 2012). Despite significantly increasing work requirements,6 funding for child care assistance continues to be insufficient (Boushey, 2011; Zedlewski, Chaudry, & Simms, 2008). Moreover, recipients are less likely than under AFDC to be provided education and job skill development opportunities (Zedlewski, 2012a). As a result, many continue to experience unstable employment cycling back and forth between work and welfare, or they end up in “dead-end” low-wage jobs trading welfare dependent poverty for working poverty (Morris, 2002; Pavetti, Finch, & Schott, 2013; Zedlewski, 2012a, 2012b).

Andwhile welfare-to-work has become the focus, marriage as a viable route off welfare has not been completely given up on with many states offering marriage and relationship services funded through federal grants. The Claims Resolution Act of 2010 (CRA) authorized $150 million for marriage promotion activities (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Administration for Children & Families, Office of Family Assistance, n.d.). Most of themarriage services provided are instructional and motivational and therefore do little to address the fact that for most recipients, marriage is not going to lead to economic security, since the men in these women’s lives also face low wages and higher rates of unemployment (Abramovitz, 2006; Edin, 2000; Fineman, Mink, & Smith, 2003; Graefe & Lichter, 2008; Jones-DeWeever, 2002).

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Reminiscent of earlier mother’s pension programs, under TANF some states also impose behavioral requirements and sanctions related to sexual behavior and parenting. PRWORA authorized $50 million annually in grants to states for abstinence-only education. To obtain funding, states were required to adhere to specific conceptualizations of “abstinence education” established by Congress. For exam- ple, the law required that programs teach that “sexual activity outside the context of marriage is likely to have harmful psychological and physical effects”. Although most states target adolescent mothers (Boonstra, 2000), the law specified that abstinence-only programmingwas to be directed at “those groups which are most likely to bear children out-of-wedlock.”7 As Neubeck and Cazenave (2002) persua- sively argue, the real intent was to target African-American recipients, as evidenced by the frequent reference to unwed birth rates among black women in legislative discussions.

In thirty-three states, continued eligibility for TANF is also based on children’s school outcomes including attendance, minimum grade point averages, and/or requirements that parents be involved in their children’s education (Kassabian et al., 2012). In Tennessee, committees in both the Senate and House recently approved a bill that would cut cash benefits to parents whose children are not promoted to the next grade level in school (Lower-Basch, 2013). And, based on the assumption that poor women intentionally get pregnant to increase their welfare benefit level, seventeen states also impose family caps (Kassabian et al., 2012), even though the majority of evaluations find that the policy has had little, if any, impact on poor women’s reproductive outcomes (Dyer & Fairlie, 2003; Grogger & Bronars, 2001; Romero & Agenor, 2009).

Women at risk

Reflecting an abiding faith in self-sufficiency and the ability of the market to provide plenty of full-time jobs paying family-level wages, much of the U.S. safety net continues to be based on a romanticized devotion to “traditional” work and family norms. The breadwinner/ homemaker model – never an option for many women – is relevant to even fewer women today (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007). Yet, as we describe above, it continues to be etched in safety net program eligibility rules and benefit formulas. As a result, the safety net has never fully recognized the role of women’s work in the labor force or valued women’s work in the home. And while this all impacts women of color and working class and poor women most, it has repercussions for all women, limiting their choices and control over their lives and their ability to achieve economic security.

While gender-neutral on the face, both Social Security and Unemployment Insurance are based on the presumption of the “ideal worker” (Williams, 2000), a model of employment typified by full-time, year-round hours and upward lifetime earnings trajectories. The ideal worker is a person unencum- bered by family responsibilities, able to devote all of their time and energies to their job. Because they continue to be disproportionately responsible for child and elder care, women are less likely to fulfill this ideal (Bianchi, Folbre, & Wolf, 2012). Subsequently, they earn on average less than men, both in terms of hourly rates and salaries and over the

course of their lifetime (Blau et al., 2009). Even among women who are able to perform as “ideal” workers, gender-based discrimination persists (Carter & Silva, 2010, 2011). As a result, not only are they unable to accumulate the same level of private savings as men, since Social Security and UI benefits formulas are based on previous earnings, women are doubly impacted. As described above, there is some compensation for care work in the Social Security program through spouse and survivor benefits but these benefits are available only for women who were heterosex- ually married (for at least 10 years) and at adequate levels only for women who were married to high-earning men (American Academy of Actuaries, 2007; Estes et al., 2012).

Even programs explicitly intended to support mothers never fulfilled their original promise and today provide even less security. Despite the 1996 “reforms” that turned TANF into a “work first” program, it does not do enough to help recipients to be successful in the labor market or become economically secure. Like its precursor programs, TANF is in many ways designed to be a minimally supportive stopgap until recipients get married or remarried. The unwillingness to concede that marriage as a social norm is declining (Stevenson & Wolfers, 2007) or that for many women it is not a viable route out of poverty has been particularly harmful to working class and poor women and women of color (Graefe & Lichter, 2008; Jones-DeWeever, 2002).

Moreover, the continued promotion of marriage in the TANF program not only negates the idea of women’s independence, it uses scarce resources that could otherwise be put towards improving the labor market success of poor women (and men) — an approach empirically demonstrated to be more effective in creating stable families (Edin, 2000; Fineman et al., 2003; Graefe & Lichter, 2008). And family caps and services that promote abstinence outside of marriage, call into question the right of poor and single women to bear children and – in the broader context of ongoing cuts in funding for family planning services – undermine their ability to avoid unintended pregnancy in the first place (Jencks, 2001; Sonfield et al., 2013).

The role of TANF as a safety net program continues to shrink even as economic conditions worsen. According to analyses by the Center for Budget and Policy Priorities (Pavetti et al., 2013; Schott & Finch, 2010; Trisi & Pavetti, 2012), cash assistance to TANF families is now at least 20% below its 1996 purchasing power levels in 34 states. Benefit levels fall below the federal poverty level in all 50 states; and in the majority of states, benefits are less than 70% of the FPL. What’s more, despite the fact that the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 2009 provided funding to states to expand TANF (as well as food stamps and UI) during the economic downturn, TANF is so politically unpopular that few states accessed these funds and caseloads grew very little (Nichols & Zedlewski, 2011; Pavetti et al., 2011). Devolution of authority for TANF down to the state and local levels, combined with the shift from cash assistance to in-kind benefits and services, has also increased the discretion of local officials and case managers to decide who deserves assistance and how it will be delivered. This in turn has led to wide variation in access to support among women, with conservative states and poor communities providing more meager benefits and imposing stricter rules regarding behavior,

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especially for women of color who are raising children on their own (Allard, 2008, 2009).

Conclusion: recommendations for reform

Reflecting growing concern about the rising rate of working poverty and increasing inequality (Skinner, 2012; Stone, Trisi, & Sherman, 2012), there have been a number of recent books and papers by U.S. safety net scholars outlining reforms, many of which focus specifically on improving the safety net for women (Abramovitz, 2009; Acs & Nichols, 2005; Allard, 2008; Boushey, 2011; Chaudry, Pedroza, & Sandstrom, 2012; Hartmann, Hegewisch, & Lovell, 2007; Harrington & Herd, 2007; Skinner, 2012; Waldfogel, 2007; Zedlewski et al., 2008). Their recommendations can be summarized under three broad objectives: changing eligibil- ity and benefit formulas to achieve gender equity; addressing work–family conflict; and reducing poverty and vulnerability among single parent and low-income families by “making work pay”. While some of the recommendations have the potential to reduce future costs by equalizing opportunity and improving employment and earnings, the increased short-term costs cannot be ignored. Politically feasible expan- sions to the safety net will undoubtedly require funding arrangements that keep costs low, target poor families, and spread costs broadly (Zedlewski et al., 2008).

Specific policy proposals include federal legislation re- quiring all states to extend eligibility for UI to parents who leave jobs for reasons related to work–family conflict and permit part-time employment for ongoing eligibility. Ex- tending the duration of UI eligibility for single parents struggling to find “family friendly” employment would also improve the UI program for women. Recommendations also include changing Social Security benefit calculations to give credit for time spent in care work (based on a percentage of median monthly wages of workers) or reducing the benefit calculation formula (currently based on the last 35 years) for every year spent caregiving and working part-time or not at all (Abramovitz, 2009; Boushey, 2011; Favreault, 2005; Harrington & Herd, 2007; Hartmann et al., 2007).

Some scholars focus their recommendations on supple- menting the wages of poor and low-income parents by, for example, expanding the EITC and Medicaid and increasing subsidies for transportation and child care assistance (Acs & Nichols, 2005; Zedlewski et al., 2008). Proposals to expand access to affordable and reliable child care include replacing the current scheme of child and elder care tax credits that favor higher income families with higher subsidies for care for poor families or establishing universal care programs. Citing the high cost of child care, others recommend instead policies to enable parents, especially single parents and those with very young children, to work part-time or not at all. Specific proposals include changing TANFwork requirements to include care work and expanding eligibility for Medicaid and increasing the size of the EITC to make non-work or part-time work affordable (Hartmann et al., 2007; Waldfogel, 2007).

Other safety net scholars focus their proposals on increasing the earnings potential of poor single mothers, for example, by encouraging states to permit TANF recipients to engage in education and job training programs as part of their work requirements and provide them with tuition and

child care subsidies while they attend school or job training (Polakow, Butler, Deprez, & Kahn, 2004). While expensive, programs like these have the potential to reduce future costs by improving employment prospects and earnings.

And while not safety net policy per se, a number of scholars call for updating the workplace in order to achieve gender equality as well as to reduce economic vulnerability among women and families. Like the safety net, the work- place continues to be designed around the outdated breadwinner-homemaker model with unrealistic expecta- tions of the ideal worker on the part of employers. Recom- mendations include expanding access to paid family leave, protecting parents and other caregivers from employment discrimination, and requiring employers to make reasonable family-friendly accommodations (Boushey, 2011; Chaudry et al., 2012; Hartmann et al., 2007; Williams & Bousehy, 2010; Waldfogel, 2007).

Because the federal Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) of 1993 requires only large employers (with 50 or more employees) to provide up to 12 weeks of unpaid leave to employees who have worked for them for at least one year, it does not adequately cover women who work part-time or intermittently for reasons related to family and care work. Moreover, low and moderate-income workers are unlikely to be able to afford to take unpaid leave even if they do qualify (Boushey, 2011; Chaudry et al., 2012; Waldfogel, 2007). Some states are already building on existing temporary disability insurance (TDI) programs to provide workers with paid family and caregiver leave. Under these laws, premiums are paid for by workers through payroll deduc- tions (collected by employers). Paid leave could also be implemented through the Social Security system, similar to the way Social Security retirement and disability benefits are, or the federal government could provide grants to states to help them set up family leave programs, similar to how UI is implemented (Boushey, 2011). These approaches spread the costs broadly and enable the establishment of progressive benefit formulas to target low- and moderate income workers.

Protecting women from employment discrimination based on current or future (real or expected) caregiver status, and requiring employers to make accommodations for workers with family care responsibilities, are also recom- mended (Boushey, 2011; Hartmann et al., 2007). As Boushey (2011) points out, the political and legal precedent and administrative framework for meeting these objectives have already been established at the federal level by previous legislation including the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938 (FLSA) which created a legal minimum wage and placed some limits on overtime; the Civil Rights Act of 1964 which prohibits employment discrimination based on sex, race, color, national origin, and religion, and was expanded in 1978 to include pregnant women; and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 which establishes a legal definition of “reasonable accommodations”. For example, she recom- mends that the FLSA be expanded to give workers the “right to request” schedule flexibility or predictability, or to refuse overtime hours without suffering negative employment repercussions. As Williams, Manvell, and Bornstein (2006) report, the majority of family responsi- bility discrimination cases are brought by nonprofessional

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working women. Policies to encourage employers to accommodate working parents will, therefore, be especial- ly helpful to low- and moderate-income working women. In addition to helping working women, workplace policies would shift some of the costs of doing so onto the private sector and spread the costs more broadly. Employer-based tax credits would help offset costs to employers and also reduce the risk that these requirements would make them less willing to hire caregivers.

Another approach that would improve the safety net for women and spread costs more broadly across the private and public sectors is to simultaneously raise the minimum wage and expand the EITC. This approach, recommended by the Center of Budget and Policy Priorities (Levitis & Johnson, 2006), would be more effective at addressing working poverty because raising the minimum wage, while ex- panding the EITC, magnifies the impact beyond what each policy does separately. Poor single mothers – among the poorest of the working poor – will especially benefit from this combined approach since they are often likely to be working in minimumwage jobs, and, as parents, have higher income limits under the EITC (U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2008, 2012b; Neumark & Wascher, 2011).

Given the increasingly conservative political climate and the fiscal difficulties facing both federal and state govern- ments, recommending expansions to the safety net seems almost futile. Yet, if America is going to truly embark on a work-based, supplemental safety net, it needs to actually support people in work and “make work pay”, as these scholars argue. A two-pronged approach – modernizing both the safety net and the workplace – more effectively and equitably creates a safety net that supports women. Restoring the role of the federal government, and creating more universal benefits not only enhances political support and stabilizes funding, it ensures more equitable access to benefits. Through a mix of private and social insurance plans, progres- sive taxes and credits, changes in employment law and employer-based tax credits, the cost of doing so can be spread equitably across the population and broadly across the private sector and federal and state governments.

Endnotes

1 The private sector also plays an independent role in providing assistance the needy, using funding from foundations and charities. In the interests of space, we focus on government safety net programs.

2 The FICA payroll tax is 6.2% capped at $113,700 for Social Security (with employers pay a matching 6.2%) and 1.45% capped at $200,000 ($250,000 for married couples filing jointly) after which it drops to 0.9% for Medicare.

3 See transcript of interview with Republican Newt Gingrich from NBC Meet the Press. Meet the Press Transcript for May 15, 2011. Retrieved from http://www.nbcnews.com/id/43022759/ns/meet_the_press-transcripts/ #.UXcAPUp3ddY.

4 A qualified retiree’s benefit is calculated by taking the earnings (adjusted for inflation) from their 35 highest-paid years and dividing by 420 (the number of months in 35 years) to get the average indexed monthly earnings (AIME). The AIME is then run through a 3-tiered benefit formula designed to replace a higher percentage of earnings for people at the lower end of earnings continuum. The averaged indexed monthly earnings is then run through a formula that calculates benefits equal to 90% of AIME up to a certain level of monthly income, 32% of AIME from that level to a higher point, and 15% of the remaining AIME (US Social Security Administration, Retirement Benefit Amounts).

5 The quarter directly before becoming unemployed is not included. This prevents people from working more hours to push up earnings, right before seeking UI.

6 Most states require even single parents of young children to participate in at least 20 h of work or work-related activities (job preparation, job search, community work experience) per week. Single parents of older children are required to participate in 30 to 40 h; and two parent families are required to participate in 30 to 40 h, combined or individually (see Kassabian et al., 2012).

7 The text of PRWORA is available at http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/ query/z?c104:H.R.3734.ENR:

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The faltering safety net in a reluctant nation: Women’s economic security at risk in America
Introduction
The safety net in the United States
Safety net politics in the United States
Women and the safety net
Social Security
Unemployment insurance
Aid to parents and children
Women at risk
Conclusion: recommendations for reform
References

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